constitutional interpretation Archives

April 1, 2024April 1, 2024

Originalism, Hypocrisy, and the Role of the Judiciary

David French’s brief column responding to a New York Times interview of retired Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer illustrates beautifully the bind that originalists – those who believe that constitutional provisions ought to be interpreted according to how they were understood by the people who enacted them – have put themselves in. French, a conservative pundit and former lawyer, admirably owns up to the fact that, because American history is “deeply confused,” originalism enables judges to pick and choose the “particular strand of history he or she prefers and then import personal preferences into what is supposed to be an objective analysis of meaning.” While he does not put it this way, French is in effect accusing originalists of intellectual dishonesty or hypocrisy: they profess to be interpreting the Constitution pursuant to “original meaning,” but in fact they often surreptitiously apply other, non-originalist criteria to select among multiple historical meanings.

But French stubbornly cleaves to the line that the “judiciary’s role is to interpret the law, not to change the law.” Thus, French seems to find himself without any tools for interpreting the Constitution: history is too complicated for judges and too susceptible to intellectual hypocrisy, but judges must not “make law” by interpreting the Constitution in accordance with their values and other “subjective determinations.”

As I will show, on the one hand, and contra French, there is a way for originalism to be intellectually respectable — but it probably is not palatable to most originalists. On the other hand, the originalists’ insistence that judges do not make law is simply untenable, and ironically, quite contrary to the history and tradition of American constitutional jurisprudence.

Before suggesting how originalism can avoid hypocrisy, I would like to expand briefly on French’s critique of originalism. Undoubtedly, when interpreting the law, the text matters a great deal. When the meaning of the text is clear and unambiguous, that is often the end of the inquiry. For example, there is no doubt that Article II of the Constitution sets an age limit of 35 for any U.S. President. The text is clear, and no “living constitutionalist” believes that “the Age of thirty five Years” ought to mean anything other than 35 years old. You might say that practically everyone agrees that the “plain meaning” criterion of interpretation gets lexical priority over other tools of constitutional construction: if a provision has a plain meaning, then the plain meaning controls.

However, there are many clauses of the Constitution that do not have a plain, unambiguous meaning. Moreover, these tend to be among the most important clauses. For example, what does the Fourteenth Amendment mean when it prohibits the States from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property” without “due process of law”? The originalist answers that it means whatever people understood it to mean when it was ratified in 1868.

The trouble with this answer is that oftentimes the historical record either lacks suitably detailed discussions of a given constitutional provision, or it contains multiple, diametrically opposed interpretations, each of which had some currency among those who enacted the provision.

The former situation can happen when framers or ratifiers deliberately leave the meaning of a provision ambiguous to maximize the chances of finding favor with different constituencies. The latter situation is what French means when he says that American history is often “confused.” Since the originalist believes that the original meaning is the only legitimate criterion of constitutional interpretation, such situations leave originalists in the position of having to pick and choose among original meanings, or inventing them. At that point, the only criteria of interpretive choice available to them are criteria that have no place in their interpretive theory. And this leads to intellectual dishonesty where, for example, originalists purport to find that one strand of historical interpretation is the “mainstream view” while the others are “outliers” or “anomalies,” when in fact they have chosen that strand based on their own policy preferences, moral values, or political philosophy.

There is a way for originalists to avoid intellectual dishonesty, however: embrace radical judicial restraint. So, whenever the historical record contains multiple interpretations of the provision at issue or, alternatively, is too sparse to determine a unique meaning, the originalist should simply refrain from the task of interpretation and leave it to Congress to sort out the mess through the amendment process. This approach would certainly lighten the federal judiciary’s workload. I suspect it would also make the Constitution essentially a dead letter.

But surely, French is right that allowing judges to make “invariably subjective determinations” about the practical consequences of their rulings and the way that society’s values evolve in interpreting the Constitution would subvert democracy itself because “it is the democratically elected branches of government that are responsible for that evolution, not the judiciary.” Well, this would come as news to the Founders. Reading judicial opinions that interpret the Constitution from the Early Republic period, one is struck above all by their repeated and unabashed invocations of principles of natural law and political philosophy to guide their interpretation of America’s fundamental law. As far as I am aware, none of the Founders or ratifiers — categories which included, in some cases, the judges themselves — ever took issue with this interpretive method, although they may have disagreed violently about the particular principles at play.

But that argument is no more than an appeal to tradition. The better answer to French’s concern is that, if the judiciary’s “lawmaking” role has been sanctioned by a Constitution duly ratified by the people, then that role cannot be un- or anti-democratic — at least not by the lights of the polity created by that particular Constitution, which sets forth the conditions of democratic legitimacy in that polity. Ironically, as I indicated above, there is every reason to think that the Constitution’s drafters and ratifiers authorized the judiciary to use tools of constitutional interpretation other than, and in addition to, original meaning. In other words, we should believe that the Constitution as understood by those who enacted it gave judges the authority to make just the sorts of subjective determinations of which French disapproves. Of course, one might ask why what the “people” decided the judiciary should do in 1787 is entitled to such deference. But this is no more than an application of the so-called “dead hand problem,” and not a special problem for the jurisprudential approach I am proposing here.

French’s column is almost poignant in capturing something akin to the transition of a religious person from unclouded faith to reluctant and guarded skepticism. I would argue that his reasons for reluctance are misguided: there is nothing contrary to conservatism in the view that judges should make value judgments and other “subjective” determinations. Actually, that view is entirely consistent with history and tradition.

July 8, 2022December 14, 2022

Constitutional Deadlock Over Privacy: A Third Way?

photograph of protest sign in fron of Supreme Court

Following the overturning of Roe v. Wade, a great deal of media attention has been focused on what comes next. The right to an abortion, granted by the original landmark case, was founded on the basis of a constitutional right to privacy. But it has already been made clear that similar rulings regarding a constitutional right to privacy, such as Griswold v. Connecticut could be at risk of being overturned as well. In addition, the Supreme Court has attracted controversy for several other controversial decisions as well, prompting proposals for how to reform the Court or how to reverse these decisions. But with confidence in the courts falling to historic lows, many such proposals would likely only make the situation worse and undermine confidence in the courts even more.

Perhaps it is time to stop worrying about what policies we want courts to protect and to start thinking about finding broad support for changes in process in the form of constitutional amendments.

The recent decision from the Supreme Court regarding abortion combined with rulings on school prayer, concealed guns, voting rights, and worries about future rulings once again reignite debates about whether and how the Supreme Court should be reformed. The impeachment of justices who some feel misled Congress has been floated, and the topic of court-packing has resurfaced again. The constitution does not specify the number of judges on the Court, so Congress could simply pass legislation creating more positions and then have those positions be filled by left-leaning justices to re-balance the Court. Term limits for Supreme Court justices would mean that there would be more turn over, preventing the Court from becoming too ideologically lopsided.

In addition to proposing reforms to the Courts’ makeup, some have proposed reforms to the powers of the Court. Some now propose that Congress strip the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction for hearing certain kinds of cases, or that legislation could be passed requiring a supermajority of justices to strike down federal laws. It has even been suggested that if a particularly controversial ruling comes from the Court that Congress or the President simply ignore it, under the constitutional theory known as departmentalism which holds that each branch of government may decide on its own how to interpret the Constitution. In addition, there are several proposals to create mechanisms for Congress to override the Court if it wanted to, not unlike Canada’s notwithstanding clause.

While many of these proposals might appease in some areas, they all have problems when it comes to putting them into practice.

After all, abortion rights proponents now find themselves in the same position as anti-abortion advocates did in the 1970s, and it took almost 50 years for them to get what they wanted. Proposals like court-packing simply do not have enough support.

It is important to note that much of the Supreme Court’s power is based on the confidence the public has in it. The Constitution does not prescribe many powers to the Supreme Court, and even its power of judicial review is based on the precedent Marbury v. Madison, and as it has become all too clear that precedents are not set in legal stone. If people do not feel like the Court is impartial, they will be less inclined to heed its pronouncements. While some would like to see justices impeached or the court packed, this would only serve to undermine the confidence in the Court from those on the right, likely prompting retaliatory measures. This would weaken perceptions of impartiality of the Court even more, effectively transforming the Supreme Court into a very exclusive legislature.

Meanwhile, having Congress override the Courts’ decisions risks undermining the commitment to minority rights.

Fundamental protections would become a flimsy thing, being reversed whenever the opposing party comes to power. Limiting the High Court’s jurisdiction risks similar problems, simply offloading the same basic problem to an alternative body that the parties will shape so as to achieve their preferred policy objectives. All these efforts to manipulate the judicial system in order to secure specific political outcomes will only undermine overall public confidence in the Court.

Perhaps an alternative to such a standoff is to stop thinking about desired result we wish courts to deliver and start thinking about broader legal principles to embed in the constitution that could appeal to people on all sides of the spectrum. The legal issue underlying so many contentious issues like Roe v. Wade is the issue of privacy. Abortion opponents charge that because privacy isn’t explicitly established in the Constitution, it isn’t protected. Rather than dealing with legal debates about implied rights, why not amend the Constitution to explicitly include privacy rights? Polls show that a vast majority of Americans are concerned about privacy issues. And with the rise of surveillance capitalism, and of AI accessing vast datasets, there may be room for broad support for proposals to embed some kind of privacy protections in the constitution.

While getting the support needed for constitutional amendments is difficult (the last amendment was ratified in 1992), the increasing importance of privacy to broad segments of American society may create room for bargaining and compromise on these issues by both the left and the right. Recently, constitutional-law David French opined that the Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade may actually help de-polarize America. Because the pro-life vs. pro-choice debate largely centered around Roe v. Wade, sides had to defend a precedent, not a specific policy. But as French observes,

Is there a hope that you would have something along the lines of a democratic settlement to the issue that makes abortion so much less polarizing in other countries around the world? Europe, for example has long had more restrictive abortion laws than the United States, but the United States couldn’t move to a European settlement because Roe and Casey prohibited that.

Indeed, polls show that Americans have fairly nuanced views when it comes to abortion. Few people would favor an outright ban on the procedure, so it may not be so difficult to imagine a compromise proposal for adding privacy to the Constitution that would not only protect abortion rights, but other rights like access to contraception, gay marriage, and protections from online surveillance. Such a move would not only allow Americans to address newly emerging privacy issues but also settle old disputes. Abortion rights passed through constitutional amendment would also have a legitimacy that Roe never did amongst abortion opponents, preventing back-and-forth sniping at the Court for not upholding preferred policies.

While a constitutional amendment would take time and a lot of negotiation, it may yield a far more stable and broadly satisfying solution to the abortion debate compared to the previous alternatives while not undermining confidence in the Court system itself. So instead of looking to courts to reach specific policy outcomes, perhaps the attention should be focused on building coalitions of support for broad legal principles that people can agree on.

July 5, 2022December 14, 2022

When Courts Change Their Minds

In late June the Supreme Court of the United States released a bevy of opinions. Most prominent perhaps is the 5-4 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health in which the court overturned the famous 1973 Roe v. Wade decision. The court also, in Kennedy v. Bremerton, has done away with the long used “Lemon test” concerning the separation of church and state.

Beyond questions of whether the decisions are ethically correct, these rulings are notable because they go against established precedent. In legal systems like the United States, courts generally adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis or “to stand by things decided.” The Supreme Court has previously ruled – in both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey – that there exists an implicit constitutional right to abortion. Changing its mind is then unusual, although hardly unique to the current court. The 1954 Brown v. Board of Education is famously seen to have overturned the “separate but equal” doctrine the court had previously held in Plessy v. Ferguson. (Although, technically, the Brown ruling is more narrow, only contending that separate but equal does not apply in public schools.) Evan Butts has previously discussed some of the practicalities of overturning precedent for The Prindle Post.

Recent additions to the Supreme Court, such as Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch, are being criticized for implying (misleadingly) they would stick with precedent on rulings like Roe v. Wade.

But why should the Court be bound by past opinion at all? Imagine a scientist claiming that we should stick with Newtonian physics and not jump ship to general relativity because Newtonian physics is an established precedent – even though they agree Newtonianism is incorrect.

This would be preposterous. And yet stare decisis is often understood to imply such a burden, that, as Justice Brandeis wrote in 1932 “in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.”

Following precedent in cases where the rightness of the initial ruling is not in question is straightforward – this is nothing more than a demand for courts to interpret the law correctly. Precedent as such is superfluous here, as consistency is being ensured purely by the court deciding correctly in each case. The doctrine of stare decisis only achieves importance when it comes to ambiguous or even wrongly decided cases, and whether they should nonetheless maintain some hold over future judicial decisions.

As Justice Brandeis suggested, defenders of stare decisis justify it by pointing to its role in settling matters of law – that is, making law fair, consistent, and predictable, as opposed to mercurial.

The claim is that absent this general principle of stability, the law could change drastically with the simple turnover of judges. More practically, precedent also provides courts the legal tools to decide cases efficiently.

The value of having settled law is especially clear in cases like Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) which enshrined a constitutional right to the recognition of same-sex marriages. Agree or disagree ethically, it is clear same-sex couples can and have built their lives differently knowing that they have a right to marriage recognition. Likewise, agree or disagree ethically with abortion, confidence they have control of whether to go through with a pregnancy affects how women live their lives. These are referred to as reliance interests.

Notably, these defenses of precedent contain the seeds of their own limitation as ultimately the doctrine of stare decisis is justified on the basis of being a social good. Cases of pernicious and dubiously-decided law are weighed against the value of the law being settled. Justice Brandeis made a further point, distinguishing the weight of precedent in statutory law (made by the legislature) which can easily be overturned by later legislation, from precedent in matters of constitutional interpretation. According to Brandeis, precedent matters less when there are fewer forms of redress.

Overall, few if any defend an imperative to follow precedent for all cases – at least when it comes to rulings being made by a court of equal or lesser authority. Precedents can and do get overturned. That lower courts should follow upper courts can provide an alternative defense of following precedent even in wrongly decided cases (sometimes called vertical as opposed to horizontal precedent).

In the 2018 5-4 decision Janus v. AFSCME, the majority opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito indicated that the current Supreme Court is especially open to revisiting previously decided matters when it believes they were wrongly decided. Justice Clarence Thomas has claimed, most recently in his concurring opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, that the Court should correct “demonstrably erroneous” rulings.

Expanding Thomas’s point, one could argue that the Supreme Court should have no special obligation to consider the social value of precedent and settled law at all, and simply always make the legally correct decision.

The chief challenge with this line of argument is on what basis should a case be considered “demonstrably erroneous”? Certainly, the current Supreme Court does not have consensus that the legal reasoning of Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey was wrong. (Brown v. Board of Education incidentally was a unanimous decision.) Absent strong evidence, e.g., a unified court, that a decision was made wrongly on legal grounds, the “demonstrably erroneous” standard of overturning precedent can collapse into “I think this decision was decided wrongly, and therefore I am justified in overruling it.” This reintroduces the dependence on the idiosyncrasies of specific justices that a principle like stare decisis is supposed to help limit.

Law is complex and so is legal interpretation – we should expect obviously incorrect decisions to be the exception rather than the rule. In light of this, one approach to stare decisis would be to acknowledge precedent should not be binding, but that the force of its motivating reasons such as consistency and stability of law apply especially strongly in cases where legal correctness or the proper interpretive framework is under dispute. Nonetheless, the current Supreme Court has indicated a more revisionary stance. It will become clear over the next few years how this plays out with the broader legal understanding of stare decisis in the United States.

May 16, 2022December 14, 2022

Constitutional Interpretation in the Roe Reversal

photograph of Authority of Law statue facing out from Supreme Court building

On May 2, Politico published a leaked draft opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. The case concerns the constitutionality of Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act, which would prohibit abortions in the state after fifteen weeks. The appearance in the press of a leaked draft opinion of the Court is a highly unusual event unto itself, the exact circumstances of which are not yet known by the public but are currently the subject of investigation and speculation. The draft opinion, authored by Justice Samuel Alito, would not merely uphold Mississippi’s restrictive abortion law. It would overturn Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and thereby rescind the constitutional protection for the right to privacy with respect to abortion that has been in place for nearly half a century.

Much of the public discussion about legal challenges to the right to privacy with respect to abortion in the press and in the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees has, rightly or wrongly, focused on the doctrine of stare decisis. From this perspective, since the Court had already recognized and reaffirmed the right to privacy with respect to abortion, the key question was whether the Court would abandon that precedent and under what conditions the Court had a legitimate basis to do so. These issues also came up in oral argument in Dobbs. In electing to overturn precedent, the leaked draft opinion provides the following rationale: Roe and Casey were “egregiously wrong” decisions that “must be overruled” because the recognition of the constitutional protection of the right to privacy with respect to abortion was an “abuse of judicial authority” wherein “the Court usurped the power to address a question of profound moral and social importance that the Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people.”Alito concludes that “the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the people and their elected representatives.”

It is first worth noting what the draft opinion does not say. It does not address the issue of whether, as a matter of basic justice or as a matter of political legitimacy, the right to privacy with respect to abortion requires constitutional protection.

This is because, notwithstanding the abstract moral provisions of the constitution, the theory of constitutional interpretation espoused in the draft opinion presupposes that these are mostly irrelevant considerations with respect to determining whether an unenumerated right is a candidate for constitutional protection. While it is presumably the case that Alito thinks abortion is some kind of grievous moral wrong, the draft opinion does nothing to support that conclusion other than to indicate that some people hold that opinion. Its primary aim is to demonstrate that the right to privacy with respect to abortion does not satisfy two key criteria it claims are necessary for an unenumerated right to require constitutional protection: that the right is “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition” and compatible with a scheme of “ordered liberty.” According to Alito, the right to privacy with respect to abortion does not satisfy these criteria, and therefore the authority to regulate abortion must be left to the states.

It is worth contemplating just what the supposed restoration of the authority of the people to regulate abortion would constitute. This would grant states, in principle, broad police powers with respect to abortion. The people of the states could, of course, limit these powers by entrenching statutory or constitutional rights against their exercise, but they could also reserve such powers to the legislature. Some of these powers are the obvious ones that the opponents of safe and legal abortion desire: the authority to severely restrict or outright ban abortion within a state, including the authority to impose criminal penalties on women and their physicians if they are so inclined.

But it would also entail, as the late legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin pointed out, the authority to compel abortion so long as doing so promotes a legitimate state interest. This point was reiterated in Casey, which notes that but for the right protected by Roe, “the State might as readily restrict a woman’s right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for example.” A draft opinion which, if it does become the decision of the Court, would authorize state policy requiring compulsory abortion or would permit the institution of a scheme of licensure for the privilege of bearing children, including the imposition of fines or penalties for failure to make use of abortion services in the absence of such license is of great concern.

I mention this not because I think this is a likely prospect — I take no position on that question — but because it suggests that the draft opinion is prima facie defective.

And while jurists are generally less willing than philosophers to contemplate what they presume to be unlikely or fanciful consequences, or “hypotheticals,” it does not require any imagination to realize that such policies are not unheard of. These were effectively part of China’s One Child Policy, for instance. Once this dimension of the right to privacy with respect to abortion is acknowledged, it becomes clear that if the Court, in overturning Roe and Casey, primarily looks to a litany of 19th Century statutes restricting or prohibiting abortion as a basis for such a determination, it has not taken its analysis of “history and tradition” very seriously.

I have postulated that the same constitutional right to privacy that protects a woman’s right to choose whether to have an abortion also protects a woman’s right to not be compelled to have an abortion. It might be claimed that this point is irrelevant because it is possible to have one without the other: it is possible to jettison the right to choose and retain the right not to be compelled. It is certainly possible to conceive of a legal regime that is barred from compelling a woman to have an abortion without that woman having an individual right against such compulsion. For instance, if the state restricts itself from exercising that prerogative, or because it would violate the rights of someone else, e.g., if an embryo or fetus is considered to be a rights-bearing person, or if a woman’s body is considered the property of another person, and so on.

However, I would suggest that if a woman has an individual right not to be compelled to have an abortion, or, in other words, if such an invasion of her body by the state is an injury to her, as it plainly is, then, ex hypothesi, her right against such compulsion, whether described in terms of liberty, autonomy, privacy, or bodily integrity, also entails that she has the right to choose to have an abortion.

If this is the case, it follows that if the right to not be compelled to have an abortion meets the criteria for constitutional protection, then the Court is making a grave error in rescinding the right to privacy with respect to abortion.

The draft opinion is also concerning due to the precedent it sets for privacy rights in general. In a recent essay, the constitutional scholar Akhil Amar attempts to assuage these concerns. He aims to defend Alito’s claim that “[n]othing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” According to Amar, overturning Roe and Casey would not imperil other privacy rights because, first, the public statements of sitting Justices indicate that they are not inclined to rescind other privacy rights, (e.g., the right to privacy with respect to contraception and the right privacy with respect to interracial marriage), and, second, because the recent legislative agendas of the states suggests that there is little to no public support for doing so.

The basic idea is that, unlike other privacy rights, the right to privacy with respect to abortion remains controversial, as evidenced by the persistence of legal challenges by various states. Therefore, other rights are unlikely targets for rescindment.

But this point is cold comfort for those who take the right to privacy with respect to abortion to have the same foundation as the other privacy rights. Perhaps the current composition of the Court can make peace with the apparent interpretive inconsistency of recognizing some privacy rights and not others, of declaring some privacy rights fundamental rights and treating the recognition of others as tantamount to judicial usurpation. But that does not prevent a future Court from using the reasoning in this draft opinion, if it does become the decision of the Court, as precedent for such judicial misadventure. (Of course, no precedent can prevent a majority of the Court that is willing to dispense with precedent altogether from imposing its interpretation of the Constitution on the nation.)

Presumably the reason Amar does not find the draft opinion to be concerning is because he does not see any such inconsistency. He agrees with Alito’s assessment that “abortion is fundamentally different” from other privacy rights, a point on which he is cited as an authority in the draft opinion. One reason, put forth by Alito and Amar, for the supposed distinction between the right to privacy with respect to abortion and the other privacy rights is the presence of an interest in protecting “potential life.”

The implication is that the right to privacy with respect to abortion entails unique conflicts that other privacy rights do not. But this is not plausible.

First, it is necessary to be clear about what the nature of the conflict is. The legitimate state interest, acknowledged in Roe and Casey, of protecting potential life, presents a conflict between individual liberty and public policy. When this is recognized, there is plainly no relevant difference between the right to privacy with respect to abortion and other privacy rights. All of these may be in conflict with various kinds of social policy, for instance, in regulating the “morals” of a community, as anti-miscegenation laws certainly purported to do.

The other reason, adduced by Alito and mentioned by Amar, states that the right to abortion with respect to privacy is distinct because abortion “destroys an ‘unborn human being.’” But the Court has not dared to claim, even in this draft opinion, as it could not do without venturing into a constitutional quagmire, that an unborn human being is a constitutionally rights-bearing person. So it is not clear what the point of this claim is supposed to be or how it factors into constitutional interpretation.

It remains to be seen whether the official Dobbs decision will differ in any significant way from the draft opinion. What is clear is that the Court is on the verge of rescinding the right to privacy with respect to abortion.

March 29, 2022December 14, 2022

On Judicial Philosophy: A Reflection on Judge Jackson’s Hearing

photograph of Ketanji Brown Jackson with law books behind

Judge Jackson’s recent confirmation hearing raises a variety of questions about the nature of judicial philosophy and what relationship it has with judicial “methodology.” In her opening statement, Judge Jackson outlines a three-step methodology to how she approaches each case: to clear her head, to examine the data, and to apply the relevant laws if it is her job. When pressed and questioned about what her philosophy is, she candidly maintained her judicial philosophy is her judicial methodology.

This has received a variety of attention. Some think her response is indicative of her defying being labeled by others. Others think she is required to give us her judicial philosophy, that her methodology is the bare minimum of what to expect from a judge. Indeed, some were analyzing and predicting what the judicial philosophy would be based on her previous remarks and experience.

While Judge Jackson’s response has been a highlight of Republican criticism, it would be rash to infer this question is pointless, a divisive tactic asked for the sake of moral grandstanding. It is worth addressing the nature of one’s judicial philosophy, its importance, and asking whether it is equivalent to a methodology.

Let us presume that a judicial philosophy comprises the values and stance from which one sees and evaluates judicial cases. In this way, a judicial philosophy is value-laden and often prescriptive of how to interpret the law and act. In contrast, a methodology is often only descriptive. This gives the impression that a methodology is fair, insofar as it does not necessarily subscribe to values and prescribe responses.

This distinction maps onto our standard use of the terms and some intuitive examples. Consider how an ethical philosophy not only describes but evaluates as well as prescribes certain actions. For instance, deontology describes and evaluates actions according to the well-known categorical imperatives, the rule of universalization, and the intrinsic value of rational agents. When the deontologist maintains “Don’t lie,” it is based on a value of rational agency and is universal in its scope and demand.

A methodology, in contrast, is procedural. Much like the surgeon who must conduct several steps to perform surgery, a methodology describes the steps of parsing data and conducting certain actions. Moreover, while a methodology evaluates appropriate actions according to the issue at hand, a methodology does not have certain prescriptions built-in (aside from, perhaps, the general prescription to act in accord with the role one stands in; consider how the Hippocratic Oath is an imperative to do no harm). Where a scalpel is required in some situations, an IV is required in others — it depends on the patient’s need.

If this distinction is plausible, then it follows that a judicial methodology and judicial philosophy are not equivalent. This is not to say, however, that the two cannot overlap. For every judicial philosophy can avail itself of a methodology, and vice versa. So, we need some clarity on what Judge Jackson means when she maintains her philosophy just is her methodology.

Would it be a problem to only maintain a judicial methodology without a judicial philosophy? At first blush, it would seem like a fortunate state of affairs if the judge were to be impartial like the surgeon with a methodology. One might argue by analogy that the judge collects the relevant data with a clear mind and applies the relevant tools according to the need. If the brain surgeon is not trained and equipped to conduct heart surgery, one would hope he denies the request to operate and calls his colleague! So too with the judge. Impartiality, after all, is necessary for a judge to be just.

Indeed, this cleanly depicts how Judge Jackson describes her own three-step judicial methodology in more detail:

Remain neutral: to proceed “without fear or favor.” Before approaching any case, she clears her head of biases and prejudices.
Evaluate the data: to receive all of the appropriate inputs for the case (e.g., hearings, factual records, etc.)
Apply the law: to exercise the “Interpretation and application of the law to the facts in the case, and this is where I am really observing the constraints on my judicial authority.”

Regarding this last step, she may look at her jurisdiction to see if it is her place to hear the case. Like the surgeon who coolly evaluates cases and responses, one might think Judge Jackson’s methodology is sufficient for her role as a judge.

However, the surgical analogy fails on precisely the points it should help. On the one hand, it is questionable that both the surgeon and judge may coolly evaluate data. Does not collection of data require an evaluation of the case’s salient features? It would seem so, though perhaps this is a common problem. If so, it would be what I like to call a ‘work hazard’ for simply engaging in this activity and thus not uniquely problematic to this particular issue. On the other hand, the respective standards which the surgeon and judge consult and the corpus to which they apply these decisions are different. For the Constitution is not self-interpreting and is far from clear at many points. For example, whose right is it to bear arms? Moreover, the application is also an issue. For example, does the prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment preclude the death penalty today? Both of these issues of interpretation and application require values to guide the judge.

To illuminate how a judge might offer different sentences based on different judicial philosophies, consider two prominent philosophies:

Originalism: Interpreting the legal text(s) according to the words and original context, most prominently the original author’s meaning and public understanding of the text.

Prudentialism (also known as pragmatism): Interpreting the legal text(s) according to the respective values and interests at play at the time of the case (Justice Breyer, whom Judge Jackson is to replace, exercised this methodology).

Based on the philosophy, one will have different answers to the above questions. According to originalism, “cruel and unusual” punishment might not preclude the death penalty. In other words, this could lead a judge be open to giving a sentence of the death penalty. Based on prudentialism, “cruel and unusual” may very well preclude the death penalty. Individuals’ sensibilities of what counts as cruel may differ from the original authors (e.g. are there really any “humane” methods of executing a human?) In other words, this could lead a judge to avoid such a sentencing. Indeed, based on the sharp decrease in numbers of executions since ‘99, there is good reason to think that sentimentality has shifted for what classifies as “cruel.”

I would suggest, then, that a judge not only ought to have a judicial philosophy but is required to have a judicial philosophy. A judge ought to have a judicial philosophy because it is both an obligation of the role and prudent to make explicit one’s values and interpretive methodology. A judge is required to have a judicial philosophy if only out of operational necessity. The Constitution and law must be interpreted and applied, and to take a stance on ‘no judicial philosophy’ is perhaps to take a stance on a nascent philosophy.

We could, of course, attempt to deduce Judge Jackson’s judicial philosophy. Some have pursued this route – she clearly maintains that “adherence to text is a constraint on my authority. I’m trying to figure out what those words mean as they were intended by the people who wrote them.” While such comments as this may be indicative of an originalist position, I find it more helpful to see how Judge Jackson’s minimal position is prudent and not unprecedented.

Judicial philosophies can unnecessarily be understood to signal a political philosophy. If offered in this forum, her position could very well be misunderstood and utilized to characterize her in different ways. This would not be unlikely, given some of the grandstanding and loaded questions from many senators. And Judge Jackson was admirably keen to avoid these issues and “stay in her lane.” So, regardless of whether a candidate is obliged to inform the committee or public of her position, it seems to be cautious in some respects.

Such a brief response is also not unprecedented. Consider, for example, Justice Sotomayor’s opening statement for her hearing before the Judicial Committee. When describing her judicial philosophy, Sotomayor stated that it’s

Simple: fidelity to the law. The task of a judge is not to make law, it is to apply the law. And it is clear, I believe, that my record in two courts reflects my rigorous commitment to interpreting the Constitution according to its terms, interpreting statutes according to their terms and Congress’ intent, and hewing faithfully to precedents established by the Supreme Court and by my Circuit Court.

Justice Sonya Sotomayor

It could very well be that this is a stock and trade answer for such a forum. Moreover, it is an intentionally minimal answer and thus, a cautious maneuver.

For all the prudence and precedence, however, the point stands: a judicial philosophy is distinct from methodology, and the former is necessary for a judge. While a judicial philosophy is perhaps part of a judicial methodology, it will not be the whole parcel.

May 27, 2021December 14, 2022

“Politicians in Robes”: Neutrality in the Supreme Court

As the Supreme Court decides which issues to take up on its docket — abortion, gun rights, and perhaps even affirmative action — legal seers are already tallying the expected results. Emphasizing the court’s 6-3 conservative majority, many see these cases as having all but been decided; the writing is on the wall.

The political leanings of the Roberts Court have only grown more visible. While an air of secrecy often attends the justices’ business and keeps the inner workings of the Court hidden from public view, any sense that the Court stands removed from the political fray is quickly disappearing. Justices Kagan and Sotomayor have increasingly called out Kavanaugh’s inconsistent rulings, and he’s been taken to task for his hollow virtue-signalling and performative hand-wringing. This isn’t like when Justice Alito sparred with Gorsuch over his textualist read of Bostock. In Kagan’s dissent in Edwards v. Vannoy just last week, she explicitly chastised Kavanaugh for his approach that “treats judging like scorekeeping … about how much our decisions, or the aggregate of them, benefit a particular kind of party.” This, Kagan argues, is simply not how judges are supposed to approach their duties. Judging requires focusing on the legal merits of the case before you; it isn’t about anticipating political fallout according to party affiliation or balancing “wins” and “losses.”

The divisiveness seen in the Court mirrors the ugly politics in Congress that preceded its recent newcomers. All three justices, Ian Millhiser points out, were “nominated by a president who lost the popular vote and confirmed by a bloc of senators who represent less than half of the country.” Given the hypocrisy surrounding Gorsuch and Barrett’s appointments as well as the acrimony on both sides over Kavanaugh’s confirmation, it will be hard to dispel the notion that the Supreme Court is just another battleground for political score-settling.

Add to this a common belief in the practice of strategic retirement – justices timing their departure to ensure the installation of like-minded predecessors – and it’s hard to see the Court as anything other than an ideological land grab. The lottery appointment system, ensuring that justices are confirmed unevenly, erodes public trust and stretches the connection between the people’s will and their rulers’ authority to its breaking point.

Taken together, these considerations question the Court’s ability to serve its necessary function as a check on power and legal backstop. Contrary to Justice Roberts’s claim that the Court’s job is merely to “call balls and strikes,” the prevailing perception is that justices are overwhelmingly motivated by their personal political agendas and, thus, the Roberts Court stands committed to effecting the Right’s political will.

So what do we stand to gain by maintaining the fiction that justices are nothing more than umpires? Why deny the Court is composed of “Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges”?

However well these cynical accounts reflect the reality, it does great and lasting damage to our legal system to reduce the High Court to just “another political institution” — a nine-member Congress replete with the familiar political hackery and partisan warfare. That damage can’t be undone by simply expanding the bench to instill balance and force it to better reflect citizens’ diverse viewpoints. Any politics-driven reform to the Court threatens to undermine whatever is left of the public’s trust in the institution. The Court’s role as guardian of individual rights, ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, and final arbiter of the law is very much at stake. Ultimately, the Court’s decisions confer legitimacy only insofar as we believe in its singular ability to apply the law in neutral fashion, according to a standard we (perhaps naively) think insulated from political ideology.

These convictions have led Justice Breyer to claim that the “peril facing the Supreme Court comes less from partisan judges than from citizens who, encouraged by politicians, equate impartial justice with agreeable judicial outcomes.” Rather than focusing on results, we should expect judges first and foremost to follow the law. Public trust comes from our faith that, in interpreting the law, justices rely on their legal ability and interpretative powers rather than fidelity to a particular political party. We call on the Court to deliver legal pronouncements rooted in a theory of constitutional interpretation rather than barefaced political morality. The Court stands apart from other political institutions because we see its members as possessing a specific kind of expertise and assessing cases according to a unique and independent metric. Judging is about applying neutral legal criteria, not about partisan policy preferences; it’s about divining the meaning of words, the intentions of authors, and the implications of past precedents. It’s an investigation rather than a contest, a deliberation rather than a quarrel, an art rather than a science.

Apart from this prioritizing of procedure over product, we also tend to think that the justice’s lifetime tenure insulates them from political pressure. On the one hand, this makes the justices unaccountable to the people; these unelected officials exercise enormous power over the lives of citizens without fear of recall. On the other hand, this suggests that judges are freed from the rancor of party politics and are beholden to no one (including the person who appointed them).

But what do we do with the incongruity between this idealized fantasy and our political reality? How do we restore (or at least maintain) public trust in the institution? Expanding the bench threatens to burn whatever credibility the Court has left, but staying the course promises death by a thousand cuts. From regular appointments to term limits, perhaps President Biden’s Supreme Court reform commission can show us the path forward, though no one seems to be holding their breath.