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What’s Learning Worth?: On The U.S. Higher Ed “Earnings Test”

You borrow $40,000 to buy a product advertised to help your career. You hope your salary increases. It doesn’t. Instead, you’re gifted years upon years of loan repayment. This is the false bill of goods the U.S. Department of Education (ED) suggests masses of American college students have been sold.

So, on July 1st, ED enacted its Student Tuition and Transparency System (STATS) and Earnings Accountability final rule for postsecondary degree programs. To pass this “earnings test,” a degree-issuing program must demonstrate its students earn more than non-degree-holding peers in two out of three award years. This is calculated by comparing median earnings of degree-holders four years post-graduation with that of non-degree-holding “working adults aged 25-34.” For example, if Bryn has a master’s degree, Taylor a bachelor’s degree, and Avery a high school diploma, then Bryn’s financial return ought to be higher than Taylor’s, and Taylor’s higher than Avery’s.

Passing the earnings test ensures a program’s students remain eligible for direct federal loans. Failing “consistently” for three years, however, enables the Department to flag a program as a “low-earning outcome” and terminate its Title IV eligibility. Citing the nation’s $1.83 trillion in outstanding student loans, Secretary of Education Nicholas Kent rationalizes, “If a program cannot show that it leaves its graduates financially better off than if they had never enrolled, it should not be underwritten by federal taxpayers.”

The goal seems straightforward: protect students’ finances, and hold institutions accountable. However, until now, legislation didn’t use earnings potential as a sole determinant for which kind of learning was most worth supporting. In doing so, this policy leaves Americans with an unprecedented verdict: access to education is justified by the government’s assessment of its financial promise.

In several fields, however, monetary reward has never been an honest metric of industry value. Per the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, pre-school and kindergarten teachers’ median earnings fall at $840 per week, with those of social workers and mental health professionals between $1,120 and $1,426. All require a four-year degree, even a master’s. By contrast, the myriad bachelor’s-only professions within computer & mathematics ($2,015) or architecture & engineering ($1,930) average at least a salary-and-a-half more than a substance abuse counselor ($1,120) with an advanced degree.

Even if the counseling program’s graduates earn more than their average masterless peers, the earnings test nonetheless reframes the value of the credential. That is, despite their “essential” status, the low earnings potential for careers like teaching and counseling can be used to further relegate them as labor not worth doing. When programs live or die by the heft of their graduates’ paychecks, then the dignity in pursuing the fields they represent is questioned.

This revaluation is a well-trod path beyond the U.S. Just last month, the BBC reported the University of Exeter’s proposal to reduce 150 full-time roles. “These cuts represent an existential threat to humanities and social science disciplines at Exeter,” states the Exeter’s University and College Union, petitioning against the reduction with over 35,681 signatures.

Perhaps you didn’t like art, history, or English and managed to employ yourself without use of the rule of thirds or semicolons. Nevertheless, beyond paychecks or even passion, there exists value in both your own (higher) education and amongst those with access to it, too. Those who live, work, and think alongside you are people whose judgment, actions, and preferences (whether you agree with them or not) will impact your own lived experience.

At least sixty years ago, American legislation identified academic enrichment as a self-justifying aim. In section 401, the 1965 Higher Education Act (HEA) states its purpose “to assist in making available the benefits of higher education to qualified high school graduates of exceptional financial need.” Though education’s “benefits” go undefined, this does not mean there weren’t any in mind; mid-century social and economic concerns, such as combating discrimination and poverty, remain wrapped up in today’s language of equal opportunity and education.

The 2024 Financial Value Transparency (FVT) and Gainful Employment (GE) regulations further corroborate these intrinsic value claims. Despite the FVT/GE’s purpose as financial accountability measures — the ones to be replaced by the earnings test, in fact — they introduce themselves with acknowledgement of postsecondary schooling’s “myriad non-financial benefits,” enumerating the following:

“Increasing the number of individuals with postsecondary education creates social benefits, including productivity spillovers from a better educated and more flexible workforce, increased civic participation, improvements in health and well-being for the next generation, and innumerable intangible benefits that elude quantification.” 

As back-to-school approaches, turn your heart to the innumerable, intangible, and unquantifiable, to the departments, professors, and peers you hold dear. How do you memorialize your own learning? By what metric do you measure the value of your coursework? Who should get to decide what that education was worth?

The first earnings test will be calculated in early 2027; the Department of Education is all too willing to answer for us.

The Man, the Bin, and the Ballot Box

I think it’s safe to say that politics has, in recent years, become a bit of a sideshow. It feels like the days of the statesman, with their clear vision for their country and their ability to rally, if not inspire, the populace are now a thing of the past. Think of Churchill’s 1940 “We Shall Fight Them on the Beaches” speech, Martin Luther King Jr’s “I Have a Dream” speech of 1963, or John F. Kennedy’s 1962 “We Choose to Go to the Moon” speech. These, and so many more, will live through the annals of time not simply because of what they were about, but also who delivered them.

More recently, however, we are faced with a rather different form of political actor and world leader. In 2005, we had former French president Jacques Chirac saying you can’t trust people, namely the British and the Finns, because their culinary skills are too poor. Argentina’s current president, Javier Milei, often portrays a less-than-reserved demeanor in his role as the country’s leader, most notably in 2025 when he shared a stage with Elon Musk as the latter wielded a chainsaw. And, of course, who could forget the countless gaffes, insults, rants, and temper tantrums of the current US president. Indeed, I struggled to pick just a single illustration of Trump’s lack of statecraft, so I decided to go with a recent one in which he rambles about the Islamic Republic of Japan (spoiler alert: Japan is not an Islamic Republic).

These examples, along with countless others, help illustrate a point which has been made several times in articles and think pieces in the Medium, Compact, National Affairs, and (ironically) the New Statesman, one which I think many of us are feeling. That the days of the great, wise leader may be behind us.

Yet, as the expression goes, the night is darkest before the dawn, and in the past few years, a political upstart has emerged on the scene of UK politics. And while they have not yet had a huge amount, or any, success in the UK parliament, recent developments have meant that now could be their time. Indeed, it seems that much of the country has rallied behind this charismatic politician and their radical agenda. What makes this noteworthy, and why I wanted to write about it here, is that this revolutionary hope is a man with a bin on his head.

His name is Count Binface. Since emerging onto the UK political scene in 2018, he has become an idiosyncratic, yet nearly omnipresent, figure in major elections. He first gained widespread attention by standing in the 2019 UK general election, where he challenged then Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Since then, he has run against a succession of high-profile politicians, including London Mayor Sadiq Khan (twice), former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, and presumptive incoming Prime Minister Andy Burnham in June of this year.

It is his latest exploit, however, that has garnered attention, as there is the distinct possibility that the self-styled Leader of the Recyclons from the planet Sigma IX – who is, just to reiterate, a man with a bin on his head – could end up in the House of Commons.

For context, and to draw a slightly long story short, there is a constituency in the UK called Clacton. In 2024, the leader of the right-wing populist and far-right political party Reform UK, Nigel Farage, was elected as that constituency’s MP. In recent months, there have been increased calls for an investigation into Farage’s financial affairs as it has been alleged that he failed to disclose income and gifts he received in the 12 months preceding his election; a requirement under the Rules relating to the Conduct of Members. Such an investigation was launched in May 2026 and was anticipated to conclude that Farage had breached the rules. This would likely result in a by-election for Clacton where Farage would once again have to campaign to keep his seat. Farage, however, was seemingly unhappy to wait for this to happen to him, and on July 7th, he announced he would stand down as an MP, thereby forcing a by-election, in which he would stand. Farage’s rationale was that he would let the people of Clacton decide his fate rather than be judged by anyone else. However, all the other major political parties have refused to field a candidate. So, for a moment, it looked like Farage would run unopposed. That is, until Count Binface announced that he would stand. Thus, while nominations are still open and others could put themselves forward for the election (indeed, a couple of persons whom we needn’t concern ourselves with have), the election is a two-horse race. On the one side, one of the country’s most charismatic and inexplicably popular political figures, a man who played a central, if not the central, role in driving the UK out of the European Union, and who some tout as in the running to become the next Prime Minister of the UK. And on the other side, once again, a man with a bin on his head.

Since the announcement that he will run, Count Binface has been doing the media rounds. This has been normal for years as a minor appearance of the novelty candidate. However, this time around, things have taken a weirdly serious tone, with Count Binface making appearances on the leading political and news channels and shows. Now, he’s not a quick throwaway gag that a reporter quickly talks to while they await a more serious candidate from the majority party or the opposition to become free. He’s on the Today program on Radio 4. He’s on Newsnight on the BBC. He’s on LBC talking to Andrew Marr. There was a 35-minute segment on Channel 4 News about him and the by-election. He’s on the front page of practically every newspaper in the country. This by-election has catapulted a novelty candidate into the political limelight. What’s more, Farage framed this by-election as a decision for the people of Clacton as a choice between himself and the establishment. However, as none of the major political parties are standing a candidate, that framing means that Farage’s main rival, the face of the establishment, is, once again, a man with a bin on his head.

Now, all this is extremely funny. In case you’ve forgotten, the UK is a nation that, when asked to pick a name for a polar research vessel in 2016, picked, by a huge margin, Boaty McBoatface (the popular choice was ignored, and the vessel was actually named the Sir David Attenborough). We Brits are famed for our dry and irreverent sense of comedy, and we are happy to take that to the extreme, be it in the naming of a multi-million pound ship or the very real possibility of voting into the highest echelons of the UK political system a man whose manifesto pledges have historically and currently included:

–Renaming London Bridge to Phoebe Waller-Bridge after the actress, screenwriter, and producer.

–Banning loud snacks from theaters.

–Banning the use of the speakerphone function on mobile phones in public. (Offenders will be forced to watch the film version of Cats every day for a year.)

–Moving the hand dryer in the men’s toilet at Uxbridge’s Crown and Treaty pub to a “more sensible position.”

–Nationalizing the singer, Adele.

–Reversing Brexit by inviting EU member states to join the United Kingdom.

It is, in all honesty, bizarre and terribly funny. And the seriousness of the possibility of his being elected to the parliament juxtaposed with the fact that (final time I promise) he is a man with a bin on his head, makes it even more funny. Yet, despite all this silliness, there is a serious political and philosophical point behind it all.

Count Binface is not the only candidate to mock the political establishment. There is a long tradition within the UK political electoral system of, for lack of a better word, odd peoples standing for office. The most well established is the various candidates put forward over the years by the Monster Raving Loony Party. In the recent Makerfield by-election, in which Count Binface stood against presumptive PM Andy Burnham, there was also a man dressed as a fox. Often, if there’s a serious point or process of politics being conducted, there will be a seriously unserious person there to subvert it. And that is itself an important feature of the political process.

The democratic process, for all its seriousness, has always required fools. We tend to think of politics as something that should be conducted with gravity. Parliament is filled with rituals and traditions stretching back centuries. Politicians speak from podiums covered with emblems. Campaign launches are meticulously choreographed. Leaders look to cultivate images of competence, authority, and statesmanship. The entire enterprise, both in the UK and beyond, rests upon the notion that those who seek power ought to be taken seriously.

Yet democracy depends just as much upon our willingness to refuse those that seek power that privilege.

In his 1971 book Rabelais and His World, Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin argued that societies require, occasionally, what he called the carnivalesque: moments in which the normal hierarchy of society is turned upside down. Using the example of the medieval carnival, Bakhtin notes that there were occasions when kings could be mocked, priests parodied, and fools elevated, if only temporarily, above those who ordinarily commanded obedience. These festivals were not attempts to overthrow the established order. Instead, they reminded everyone that power was ultimately human. The king, whom had rule overall, was still just a man.

It is this moment of subversion, where the world flips on its axis, that Count Binface currently embodies. His candidacy functions as a modern carnival, one played out not in a medieval town square but on television studios, radio programs and ballot papers. By standing alongside prime ministers, cabinet ministers and party leaders, he punctures the carefully cultivated aura that surrounds political office. He reminds us that no office is so exalted that it cannot accommodate a joke, and no politician so important that they cannot find themselves debating public policy with a self-proclaimed extraterrestrial from the planet Sigma IX.

This is not to say that Count Binface is making politics absurd. Far from it. He reveals the absurdity that was already there.

After all, modern politics increasingly resembles performance. Election campaigns are stage-managed spectacles. Politicians spend as much time crafting social media clips as they do policy. Success is measured not only in legislation passed but in viral moments, memorable one-liners, and dominance of the news cycle. Increasingly, politics rewards charisma over competence, spectacle over substance. It gives power to those who, rather than being a statesman, are those who can sell their brand of unaware unseriousness. Who think that calling your political rivals names like Sleepy Joe or dumbocrats is high art.

In that environment, Count Binface is less an interruption than an exaggeration. Like all good satire, he simply pushes reality one step further than reality has already pushed itself.

This perhaps explains why his current campaign feels so different from his previous ones. For years, novelty candidates occupied a familiar role in British elections. They provided a brief comic interlude during the results declaration before the cameras returned to the “real” candidates. This time, however, the cameras have stayed on him. He has become a serious participant in the national conversation, not because he has abandoned the joke, but because the joke has become an unexpectedly useful lens for examining British politics itself.

There is a delicious irony in the fact that Nigel Farage sought to frame the Clacton by-election as a contest between himself and the political establishment. By refusing to field candidates, the major parties inadvertently transformed that framing into something else entirely. The principal alternative to one of the most recognizable figures in British politics became a man who is campaigning for cyclists who break the highway code to be forced to ride unicycles instead. If Bakhtin’s carnival momentarily dissolves social hierarchy, then this is surely its democratic equivalent. The distinction between the political elite and the political outsider collapses, leaving voters to confront an unsettling question: how much of politics is performance, and how much is merely costume?

Bakhtin believed that carnival possessed a peculiar kind of truth. By laughing at authority, people were not rejecting society but renewing it. Laughter strips away the facade and reminds rulers that they remained accountable to those they governed. It prevents power from becoming untouchable. That is the role Count Binface performs today.

Whether he wins in Clacton is, in many respects, beside the point. His greatest achievement has already been realized. He has reminded us that democracy is healthiest when it retains the capacity to laugh at itself. As he himself said, when asked whether he has a chance to win: “err probably not. But then, you know, my job is to celebrate and defend the wonders of British democracy.”

If there is but one lesson to be drawn from Count Binface’s rise, it is that satire is not the opposite of politics; it is one of its oldest companions. Democracies need serious politicians willing to grapple with serious problems. But they also need their muppets. Those who are willing and able to expose vanity, puncture pomposity, and remind us that, beneath the titles, the motorcades and the campaign slogans, every politician remains exactly what they have always been: an ordinary human being who probably has just as much clue about what’s happening as the rest of us.

Sometimes, that reminder just so happens to be, for the final time, a man with a bin on his head.

Jake Monaghan: Just Policing

Policing sits at the center of some of our most heated debates about justice, power, and public safety. In the first episode of Season 11, Alex talks with philosopher Jake Monaghan (University of Southern California) about his new book Just Policing. Monaghan makes the case that policing, done right, is not just permissible but morally necessary, even as he confronts its very real capacity for harm and abuse. Drawing on his research into the political philosophy of cities and his hands-on work with police reform and reentry programs, he pushes back against calls to abolish or radically defund police, while still taking seriously the demand for accountability, restraint, and reform.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Jake Monaghan is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California, where his research focuses on the political philosophy of policing and cities. He earned his Ph.D. at the University at Buffalo and previously held positions at Chapman University’s Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy and the University of New Orleans. His work extends beyond academia: he has consulted for the Buffalo Police Department’s Foot Patrol Integration Unit and ran a reentry program at the Orleans Justice Center in New Orleans, where undergraduates taught digital literacy and job skills to soon-to-be-released inmates.

GET THE BOOK

Library Search →

Amazon →

ThriftBooks →

 

FOR FURTHER READING

Daniel Muñoz, “Just Policing, by Jake Monaghan,” Forthcoming in Ethics (PhilArchive)

Lauren Lyons, “Institutionalizing Just Policing: Culture, Discretion, and the Limits of Reform,” Criminal Justice Ethics

David Millar, “Do Police Intentions Matter?,” The Prindle Post

Why Debate?

In December of 2025, CBS and the Bank of America announced the “Things That Matter” series of town hall debates. According to editor-in-chief Bari Weiss,

We believe that the vast majority of Americans crave honest conversation and civil, passionate debate…In a moment in which people believe that truth is whatever they are served on their social media feed, we can think of nothing more important than insisting that the only way to get to the truth is by speaking to one another.

Debates are popular these days. The YouTube channel Jubilee, for example, claims to “Provoke human connection” by producing videos where one central figure debates numerous contrarians (often 20 or more), with recent video titles including: “Doctor Mike vs. 20 RFK Jr. Supporters,” “Andrew Callahan vs. 20 Conspiracy Theorists,” and “Piers Morgan vs. 20 Woke Liberals.” These videos receive millions of views, and the Jubilee channel itself boasts over 10 million subscribers.

Our current moment is often presented as one in which polarization is running amok. Think pieces and books abound on the need to bridge social divisions, and debating issues is often seen as the best way to reach across political aisles to address those issues rationally and productively. But despite their popularity and promise of healing divides, maybe what we need is a little less debate.

What do I mean by “debate”? While they can take different forms, debates are generally ways of engaging with issues where parties take opposing stances on a particular issue, present arguments for their view, and criticize and respond to the arguments of their opponents. In engaging in a debate, the ultimate goal is to “win”: in formal debates, a “winner” or “loser” may be declared, while in more informal debates, it is left up to an audience or the participants themselves to reach a verdict.

Issues can be debated in better or worse ways. A debate where people are screaming and insulting each other isn’t a good one; hence, we see “civility” commonly espoused as a characteristic of a quality debate. There is no shortage of additional advice about how to debate well: books on proper debating techniques like Win Every Argument: The Art of Debating, Persuading, and Public Speaking and Good Arguments: What the art of debating can teach us about listening better and disagreeing well emphasize rhetorical strategies alongside proper debate decorum, with the promise of helping their readers get the edge over their ideological rivals.

If we’re going to debate, then we should want to do it well. One of the main criticisms of Jubilee, for example, is not that it features debates, but that the debates it features are bad: participants arrive unprepared and talk over one another, many of the arguments are specious, and the overall vibe is more chaotic than civilized. However, we might think that something like the “Things That Matter” series, which promises well-informed speakers and civil engagement, would be the ideal way to address divisive political issues.

The lineup of the “Things That Matter” series, however, illustrates one of the major problems with how political and ideological issues are presented for debate, at least in the media: while debates are often presented as ways to critically evaluate views from a neutral position, choosing which issues to debate is itself a political act.

For example, one of the purported issues that “matter” in the CBS series concerns feminism, with the question “Has feminism failed women?” being up for debate. While it is certainly worthwhile to discuss feminism and its relation to American politics, the question is presented in a way that places two positions on equal footing: one that claims that feminism has failed women, and one that says it hasn’t. Using debate to address political issues thus presents them as being equally worthy of consideration, even when they’re not. There are plenty of examples of this kind of “bothsidesism” in the popular debate landscape, for example: flat earthers vs. scientists, doctors vs. antivaxxers, etc. The mere fact that there are people who disagree on some issues, then, does not mean that they ought to be presented as issues for debate.

Some commenters have also criticized the “Things that Matter” series in particular for the choice of debate topics. In addition to “Has feminism failed women?”, the series includes the questions “Does America need God?” and “Should gen Z believe in the American dream?” Again, these are certainly topics some Americans disagree about, and they may even be ones that have some well-formulated arguments on both sides. However, in the current moment, they are arguably far from the most pressing. Choosing an issue for debate, especially as part of a major national televised event, thus elevates it as being particularly important. Again, choosing which issues to debate becomes a political act.

These might be problems when it comes to big, televised events or social media channels with millions of followers, but surely, when it comes to our own personal disagreements, we should still encourage engagement with people we disagree with in a way that emphasizes civility and well-formulated arguments. What would it mean to say that we should be debating less with each other?

There are ways to engage with contentious issues that don’t involve debating them. Philosophers, arguably, do not debate; instead, they discuss different views. While the difference between debates and discussions might seem semantic, the philosopher’s discussion is motivated by pursuing the force of arguments and working collaboratively to find the best such arguments to gain a deeper understanding. While philosophical argumentation can also be done in better or worse ways, the virtuous philosophical argument is not motivated by a desire to defeat an opponent.

Indeed, that debates encourage adopting the mindset of wanting to emerge as a “winner” in turn encourages obstinacy in the face of evidence that one might be wrong. Sometimes, though, the most reasonable course of action in the face of arguments is to change your mind. That this would constitute “losing” a debate underscores both the artificiality of debates and how ill-suited the debate mindset is to engaging with complex political issues.

Debating isn’t all bad. As many books about debating point out, to debate well, you need to know how to do other important things, such as analyzing and formulating arguments. But the idea that the best approach to socially divisive issues is to debate them fails to acknowledge how debates can amplify political differences rather than bridge them.

When Your Vote Counts: Electoral Nihilism

Tuesday, November 4th, was an election day in the United States. Nevertheless, if you are eligible to vote in the U.S., you likely did not do so. Perhaps you did! Voter turnout was higher than usual. Further, there may be a significant selection effect among this audience such that you, someone interested in reading public philosophy, is more likely to be electorally engaged.

But statistically speaking, a majority of those who are eligible to vote in the U.S. don’t participate in each election, at least in recent decades. In presidential elections since 2004 between 50 and 66% of eligible voters cast a ballot, meaning that between one third and one half do not. Midterm elections typically see between 40% and 50% turnout during even-numbered years, with some years dipping into the 30’s – so most potential voters sit these out.

But turnout for local elections, especially those which occur in odd numbered “off-years,” is the most troublingly low. Data are hard to gather, given that these elections are (usually) not for federal offices and thus take place at the town, county, or state level. Regardless, the available data suggest that turnout for most local elections ranges from low to shockingly low; mayoral elections usually see about 20% turnout even in major cities, while other offices such as school board, town supervisors, or city council members may see turnout drop into single digits.

There are several reasons we might be troubled by this. I want to articulate at least three philosophical reasons for concern. First, there are epistemic issues. Going back to (at least) Aristotle, theorists have argued that what makes democracies special is that, by having many participate in the political process, we can access knowledge that may be inaccessible if only a minority participate. The idea here is that, through accessing the aggregate of everyone’s views, we are more likely to come upon the right view.

Exceptionally low turnout elections run counter to this proposed advantage of democracy. Instead, they appear to more closely resemble an aristocracy, rule by a small number of elites – only a select few participate in determining the outcome of these elections. Thus, if democracy is in part justified by its unique advantage in reaching the right answers, then we have reason to doubt the merits of elections where only a small minority participate as their verdicts are not a collective aggregate.

Second, one might worry about the legitimacy of any institutions whose officers are determined by only a small number of voters. Many contend that governments are only morally justified via the consent of the governed. It is this idea that gives democratic institutions their legitimacy; voting is the procedure by which we indicate our preferences and express consent for the outcome that emerges. However, when very few participate in the elections, we have serious reason to doubt the moral legitimacy of those selected. Only a small minority express a preference for them and thus the rest are giving, at best, tacit consent to grant power to those officials.

However, I think that closer examination of this issue – the role of elections in shaping governmental legitimacy – will reveal a larger issue to which low turnout elections give rise. It seems to me that low voter turnout will help to enable electoral nihilism. By this I mean the view that there is no good reason to participate in elections. The fewer people that participate in elections, the more likely it is that potential voters will become electorally nihilistic.

This may seem counter intuitive. I am claiming that not participating in elections, particularly local elections, may lead someone to believe that engaging in the electoral process is pointless. One would think that the order of operations would go in reverse – the view that it is pointless comes first, which then deflates the desire to participate.

But think carefully about the elections in which most voters do not participate, local elections. These are the elections which a) will have the most immediate, direct effect on their lives and b) are those where their vote will have the most power.

Suppose, for instance, that my town has a referendum on funding a new park. The referendum passing could produce a material change in my life and do so relatively quickly – the park would provide new opportunities for recreation, a new venue for events, etc. If I voted in favor of the referendum and it passed, I may see the results of my action and its impact on my life in short order.

Compare this to political action at the federal level. Former President Barack Obama, before leaving office, compared federal policy to steering a very large ship; it takes a long time to turn the boat in a new direction, and slight, even imperceptible, changes at one moment can result in arriving at a very different destination given enough time.  Few of us feel the effects of federal level elections soon after they occur. Of course, there will be exceptions – candidates may campaign on, and follow through with, policies that involve aggressively targeting specific groups, threaten to upend the economic or social order, and lead to war. But our vote at the federal level generally takes more time to trickle down to our individual lives.

Additionally, just mathematically speaking, our vote at the local level carries more weight. Given that there are fewer voters in a local election, each single vote matters much more. There is a real sense in which votes for federal offices do not matter. In the 2024 elections, out of 468 elections for seats in the House and Senate, only 43 had a margin of victory under 5%. However, the closest race in the Senate was won by 15,000 votes, while the most competitive House race had a margin of 187 votes. For presidential elections, the only voters who appear to shape the outcome of the elections are tens of thousands of voters across the battleground states. There is a real sense in which one simply casts their ballot into the ether in these elections. One can hardly be blamed for thinking that there is no point in participating in these circumstances.

Local elections, however, are quite different. The 2025 mayoral election for Johnson City, New York, a town where I lived during graduate school, was apparently decided by just 9 votes. No single person’s vote changed the outcome of this election, but one person’s actions may have or could have changed the outcome – one day of canvassing, one night of phone banking, one trip to take voters in need of a ride to the polls, or a few conversations with friends, could have added or flipped enough votes to change the victor. One’s personal vote, and their election related actions, are much more impactful on the local level. Thus, when one is regularly participating in local elections, it is far more difficult to collapse into electoral nihilism. The results of one’s efforts are readily apparent.

Of course, there are significant challenges to participating in local elections. As our sources of news have become more nationalized, 40% of local newspapers have gone out of business, resulting in 50 million Americans living in “news deserts” where there is extremely limited (or no) news coverage of local events and, by extension, elections. This is especially troubling given that the power to vote comes with responsibilities, specifically the responsibility to be informed. Voters may need to do significant personal research to find out who and what precisely is on their ballot, then dedicate efforts towards gathering information about the specific platforms for each candidate.

So why put in this effort to avoid electoral nihilism? At least initially, I think there are two primary reasons. First, Americans’ confidence in their democracy is at an all-time low. Of course, addressing this will require systemic reforms. But ensuring that one feels that voting matters seems to be a necessary first step to any changes. Second, reducing electoral nihilism may lead to more responsible voter behavior. When one feels that one’s vote is meaningless, it becomes easier to vote for fictional characters, or to treat your vote as a joke – when nothing matters, then anything is permitted. In a democratic society, we ought to be prepared to, even if only hypothetically, provide a good justification for how we fill out our ballot. It seems that a necessary first step along the way to developing this justification, is to think that one is doing something that matters with one’s vote. Being an engaged, informed and responsible voter is hard work, and hard work may not be worth doing if one feels that it does not matter.

Barry Lam: The Case for Discretion

Modern life runs on rules—some helpful, some… not so much. In this episode, Alex talks with philosopher Barry Lam (UC Riverside) about his new book Fewer Rules, Better People: The Case for Discretion. Lam makes a bold claim: sometimes fewer rules can actually make us better. With sharp insights and real-world stories, he walks us through why giving people more wiggle room might lead to fairer, more humane outcomes. But it’s not all freewheeling freedom—the conversation also digs into the risks of bias and the need for accountability when discretion takes the wheel.

 

ABOUT THE GUEST

Barry Lam is a graduate of the University of California at Irvine and former program director and general manager at KUCI 88.9FM. After earning his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Princeton University, Barry was Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vassar College for 16 years, and has recently moved to UC Riverside as Professor of Philosophy. His podcast, Hi-Phi Nation has received critical acclaim from The Guardian, The Huffington Post, and IndieWire, among other venues.

 

GET THE BOOK

Library Search  →

Amazon  →

ThriftBooks  →

 

FOR FURTHER READING

Barry Lam, “Addicted to rules: How to slay the bureaucratic beast, from SF to DC,” The San Fransisco Standard

J.D. Mathes, “Antidote to criminal system? ‘Fewer rules, better people,'” UC Riverside News

Evan Sellinger, “We Might Be Better Off with Fewer Rules,” The Boston Globe

Nick Kreuder, “Be On Your Best Behavior: On Lifetime Judiciary Appointments,” The Prindle Post

David Millar, “Do Police Intentions Matter?,” The Prindle Post

 

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Robert Talisse: Civic Solitude

Our 2024-2025 season continues with a conversation with Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt) on his new book, Civic Solitude: Why Democracy Needs Distance. Here, Talisse argues that democracy, in addition to its participatory elements, requires a kind of reflection and capacity building that is best achieved in solitude. He recommends that we rebuild and/or expand public spaces for such development as a potential antidote to some of our own democratic political ills.

 

ABOUT THE GUEST

Robert Talisse is W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. A native of New Jersey, Talisse earned his PhD in Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate School in 2001. His research focuses on democracy. Specifically, Talisse writes about how a democratic political order can assist and complicate our efforts to acquire knowledge, share ideas, understand what is of value, and address our disagreements. He engages questions about public discourse, popular political ignorance, partisan polarization, and the ethics of citizenship.

 

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FOR FURTHER READING

Robert Talisse, “Overdoing Democracy: Why We Must Put Politics In Its Place” (Oxford University Press, 2019)

Robert Talisse, “Stop and think: An Undervalued Approach In a World That Short-Circuits Thoughtful Political Judgment,” The Conversation

Lilliana Mason, “Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity” (University of Chicago Press, 2018)

Marta Nunes Da Costa, “Due Attention: Addictive Tech, the Stunted Self, and Our Shrinking World,” The Prindle Post

Evan Arnet, “When Does a Democracy Die?,” The Prindle Post

Wes Siscoe, “The Empathetic Democracy: Countering Polarization with Considerate Civic Discourse,” The Prindle Post

 

Is Speech Freer Without Fact-Checks?

Meta recently announced that it will end its practice of employing fact-checkers to moderate content on its platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and Threads. Instead, Meta sites will employ a system similar to the “community notes” feature on Twitter/X, where users can propose notes to provide more information about a post. In a short video posted to Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg explained that he was motivated to make the change due to fact-checkers being too “politically biased,” and accused them of having “destroyed more trust than they created.” At the end of the day, he wanted his platforms to get back to their roots of upholding freedom of speech.

Many have expressed concerns about Zuckerberg’s decision, as well as his motivations for making it. The most prominent concern has been that without moderation from fact-checkers, significantly more false and hateful information will make its way around Meta’s platforms. Others have expressed the concern that Zuckerberg’s decision is itself politically motivated. There is evidence that fact-checked posts are more likely to be shared by conservatives who appeal to low-quality news sites, which has led some to believe that conservative voices are being disproportionately targeted. Zuckerberg’s recent behaviors – including donations to Trump and his removal of protections against certain kinds of hate speech – have led some to conclude that Zuckerberg is really motivated by a dislike of seeing fact-checks on views he and his friends hold.

Even if Zuckerberg truly is motivated by promoting freedom of speech, what is it about having a system of third-party fact-checkers that inhibits free speech? And will shifting responsibility to the community make speech on Meta platforms more free?

Let’s start with the first question: why might third-party fact-checkers inhibit freedom of speech? One might think that the problem is one of quantity: any instance of fact-checking is a form of censorship, perhaps, and thus without dedicated fact-checkers whose job it is to flag content there will simply be less censorship and thus speech will be more free.

If this is our concern, would a community notes system be an improvement? Perhaps. When looking at Twitter/X, for example, The Poynter Institute “found that fewer than 10 percent of Community Notes drafted by users ended up being published on offending posts,” and that these numbers “are even lower for sensitive topics like immigration and abortion.” Shifting to a community notes model where only a fraction of notes ever see the light of day may then decrease the number of posts that are flagged.

At the same time, however, the number of community members of sites like Facebook and Instagram outnumber third-party fact-checkers by many orders of magnitude. So even if a small percentage of community notes end up being published, the result may not be any fewer fact-checks.

Zuckerberg’s argument, however, is not so much with the concept of fact-checking itself, but that third-party fact-checkers are too politically biased, and are thus disproportionately censoring certain views. There has been significant pushback against this claim; regardless, let’s assume for the sake of argument that it’s true. If fact-checkers are biased, will the community be any better?

It’s not clear that it will. After all, the community itself may very well be biased by having a plurality of users falling on one side of the political spectrum. It’s also unclear whether conservative views will receive any fewer flags under a community notes system than a fact-checking system. A recent study in Nature, for example, found that professional fact-checkers and “politically balanced groups of laypeople” largely agreed on which sources of information were low quality, the lion’s share being those that amplified conservative views. If Zuckerberg is concerned that flagging conservative views disproportionately constitutes a form of censorship, then shifting fact-checking responsibilities to the community may not make things any better.

One might think instead that third-party fact-checking just really isn’t necessary anymore. An article in Politico, for instance, recently argued that the “disinformation panic” that started during Trump’s first presidency is “over.” Part of the evidence for this claim is that while the contentious and surprising nature of Trump’s first election win demanded an explanation – which many blamed on misinformation campaigns designed to mislead voters – the second Trump win was definitive and, at least in terms of drama around the manipulation of results, mundane. Per the Politico article: “no one was fooled into voting for Trump.”

There have also been increasingly frequent criticisms that programs dedicated to ameliorating the problems of misinformation and disinformation have largely failed to bear fruit. People spreading false information, the argument goes, is not so much a problem to be solved as it is a feature of humanity to be tolerated; especially so, given the politically fraught nature of labeling information about social issues as either true or false. This is not to say that we should abandon the project of identifying false and potentially harmful information online. Rather, employing third-party fact-checkers is an overcorrection of a non-problem, and thus unnecessarily restricts free speech.

Questions about the fecundity of the study of misinformation and disinformation are open, although there is good evidence that many interventions are, in fact, effective. As stated in the Politico article, there is also good reason to be worried about the quantity and egregiousness of false information being shared on social media in the second term of the Trump presidency given his infamous disinterest in the truth and his choice of appointees. Of course, it may very well turn out that Trump’s rhetoric is met with less opposition during his second term and that changing political winds result in more people agreeing on obvious falsehoods they see on social media. However, this is not an indication that disinformation is over, but instead underlines how those in power have a vested interest in attempting to control narratives around the extent to which disinformation is a problem.

We have seen little reason to think that the existence of fact-checking represents a limitation on free speech, nor have we seen much reason to think that shifting to a community notes model will make things any better. But perhaps shifting responsibility for fact-checking to the community will better promote free speech not by being any less restrictive, but by granting new abilities to its users. By creating a system in which everyone has a say in helping to determine whether some content is fact-checked or flagged, the process becomes democratic in a way that is presumably lacking when outsourcing those duties to third parties, and thus free speech flourishes.

There is a sense in which this shifting of responsibilities gives more freedom to the users, as they now possess an ability they didn’t have before. But a system with only minimal guardrails also risks stifling many more voices. For example, Zuckerberg’s recent changes that allow users to say that gay and trans people have “mental illness” remove restrictions on a certain kind of speech from a certain kind of person, but will undoubtedly result in a lot less speech from members of communities that Meta’s policies refuse to respect. Moderation of speech – be it in the form of fact-checking or policies around what kinds of content are permitted on a platform – can thus promote free speech rather than inhibit it.

It remains to be seen whether Zuckerberg’s version of community notes will be successful in identifying false and misleading information, and it’s perhaps only known to him what his true intentions are in making the change. However, if he really was motivated by making speech freer on his platforms, there’s good reason to think his efforts are misguided.

Should You Keep Using Twitter?

Twitter (or “X”, as no one calls it), isn’t what it used to be. Traffic has plummeted at the social media network, while rivals Bluesky and Threads have seen their userbases skyrocket. For any longtime Twitter users, it’s probably not surprising why this is the case: Musk has made a series of widely criticized decisions since his takeover, the results of which have been a failure to curb hate speech, a proliferation of white supremacist accounts, and numerous questionable actions by Musk himself. Add to that the plethora of technical changes that have irked Twitter’s users, and you can understand why Bluesky was recently the most popular download on Apple’s App Store.

Not everyone is unhappy with Twitter under Musk’s command, of course. His outspoken support of Trump has made him popular with the political right, and a casual scroll through a Twitter feed will reveal that many of the most visible and promoted posts tend to espouse right-wing views. Bluesky, on the other hand, is being portrayed as a safe haven for those on the left, with many pundits opining that left-wing users are leaving Twitter specifically because they’re looking for a space where people are more likely to share their views.

This picture is, I think, too simplistic. As many users have noticed, it is less the desire to find people of the same general political orientation that ultimately caused the move, and more the desire not to have one’s replies be overrun by bots or be called racial slurs by people who have paid for the right to have their voices amplified.

Regardless of the motivation, some have argued that the exodus of Twitter contributes to the formation of echo chambers, resulting in spaces where users listen only to those who share the same beliefs and express values in the same ways. For example, in The Globe and Mail:

[T]he flight to Bluesky is a concern, not because X is the superior platform, but because at a moment when persuasion and communication are vital, Mr. Trump’s loudest and most influential critics are building an echo chamber… if the aim is to defeat authoritarianism, I’m not persuaded that Bluesky helps.

Similarly, The Telegraph claims that:

[T]he shift [of left-leaning users away from Twitter] has led to accusations of Bluesky becoming an “echo chamber”, as users promote so-called block lists to hide Republican-leaning accounts from their timeline.

At The New York Times:

Liberals moving away from X are giving up on the 20th-century ideal of a public sphere… migrating Bluesky users are signaling political separation from an increasingly conservative X and giving up on the idea of a town square that holds all voices simultaneously.

And the Independent quotes right-wing political commenter Toby Young, who claims that: “[o]ne of the ironies of people on the Left deserting X for Bluesky is that they are often the very same people who complain about how politics has become ‘too polarised’.”

If you’re considering leaving Twitter, should you? Or are you obligated to stay, and try to keep the dream of bipartisan discourse in the public sphere alive?

Many of those commenting on the issue seem to think that we do have such an obligation. After all, echo chambers are bad insofar as when we are in one, we risk losing out on hearing information from different voices, and may get stuck in our ways when there are no critical eyes to challenge us. Echo chambers can happen in any context, but are perhaps most concerning when they are delineated across political lines. Discourse across the political spectrum is a sign of a healthy democracy, and so we at least have some reason to try to ensure that we make such discourse possible.

Here we have the makings of an argument: if you’re a left-leaning Twitter user who leaves Twitter for Bluesky, then you will contribute to creating echo chambers on both social media platforms. But we have reason to think that echo chambers are bad, if not just in general, then for democracy (and perhaps the “public sphere”) in particular. So: you should stay on Twitter.

While this argument isn’t stated explicitly in the passages above, the idea is that choosing social media platforms now comes with the added responsibility of contributing to increasingly polarized discourse online. Although many who have left Twitter have expressed frustration with the inability to engage with those they disagree with in a productive, civil way, shouldn’t that be more reason for them to stay and try to make things better?

I think we do have a general obligation to listen to and engage with those who disagree with us. But the obligation is pro tanto; in other words, it can be overridden by other duties that we have towards others, and to ourselves.

For instance, while discourse is important, it should not require that one martyr oneself in the name of the public sphere: our duties to our own well-being outweigh the duty to entertain Twitter trolls. Furthermore, if an attempt at discourse is met with hate and closed-mindedness, the obligation to improve that discourse falls squarely on the hateful and closed-minded – or else on the platform to step in as moderator. The thought that it is the responsibility of those leaving Twitter to make Twitter better puts the blame on the wrong shoulders.

The questions around the segregation of social networks have become more urgent not only because the exodus of users to Twitter-alternatives seems to reflect an increasingly divided American society, but because the social media landscape feels like it is at a tipping point. It’s unclear how equilibrium will be established. Will the upstart social media platforms fizzle out with everyone eventually returning to Twitter (perhaps even finally calling it “X” as penance)? Or will Twitter dry up into a husk of what it once was, sold off for a substantial loss once Musk gets bored with it? Or will we reach a third point, where there are equally popular but polarized networks that segregate views along rough political lines?

At this point, it’s impossible to tell. Despite the rhetoric, however, if you’re a long-time Twitter user who’s been looking for a change, you shouldn’t feel bad about leaving.

Be On Your Best Behavior: On Lifetime Judiciary Appointments

In my previous column, I considered President Joe Biden’s arguments for limiting the terms of U.S. Supreme Court justices. Of the three arguments, only the view that no single presidential term should have disproportionate impact on the Court showed immediate promise. Although, after unpacking the likely justification of this view, I argued that accepting it may require viewing the Supreme Court as a political institution. This result should give us pause as a politically neutral high court is a desirable thing.

Lifetime tenure is the status quo in the U.S. But this mere fact does not automatically make it desirable. Humans tend to favor the current state of affairs, even if there is an advantage to departing from it. So, we ought to consider arguments which can be marshaled in favor of indefinite terms for Supreme Court justices. If these arguments are not compelling, then perhaps the arguments for term limits will gain appeal, simply by virtue of being a better, albeit potentially flawed, option.

The most influential arguments for lifetime judicial appointments in the U.S. come from Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78, first published in 1788. This paper is part of a collection now commonly called the Federalist Papers, a series of essays in which Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay sought to offer public arguments defending the various features of the then new United States Constitution, hoping to help ensure its ratification. Each essay offers some defense of a particular aspect of the newly proposed federal government.

In Federalist 78, Hamilton defends the structure of the judiciary. Among those features he wishes to defend, Hamilton argues in favor of lifetime appointments for the justices, using the language of “hold[ing] their offices during good behavior” adopted in Article III of the Constitution to describe this tenure.

He offers three major arguments to defend the judiciary. First, the Supreme Court is the least dangerous of the three branches of government. Second, few people in society will acquire the knowledge and skills necessary for a successful tenure. Third, that lifetime appointments are necessary to secure the independence of the judiciary.

In describing the power of the Supreme Court, Hamilton writes that “The judiciary… has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may be truly said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” So, Hamilton’s position is that the Supreme Court lacks power. In his view, all it can do is interpret the Constitution. Further, it has no ability to enforce the decisions that it reaches. The Supreme Court effectively requires compliance from the executive and legislative branches. As Andrew Jackson is often and perhaps apocryphally quoted, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”

Ultimately, Hamilton thinks that we as citizens have little to worry about from the judiciary. He claims that “though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter… so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive.”

Of course, things have changed significantly since the late 18th century. All branches of the federal government, and the United States as a whole, have much greater power than the founders anticipated. In fact, just 15 years after Hamilton’s death, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government has powers not explicitly granted to it by the Constitution.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has often reshaped the lives and rights of Americans simply by interpreting the Constitution. Since just the mid-20th century, the Supreme Court ended racial segregation, guaranteed the right to a defense attorney for those who cannot afford one, declared laws against interracial and same-sex marriagesunconstitutional, established a Constitutional right to privacy, then used that right to conclude access to birth control and abortion are Constitutional rights, as well as that criminalizing sexual acts between consenting adults is unconstitutional. They have since walked back at least some of these decisions and may do the same for others.

The Supreme Court certainly lacks the power of the executive and the legislative. They cannot make the law and they cannot enforce it. However, their ability to interpret both individual laws and rights guaranteed by the Constitution has the potential to greatly impact the lives of millions, if not all, Americans. Thus, Hamilton’s argument misses the mark in the 21st century. Although arguably not the most powerful branch, the Supreme Court may reshape features of our lives.

Second, Hamilton notes that there are few who can meet the qualifications of being a justice. He writes that “a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound.”  Further, Hamilton notes that “the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to very considerable bulk and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.” So, Hamilton thinks that few can both develop the skill and character necessary to serve as a justice. There’s simply a lot to learn.

One might, however, wonder if Hamilton’s views here may be a product of the era in which he lived. As described by Jay Alexander, 18th century lawyers typically began practicing law by apprenticing. However, their mentors frequently traveled for trials, leaving apprentices to simply read legal books for weeks or months at a time without any guidance. Under these conditions it is no surprise that it was incredibly difficult to gather the knowledge to practice law, let alone become highly proficient in it. Yet things are different in the 21st century. According to the American Bar Association, there are more than 1.3 million practicing lawyers in the United States as of 2023. For reference, the U.S. population according to the 1800 census was 5.3 million. Of course, most Supreme Court justices are typically justices prior. But many simply had prior legal expertise and worked in careers other than judging preceding their appointments.

It is true that justices ought to be individuals of great knowledge, experience, and character. Yet given the sheer number of individuals with legal training, it is not clear that there are only nine people capable of serving as a justice on the highest court at any moment. So, this does not seem to offer compelling reason for why justices ought to have lifetime appointments. Of course, the U.S. legal code has gotten significantly more complicated since the 18th century. But we are significantly better at training, and produce significantly more, people capable of practicing law.

Finally, Hamilton argues that lifetime appointments judiciary appointments are necessary to preserve the independence of the court, which is required to fulfill their function. He writes “that inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission.”

His rationale is this. Suppose that judges serve limited terms. Presumably, they could be reappointed to the bench. If this is the case, it may bias the judgments of those judges. Rather than making rulings which best fit current law, justices may instead rule in ways which please the executive and legislative branches; the executive branch nominates the justices, and the legislative branch confirms them, so making rulings to please both may go some way towards securing future appointments for justices. Additionally, when discussing the limited power of the judiciary, Hamilton does note that a judiciary aligned with another branch of government creates a great potential for despotism; this has borne out in the 20th century as authoritarian regimes have sought to push out justices appointed by prior leaders and stack the court with loyalists.

Further, we can extend Hamilton’s argument. He focused primarily on justices’ relationships to other branches of government. However, even if justices can serve only one term, they may still have concerns about their future off the bench. Perhaps a concern about their future could lead them to favor corporate or moneyed interests in their final years. After all, a corporate plaintiff or defendant could need a well-compensated legal consult in the near future. We might find this  possibility especially troubling since the Court recently ruled that federal anti-bribery laws do not cover gratuities, the gifts or other forms of showing appreciation given after a public official has taken an action.

This argument seems powerful on its face. We should certainly worry about justices focusing on their future careers rather than remaining independent, impartial interpreters of law. Yet consider the number of scandals regarding the politicalaffiliations of justices and their families, as well as significant personal and financial conflicts of interest. It seems currently that lifetime appointments are not sufficient to counteract the ways in which the justices’ interests, political, personal, or financial, may affect their rulings. The salary and the prestige of the position may not be enough for those individuals ambitious enough to rise to such a high rank.

So perhaps we need to emphasize the way in which Hamilton and the framers of the Constitution described the tenure of justices. Federal justices are not explicitly given “lifetime appointments.” Instead, their tenure is described as lasting throughout “good behavior.” Rather than overhauling the Court, perhaps the solution is simply to hold the justices to that standard. We should demand they at least attempt to be impartial, to avoid even the appearance of conflicts of interest, and step aside from those cases when we have reason to believe their judgment may be biased. If their tenure is to only last during times of good behavior, then we ought to remove those justices unwilling to behave as those with a good judicial character would.

Of course, this requires legislating in good faith and seriously scrutinizing the behavior of even those justices whose rulings we find agreeable. But if we are to have an institution whose members are to interpret the law impartially, we must impartially hold them accountable.

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