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The Algorithm and the Barrel: Diogenes in the Age of Attention

In 1976, historian Laurel Thatcher Ulrich wrote that, “[w]ell-behaved women seldom make history.” While her original intention was to highlight how the historical record overlooks women who conform to the expectations of their time, it has since been taken up as a rebellious mantra, one that supports bucking the patriarchal norms that expect women to, for lack of a better word, behave. In its original context, it referred to women who adhered to Puritan social norms, but I have more often heard it used as a broader call to resist and disrupt conformity. In its widest interpretation, it becomes a claim about history itself: that change rarely comes from compliance, and that progress tends to belong to those willing to upset a few apple carts.

The reason I start with that quote here is that it kept coming to mind over the past week as I read Diogenes: The Rebellious Life and Revolutionary Philosophy of the Original Cynic. This book, part biography, part theoretical exploration, provides the reader with a wonderful introduction to the works of the (in)famous thinker, his brand of Cynicism, and his talent for annoying the ever-loving hell out of almost everyone he encountered. It is this latter quality — his refusal to recognize the conventions of his time as anything other than arbitrary — that may well explain why we still know his name. And while he was most certainly not a woman (and I feel no small degree of discomfort about deploying Ulrich’s quote when talking about a man), the underlying idea still feels intact: that to be remembered, one often has to challenge the powerful, whether those powers are people or systems, and this is often noisy.

Nothing symbolizes this more than Diogenes’ legendary encounter with Alexander the Great. According to accounts from the 3rd century CE (somewhat confusingly written by another man also called Diogenes), Alexander visited Corinth, where Diogenes was living. Intrigued by the philosopher’s reputation for rejecting wealth, status, and convention, Alexander sought him out and found him resting in the sun. Introducing himself, Alexander asked if there was anything he could do for him. At this point, he was already the most powerful man in Greece and, therefore, capable of granting almost any desire Diogenes might reasonably have had. Diogenes, however, was unimpressed. He simply replied: “Yes — stand out of my light.”

Alexander is said to have been struck by the answer. That this man, rather than asking for wealth, property, slaves, or power, should instead request only the return of sunlight was reportedly astonishing to him. Rather than taking offense, Alexander is said to have later remarked that if he were not Alexander, he would choose to be Diogenes.

Whether this encounter took place is difficult to say. The account we have was written several hundred years after both men’s deaths. Yet, whether factual or not, it remains the clearest symbol of Diogenes’ philosophy: a rejection of unnecessary desire, a commitment to self-sufficiency, and a willingness to speak truth to power. In another equally famous exchange (and one that is far more likely to have historical grounding), when Plato defined a human being as a “featherless biped,” Diogenes allegedly arrived at one of Plato’s lectures with a plucked chicken and declared (depending on the translation), “This is Plato’s man!

While these are, arguably, two of the most iconic interactions Diogenes had with those around him, they are by far not the only ones. Diogenes consistently found ways to, if one wants to be polite, challenge assumptions (and if one wants to be less polite, consistently be a bit of a dick.)

All this is to say that Diogenes was rarely well behaved, and he most certainly made history.

Now, I know what you’re thinking: this is all rather interesting (and I would encourage anyone interested in philosophy to spend more time with Diogenes), but why does this matter right now?

One way to answer that is to place Diogenes not in the ancient world, but in the modern world of attention economics. We tend to think of disruptive figures — cultural, political, or digital — as people who break systems. Yet much of what appears disruptive today is, in practice, faithful to the systems in which it operates. The most successful “rebels” of the digital age are those who have learned, consciously or not, to optimize themselves for the logic of the algorithm or the economy.

Take, for instance, the ecosystem shaped by platforms such as YouTube. Its recommendation systems reward watch time, engagement, and retention above all else. Within that framework, creators who appear outrageous, extravagant, or rule-breaking often thrive; not because they are resisting the system, but because they are calibrated to it. The more extreme the gesture, the more efficiently it converts into clicks; the more legible the spectacle, the more reliably it circulates.

This is where the modern “Diogenes figure” becomes interesting. Contemporary attention economies produce a corrupted echo of Cynicism: the creator who appears to reject norms, stages acts of excess or refusal, and claims to exist outside convention. Yet this rejection is frequently itself a performance that the system not only tolerates but actively amplifies.

Few figures illustrate this tension more clearly than large-scale content creators such as MrBeast. On the surface, his videos often appear to escalate beyond rational limits: vast sums of money given away, elaborate physical challenges, and increasingly cinematic production values. There is a surface narrative of disruption: “no one has done this before,” “this breaks the internet,” or “this is bigger than anything else on the platform.” But this is precisely the point. The content is not outside the algorithm; it is shaped by it. It is engineered for retention, shareability, and the precise signals platforms reward.

Seen this way, the “radical” gesture is not Diogenes lying in the sun and refusing Alexander’s offer. It is closer to Diogenes’ learning that the loudest provocation gathers the biggest crowd, and then refining that provocation until it becomes an optimized spectacle. The detail matters here, and Diogenes may well have enjoyed the attention his antics generated from the ancient crowds. But what matters more is not his personal psychology, but the ideas he espoused: that value systems are arbitrary, and that refusal, not performance, is what exposes them.

When Diogenes disrupts Plato’s lecture with a plucked chicken or tells Alexander to move, he is not attempting to win within an attention system; he is exposing the system itself as arbitrary. The discomfort he produces is not aesthetic but philosophical. And crucially, it resists measurement. There is no metric that can translate his actions into success, because he is not operating within a framework that rewards him for success in the first place. Indeed, as we saw with Alexander, he actively avoided what many would consider rewards.

By contrast, the contemporary attention economy absorbs even the appearance of refusal and converts it into a monetizable form. The algorithm does not care whether you are praising or mocking it, so long as you are engaging with it. This produces a strange inversion: the more something resembles Diogenic rebellion — transgression, refusal, anti-establishment performance — the more easily it is captured by the system it seems to oppose.

The consequence is that “making history” today can look less like stepping outside a system and more like mastering its internal logic. The figures who dominate digital culture are not necessarily those who reject the rules, but those who understand them most intuitively. In that sense, the OG Diogenes becomes less a model for spectacle and more a correction to it. He reminds us that refusal is not simply about being louder, more extreme, or more visible. It is, at least in principle, about withholding participation in the economy that turns attention itself into value.

Now, is it still possible to withhold? That is a question. But I like to think that Diogenes, confronted with a world so thoroughly structured around visibility, optimization, and capture, would not adapt quietly to it. If anything, I suspect he would be less well behaved than ever, and that might still be the most honest response available.

Efficiency Isn’t the Point: Work, Time, and Reverence in the AI Wave

“I didn’t like it when you took out the picture painter last month.”

“That’s because I wanted you to learn to paint all by yourself, son.”

Ray Bradbury, “The Veldt” (1950)

 

AI frenzy abounds. Last month, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman faced attempted murder, and Anthropic’s Project Glasswing launched. In March, Science labelled artificial intelligence “sycophantic,” claiming large language models’ (LLMs’) flattery “decreases prosocial intentions and promotes dependence.” Citing cognitive surrender and the loss of something essentially human, critics mourn creative and critical thinking capacities, as well as the heightened electricity and water consumption, traumatized content moderators, and military use of autonomous weapons indirectly implicated by the average user’s encounter with ChatGPT.

But I don’t want to talk about all of that – we’re sufficiently swirling in chatbot praise, critique, and bothesidesism. Instead, I’d like to unpack what I encounter to be its most common justification: “It just saves so much time.” From what, exactly, are we saving ourselves? For what ought we preserve our time, energy, and attention?

In other words, if AI’s perceived upshot is efficiency, then we must first ask if efficiency is good.

To be efficient is to minimize input while maximizing output. At first, it’s hard to see this as anything but a win. Suppose you have a series of to-dos requiring four hours of your time and 70% of your energy. If granted an offer to expend just two hours or 35% effort to accomplish the same tasks, then accepting it seems like a no-brainer.

Familiar bearers of these magic offers include sinks and stoves, washers and dryers, and dishwashers. Weekly hours devoted to hygiene and maintenance vanish, replaced with a utility bill and push of a button, producing near-instant heat, water, and clean clothes. With oodles of bonus time, you may do anything you like, from extra work to extra rest. For many, any conceivable use of time seems more valuable than those sunk into soapy water.

If behind-the-scenes essentials are handled, then human attention can be delegated toward what really matters. But what counts as washing dishes, and what counts as the thing we ought to do instead?

To answer, imagine you’re a researcher compiling a literature review. You’re up to your elbows in reading, none of which may make it into your end product. You scour papers, hunt through footnotes, and chase citations. Once the gathering is over, you endlessly rework paragraphs, contextualize your contribution within a broader narrative, and scroll through a few more PDFs, just in case you missed something. It takes weeks.

Barring its citation fabrication habit, AI could do this before you finish brushing your teeth.

Is this good?

If you spend less time doing your work and have less of your work to do, then you spend less time with it. This poses two risks.

First, you disassociate from the chance encounters that come along with work. There’s no more surprise confrontations with that random secondary author’s name over and again and puzzling over terminology of centuries-old subfield debates, the moments that enable our stumbling upon new projects to explore and ignite curiosities. There is a sea of untapped value floating in extra hours of devotion before we reach the point of unconstructive rumination or moral masochism.

Second, less time with work means less knowledge of it. For instance, if I ask AI to pour over my students’ handwriting and stylistic quirks, then I decline opportunities to encounter who these thirteen-year-olds are. Such circumstances leave me with more time but less understanding of who or what I’m tasked with learning, nurturing, or preserving.

When the researcher, grader, or student speeds through or delegates their job, something connective and uniquely human dies, just a little. Floundering in how to reply to a colleague, brainstorm an essay, or outline a painting are not mere precursors to an output. Thoughtful expression is the task itself. 

I think I mean something like this: we need to be hyperaware of the aim of our efficiency and the tools we use to achieve it. That is, “It just saves so much time,” is an incomplete celebration. We ought to hold our applause until affirming that a given stroke of efficiency promotes something that really matters. In other words, efficiency isn’t an inherent good. It’s good when it preserves what is good, not good when it doesn’t.

One thing that probably is good is that which, in both process and result, enables human flourishing. And if our flourishing is the aim, then some of our work shouldn’t (or can’t) be efficient. Kurt Vonnegut’s 2006 letter of advice to high schoolers articulates it best:

“Practice any art, music, singing, dancing, acting, drawing, painting, sculpting, poetry, fiction, essays, reportage, no matter how well or badly, not to get money and fame, but to experience becoming, to find out what’s inside you, to make your soul grow.

Seriously! I mean starting right now, do art and do it for the rest of your lives. Draw a funny or nice picture of Ms. Lockwood, and give it to her. Dance home after school, and sing in the shower and on and on. Make a face in your mashed potatoes. Pretend you’re Count Dracula.

Here’s an assignment for tonight, and I hope Ms. Lockwood will flunk you if you don’t do it: Write a six line poem, about anything, but rhymed. No fair tennis without a net. Make it as good as you possibly can. But don’t tell anybody what you’re doing. Don’t show it or recite it to anybody, not even your girlfriend or parents or whatever, or Ms. Lockwood. OK?

Tear it up into teeny-weeny pieces, and discard them into widely separated trash recepticals. You will find that you have already been gloriously rewarded for your poem. You have experienced becoming, learned a lot more about what’s inside you, and you have made your soul grow.

The thought of quickly, efficiently executing this task, or even striving to do so, is nonsensical, and not because someone will mourn their favorite writer’s flick of the wrist. Some value doesn’t rest in it being for anyone. The process is the point.

Further, even if you disagree that some work shouldn’t (or can’t) be efficient, it’s hard not to accept another notion: efficiency rivals reverence, and reverence is essentially human.

Reverence is a name for the attitude that begins with deep looking and awe and sprouts truth-entrenched, thoughtful responses. It is necessarily slow and methodical, even repetitive or nutty. It lives not only in open-mouthed wonder in response to sunlight but also in the evenings of rereading a sentence five times, of staring at a semicolon and wondering if it belongs there.

There’s something reverent in talking to someone about an idea in person for no other reason than curiosity. It’s what we take on when staring at the sheen of an apple, tracing handwritten sentences, or reflecting on the care and vulnerability embedded in the act of a peer reading your paper and how, in response, you might embrace the disgustingness and epiphany in rewriting.

A chatbot could tell you exactly what shade of red the apple is quicker than you can describe it, offer an analysis of your collection of letters, and shoot you feedback with entirely less effort than your friend will expend. While I am sure someone has arguments (perhaps compelling ones) for its place, I cannot help but mourn that something – wonderfully vibrant and real – we’ll lose, even if just a bit. We owe it to humanity to cement our lives in a handful of bumbling, blisteringly human habits, if given up, would make you feel less yourself.

Maybe we are supposed to hand wash the dishes. And be bored. And look over each word each of our kids wrote in their essays. Or help each other think of synonyms and solutions and jokes and pick up apples and stare at them because they’re there, and they’re red, and we can see them. What else, really, are we supposed to be doing?

Our aims do not live and die in efficiency. It’s hard to call something a tool when its use is to “alleviate” us from the hours needed to meaningfully persist alongside each other. How can we expect to engage our own humanness by mechanizing it? And even if we were able to pull it off, wouldn’t the irony cheapen it so severely that something, surely, has already been lost?

Amidst panicked invitations to question the fate of humanity, let us not, in the meantime, forget to revel in its essence.

Should You Be Weird?

In a recent interview, Palantir CEO Alex Karp said that he believes that AI will “destroy humanities jobs.” A philosophy graduate himself, Karp is pessimistic about the long-term employability of humanities grads, given that they tend to be “generalists” who specialize in critical thinking and problem solving, things he thinks AI is better suited for. Those who do have a future, according to Karp, are those who either have “vocational training” or are, in his words, “neurodivergent.”

Ironically, Palantir is arguably in need of people who specialize in the humanities, especially ethics. Regardless, Karp’s advice seems to be going against the grain: numerous other CEOs and economists have stated recently that the so-called “age of AI” has led them to look to liberal arts majors as sources of creativity that is outside AI’s wheelhouse. As one researcher puts it, there is currently a “weirdness premium” when it comes to job applicants.

While Karp and his critics disagree about the future job-readiness of humanities graduates, both seem to agree that there is something important about being weird. But what kind of weirdness is worth pursuing? Should you, too, be weird?

Weirdness might be considered particularly valuable at this moment in time because what AI produces – specifically, generative AI programs like bog-standard chatbots – is decidedly not weird. Or, if it is weird, it is weird by accident: AI-generated images and videos can often “look weird” by being uncanny or unnatural, and the output of chatbots can seem “weird” when they produce nonsense. But this weirdness is the result of AI programs not working properly: when they work as they should, they produce content that tends to be perceived as generic. This is a consequence of how these programs work: chatbots produce content by finding the most frequent combinations of parts of words in their database and strings them together. As a result, chatbots tend to produce content that is the average of the most common ideas, and is thus decidedly not weird.

If AI isn’t giving us the weirdness we want, where should we find it? “Weird” can be used in lots of different ways, depending on the context: we might think that a person is weird because of some facet of their personality we don’t really like or get; unexpected outcomes of actions or experiments are sometimes described as weird; something can be weird to our senses (tasting weird, smelling weird, etc.); art can be weird in plethora ways; etc. And, of course, weirdness is dependent on context: different people from different places will consider different things weird.

While many of these senses of “weird” are pejorative, the kind of premium on weirdness is presumably not that kind of weird we talk about when we refer to people that “weird us out” or when our yogurt tastes weird. What we’re looking for, then, is a kind of virtuous weirdness.

Although we use the word in lots of different ways, we can identify some characteristic aspects of what it means to be weird. Weirdness seems to involve something unusual, in the sense of being both infrequent and contrary to our expectations; after all, if everyone was doing it, and it wasn’t surprising, it wouldn’t be weird. Weirdness also seems to require an aspect of deviance. A deviant act is one that is recognizable as a type, but goes against the grain in some way. For example, if I were to say that my yogurt tastes weird, it is something that I would still recognize as being yogurt, just different, in some way. As such, weirdness is not chaos, randomness, or mere noise: it does not completely abandon the structures that we are accustomed to, but rather pushes on them in a way that causes us to reconsider how we interact with those structures.

The conditions of being unusual and deviant need to be present at the same time for something to be weird. Being unusual by itself is not necessarily weird: for example, we might meet someone who has the relatively niche hobby of stamp collecting, and this might be surprising given what we know about their personality, but this isn’t enough to say that they are weird. Similarly, mere deviance does not make for weirdness: there are plenty of behaviors that are “deviant” in the face of certain common norms, e.g. petty crimes like shoplifting, graffitiing, or doing drugs in places where that’s not allowed. We might argue about the morality of such acts, but they certainly aren’t “weird.”

Of course, acting in ways that meet all the conditions for weirdness does not necessarily result in anything we would want to aspire to. A virtuous weirdness might then require being directed towards a worthwhile goal. Consider, for example, a contemporary paradigm case of virtuous weirdness: the Quebecois band Angine de Poitrine. They have taken the internet by storm precisely because they are so weird: the two-person (or potentially alien) band, dressed in black-and-white spotted outfits and sporting proboscises of varying rigidity, have earned them the title of “the world’s weirdest party band.” The band has sometimes been called “anti-AI”: whereas AI-created music often sounds like an anodyne slurry of only the safest radio hits, Angine de Poitrine is surprising and captivating, even if the music itself is not really your thing.

This kind of weirdness is unusual – no one else is really doing what Angine de Poitrine are doing – and it is deviant: the music they create is different, but not so divergent from other music as to sound like mere noise. It is also directed at what seems like a worthwhile end: as an artistic expression, and to make us think about music in a way that we may not have considered before.

This is the kind of weirdness that cannot be replicated by AI, and is at a premium among today’s CEOs – although they are likely looking for weirdness that is directed towards a different end, namely, that of generating solutions to complex problems. Whether this kind of weirdness is something that can be cultivated by an education in the humanities or whether you simply need to be born with it is up for debate.

So: should you be weird? There are practical reasons why you might want to be weird, since you might be able to do things that AI can’t or won’t do, so your future employment opportunities will be safer. But there seems to be something antithetical about weirdness that is cultivated for the sake of impressing tech CEOs who are bored with their AI. Indeed, AI companies are frequently in search of those with niche expertise in creative disciplines to train their AI models, presumably with the goal of making them better at producing an ersatz weirdness that distinguishes them from their competitors, at least in some small way. But weirdness that is used to supplement or train AI then risks being self-defeating, making the unusual and surprising usual and predictable. It doesn’t seem like virtuous weirdness can be directed towards its own destruction.

That’s not to say that the only virtuous weirdos are those who, say, make weird art that they will never profit from, and weirdness may indeed be on display when coming up with creative new ways to solve problems in areas that many people would find mundane. But virtuous weirdness, no matter where it’s exhibited, seems to require a love of the game, valuing its unusualness and deviance for their own sake, at least in part. While we should rightly value weirdness, if your sole motivation for being weird is that you can secure a job at Palantir, then you’re probably not being the good kind of weird.

The Ethics of Setting a Warehouse on Fire

In early April a Kimberly-Clark Corporation distribution center was set ablaze. The accused arsonist, an employee, compared himself to Luigi Mangione and allegedly stated: “All you had to do was pay us enough to live.” Since then a viral story has emerged about a growing surge in warehouse fires motivated by unacceptable working conditions, complete with a crowdsourced warehouse fire tracker. The truth underneath the social media phenomenon is harder to suss out. As yet, only a small number have been confirmed as arson. For most, the causes have yet to be determined and they may well be one of the approximately 1500 warehouse fires that occur annually in the US.

What about the ethics? Can burning down a warehouse ever be an acceptable response to poor working conditions?

The most straightforward analysis of arson is that it’s ethically wrong because of the harm it causes to people and to property. A warehouse fire may destroy a lot of property (and result in further economic losses from the inability to use the warehouse), but the question of financial harm caused to a company is more complicated. For giant companies, such as Amazon, the actual harm caused is comparatively small, just given the number of warehouses (600+ logistics centers in the US). Smaller companies may suffer more severe disruption, but even then, insurance will mitigate many, although not all, of the financial harms. Finally, unlike a person, a corporation cannot have a sentimental attachment to property nor need it as shelter. Altogether, if someone wants to harm their employer, a warehouse fire may not actually be that effective.

Ironically, some of the people most likely to be harmed by a warehouse fire are employees whose place of work is destroyed. For instance, a company in Green Bay, Wisconsin, laid off 32 employees after a major warehouse fire in late April — no indication yet this fire was arson.

It’s not just property; people can get hurt in warehouse fires as well. Having said that, injuries and death are fortunately relatively rare, averaging around 2 deaths per year in the US over recent years. Of course, fires can spread, creating unpredictable risks.

An action is not automatically unethical just because it causes harm, although it certainly makes it more challenging to defend. From a consequentialist perspective (an ethical approach that prioritizes the overall consequences of an action), even arson can be justifiable if the overall effects are beneficial.

So, what’s the positive contribution of setting a warehouse on fire? Assuming a company treats its employees truly egregiously, how would a warehouse fire solve that? Even when an employee makes their motivations explicit, as with the Kimberly-Clark fire, it’s unlikely to make company leadership reflect on their policies rather than simply dismiss the event as the action of a single disgruntled employee. Nor is it apparent why they would, say, increase pay and not security or insurance coverage. If companies actually began to substantially improve working conditions in response to concerns about arson, we would have the bones of a consequentialist argument, but there is no indication this is the case. Even then, benefits would have to outweigh the harms of a spate of warehouse fires.

This speaks to a general problem of independent radicals. Their actions are always explainable (often justifiably) as the pathology of a specific individual and thus can easily be brushed off. Even an uptick in copycat arson would at best show pockets of shared sentiment. By contrast, mass actions such as strikes and protests communicate more clearly. Necessarily, many workers had to come together to engage in the action, signaling shared and deep concerns. Movements can also enmesh action within a broader set of goals, giving them clarity of purpose.

Harmful actions may also be more ethically acceptable if there are fewer alternatives. What else could someone have done other than set their workplace on fire? On an individual level, of course, changing jobs may be one alternative. But it’s worth noting this strategy doesn’t address workplace injustices; it merely helps one person get out. Collective action might be a preferable response, but the US landscape for labor organizing has been greatly eroded over the last several decades. Still, most workers maintain a general right to organize within the workplace.

Ultimately, it is crucial that workers feel they have agency in the workplace. In the United States, early 20th-century legislation such as the Wagner Act and the more restrictive Taft-Hartley Act, channeled labor organizing and company responses into a narrow range of acceptable channels. Prior to this, conflicts were often incredibly violent. In the 1892 Homestead strike, company president Henry Clay Frick hired the Pinkertons as a part of strike-breaking action, ultimately resulting in shots fired between strikers and Pinkerton agents. Even more dramatically, the Battle of Blair Mountain in 1921 was a full-scale armed conflict between striking coal workers and strike breakers. It is in the public interest to have effective, and peaceful, avenues for resolving disputes between workers and employers. If these do not exist, or are seen as unfair, workers may choose to go off-script to fight for dignified working conditions.

Ultimately, burning down a warehouse is probably not an ethical (nor an effective) way to improve working conditions. But it brings to the fore an important point about violence and harms. A fire is highly attention-grabbing. Like protestors destroying property, or large-scale strikes, it’s a perfect fit for the evening news. Far less visible are the background harms that push someone to take such drastic action in the first place.

There is preventable harm occurring in society all the time: the crumbling bodies of Amazon workers from moving packages on their feet all day, children suffering from malnutrition, accumulation of toxins from unregulated or poorly regulated chemicals. The peace theorist Johan Galtung famously characterized structural violence, when institutions and the broader structure of society prevent people from having their needs met and rights supported. Whether this is the best way to define violence is tricky, and likely depends on the context in which one is deploying the term. But it has an important advantage. It calls out equally those acts which break the status quo (war, terrorism, crime, arson), and those acts which compose the status quo (poverty, oppression, discrimination). We should be wary of the injustices hiding out in business-as-usual, for they can be just as harmful, and just as in need of prevention, as warehouse fires.

On Assassination Attempts and Infamy

This week, President Donald Trump experienced his third assassination attempt in the last two years. On Saturday night, the annual White House Correspondents’ Association (WHCA) dinner ended prematurely when an armed man rushed a security checkpoint, firing gunshots in the process. Within hours, news sites around the world were publishing photographs and details of the assailant, including the particulars of his written manifesto.

It’s the way these stories almost always go. Whenever a sensational crime is committed, the media rush to report every possible detail of the offender; from their family history, to their political affiliations, to their online activities. There’s a certain voyeurism to it – no doubt fueled by our dark fascination with how ordinary people can come to do extraordinarily terrible things. Our “true crime” obsession now means that this exposure can extend far beyond the standard news circle. The Zodiac Killer had their own movie, while Jeffrey Dahmer got an entire television series.

But is this the right move? Should we rush to cement the infamy of serious offenders?

Compare the above examples with the mosque attacks that occurred in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019. Two consecutive mass shootings saw a single gunman kill 51 individuals and injure 40 more. Who was that gunman? Few in New Zealand know – or care to. This largely stems from what has been referred to as an “explicit moral choice” by New Zealand media to provide no infamy to the killer. As Professor Susanna Every-Palmer has since noted:

“The shooter’s actions suggested a man seeking maximum exposure. The media, presumably repelled by the blatant solicitation of their attention, appears to have baulked at providing him with what he sought.”

And perhaps there are good moral reasons to react in this way. In order to see why, we might consider the reasoning behind our most common response to wrongdoing: punishment.

Most of us share the intuition that when someone breaks the law, that person should be punished. But it’s worthwhile considering why this might be the case. Generally, punishment tends be justified in one of two broad ways. The first is consequentialist: a forwards-looking approach that justifies punishment on the basis of the future goods that it can achieve. Most obvious among those goods is deterrence. When we punish an offender, we hope to deter that offender from committing similar crimes in the future. But we also hope to deter others – that is, to make an example of the offender such that other potential offenders will choose to not break the law. The more general idea behind deterrence-based reasoning is that we want the consequences of committing a crime to be as unattractive as possible. At the very least, we want to do all we can to ensure that there is no incentive for an offender to commit a crime.

Providing infamy to an offender runs counter to this idea – particularly in cases where the offender is committing their crime for the explicit purpose of making public some kind of cause or agenda. This, arguably, was among the motivations of both the Christchurch gunman and the WHCA dinner assailant. Put simply: giving public exposure to these individuals – and their causes – provides them with the very thing they’d hoped to achieve. What’s more, it might provide a powerful incentive for others who seek infamy to try to achieve it in the same kind of way. If this is the case, then providing these offenders with as little media coverage as possible might be at least one way we can try to deter the future commission of similar crimes.

But there aren’t just consequentialist reasons for denying an offender infamy. An alternative way of thinking about our response to wrongdoers can be found in the theory of retributivism. Unlike consequentialism, retributivism is backwards-looking, and instead justifies punishment purely on the basis that the offender has – in the past – done something wrong. Retributivism comes in various forms, but is often justified in terms of “desert”. In its simplest form, this concept merely captures the common intuition that good actions deserve good results, and bad actions deserve bad results. On this basis, the reason we punish an offender is because this is what they deserve.

When we see a serious crime committed, we often have a strong urge to make public an offender’s actions – to “name-and-shame” them for their reprehensible behavior. But maybe we need to temper this urge with a more careful consideration of what these offenders actually deserve. Do they deserve infamy? Do they deserve to have their causes advanced or their manifestos published?

Arguably, they don’t. What they might deserve is total obscurity. To be forgotten altogether.

Whether our reasoning is consequentialist or retributivist in nature, the conclusion seems to be the same. It’s a sentiment that’s most eloquently captured by former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern who – following the Christchurch massacre – described the gunman as:

“…a terrorist… a criminal… an extremist. But he will, when I speak, be nameless. And to others, I implore you: speak the names of those who were lost rather than the name of the man who took them. He may have sought infamy but we, in New Zealand, will give nothing – not even his name.”