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Insects on the Menu: The Class Divide in Sustainable Protein

photograph of insect dishes on buffet

This article contains spoilers for the 2013 film Snowpiercer and some possible spoilers for the series of the same name.

Last night, I attended a talk by the U.K.’s Royal Entomological Society. The talk was titled “Insects as Food and Feed: Delivering Insect Proteins in the UK.” The panel consisted of a lawyer specializing in the regulation of regenerative agriculture, technology, and innovation; a professor in animal health and production; a CEO of an insect-based waste management company; and a poultry nutrition and innovation manager. The general gist of the talk was to consider the scientific, legal, and market factors that might enhance or inhibit the use of insects as food, both for humans and for farm animals.

Now, I should have realized that a talk hosted by an entomological society, with a panel consisting of persons interested in seeing commercial insect consumption for both people and farm animals, would have a certain bias. Or, to put it more delicately, such an event would focus on the areas mentioned above and not consider, as a central point, the ethics of animal consumption. Unfortunately, this didn’t occur to me before attending the talk, and despite my best efforts during the Q&A (for which I wasn’t called to ask a question), I could not shift the conversation in a more philosophical direction.

So, I want to abuse my position here just a little and talk about one of the many ethical issues that insect farming raises: the symbolism of insect consumption regarding class division.

The reason this topic came to the forefront of my mind during last night’s talk can be traced back to a single point. About halfway through, the panel were discussing how to make eating insects more appealing to people. Obviously, to many of us, the idea of eating bugs rather than steak, chicken, pork, or any other farmyard animal, is less than appealing (I’m a vegetarian, so it’s all bad in my eyes). This, however, isn’t universal. In countries like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Madagascar, insects form a staple part of one’s diet. Yet, here, in the “Western world,” there is a significant, if not overwhelming, taboo against insect consumption. So, any discussion about getting more people to eat insects, for whatever motivating reason, would naturally turn to methods.

A member of the panel noted that insect consumption is generally considered less troublesome when one isn’t faced with an actual insect to eat. Instead, revulsion at the idea tends to drop if they have been crushed, diced, blended, or processed via any other means. This shift shouldn’t be too surprising. It seems only natural that the physical nature of the insect, having to bite into a thorax or carapace, would generate feelings of disgust far more than if one can’t tell what a processed food was before being processed. So, the panel talked about protein powders, much like many of us use in our shakes or oats. But rather than the protein in these powders being sourced from things like whey, it would instead come from insects.

Ultimately, their argument was that the processing process rendered insects more palatable and thus would provide a valuable, and importantly, cheap, source of protein.

This stance makes sense to me, and I don’t wish to contest it. Nevertheless, the idea of processing insects to make them more likely to be consumed by a target population instantly conjured up memories of Bong Joon Ho’s 2013 post-apocalyptic action thriller Snowpiercer.

Before going any further, I feel compelled to say that if you have not watched Snowpiercer, stop reading this, go watch it, and then come back. The film is a masterpiece. It has a stellar cast (Chris Evans, Tilda Swinton, John Hurt, Ed Harris), fantastic set design, and a storyline and premise that captures you from the first frame to the last. I don’t want to spoil the film for you, so seriously, go now, watch it, and come back.

Welcome back.

Throughout the film, we follow the tailies (those living in the tail end of the train) as they fight their way up towards the train’s engine, the seat of symbolic and actual power. As they move forward, they move through the train’s class system and witness the increasing bleakness of life in the tail compared to the ever-growing luxury. It is with one scene before they get far on their journey, however, that instantly came to my mind last night.

After leaving the area where they had been contained, the tailies take control of a production carriage where the protein bars they had been living off of for the past 17 years were made. Chris Evens’ character quickly looks into the machine and sees (you guessed it) that the bars on which every person living in the train’s tail end ate were made from ground-up cockroaches. His reaction makes it instantly clear that neither he nor anyone else in the tail knew the true nature of what they were eating, and he decides to keep it that way. This scene starkly contrasts later ones where, as the group progresses, we see the splendor and variety of food the more affluent passengers ate (sushi, for example).

Now, I am not saying that this is what would occur in real life. I don’t think anyone on last night’s panel was suggesting that insects should be smuggled into people’s diets. Yet, there is something here — some sort of overlap — between the real-world possibility of processing insects so that more people would eat them, and the bleakness of Snowpiercer’s bug-based diet. And, after some reflection, I think it comes down to money. Or, put another way, down to the market forces that have opened a window and seemingly necessitate insect consumption.

Currently, buying insects to eat them is marginally more expensive than buying more traditional meat products (at least, it is in the U.K.). This, however, shouldn’t surprise anyone. Things get cheaper when production is scaled up, and at the moment, the edible insect market is small. So, companies that farm them are also small, with relatively high prices. There is also the legal environment with which to contend. Insects are only just now starting to be entertained as a suitable food. So, there are limited marketable opportunities because we don’t have straightforward or accommodating regulations. Should these two constricting factors change — a larger market and a less cautious regulatory and legal environment — the cost of insect production will fall.

Indeed, many believe the cost would fall so significantly that insects would make an ideal, cheaper, protein-rich alternative to pork, beef, chicken, etc. After all, it takes far less space and resources to farm insects than it does cows, pigs, or sheep. Plus, insects can be fed things which farm animals cannot (things like waste).

It is this point, however, that gives me pause for thought. I am not against finding cheaper (and more environmentally friendly) ways of feeding people; far from it. But I don’t think we can get away from the fact that marketing insects as a cheaper alternative to traditional meats means that those with the shallowest pockets are more likely to buy them, even if they don’t necessarily want to. This possibility is something we see all the time when it comes to the purchase of foods that are cheap yet unhealthy. People, generally, don’t want to buy things that will make them ill in the long run, but when that’s all they can afford, and when our economic and food production systems funnel consumers into those purchases, they have little alternative.

The same is true here with insects. Not that they may make people ill, but those who can’t afford anything else will be forced to have bugs for dinner by their economic reality.

Of course, on the flip side of this, we have the rich. Those with the material resources can purchase what they want, when they want, free from the constraints under which many others labor. For them, insect consumption might be a choice, they might make such sources of protein a staple of their diet. They might eat bugs occasionally or as a one-off just for fun. Or they might never do it because the idea gives them the willies. The important thing, though, is that they have a choice. They can decide, and my sneaking suspicion is that for many here in the West, given how attached we are to our traditional meats, we would be reluctant to give them up for a bug burger, even if the insects are well processed.

And so, what I worry about, what Snowpiercer depicts, and what I think is almost inevitable with our general rush to the bottom economic system, is that people with low incomes will be forced, through the accident of birth and the whims of a financial system over which they have no meaningful control, to exist on protein bars, shakes, and other products. At the same time, those who already possess substantial material and financial resources will find that anything resembling a decent cut of meat will be theirs to enjoy without competition.

Ultimately, I worry about bug consumption’s class implications and social justice concerns. I don’t want to live like a tailie, and I certainly don’t want to have the idea sold to me as a benefit when, in reality, it constricts diet options even more than finances already do.

On the Morality of Squashing Lanternflies

photograph of spotted lanterfly

This summer, the East Coast of the United States has been plagued by the spotted lanternfly. First discovered in Pennsylvania in 2014, the lanternfly is a highly invasive species that – if allowed to spread throughout the U.S. – could devastate the ecosystem, and seriously impact the grape, orchard, and logging industries. States have been swift to respond. Ohio is setting traps, while Pennsylvania has employed sniffer dogs to track down their eggs. Connecticut and Virginia, on the other hand, have issued a very clear message to their residents: “Squash these bugs on sight!”

Several weeks ago, I discussed the revelation that insects might experience pain and – for this reason – might be worthy of moral consideration. This was based upon Peter Singer’s assertion that the only prerequisite for having interests is the capacity to experience pleasure and pain (since if something can experience pleasure then it has an interest in pursuing pleasure, and if something can experience pain then it has an interest in avoiding pain). Once identified, these interests must – according to Singer – be counted equally with the same interests when experienced by any other being.

Put simply, if it is morally wrong to cause X amount of pain to a human, then it must also be morally wrong to cause X amount of pain to any other creature capable of experiencing pain – even insects.

But that reasoning seems to run counter to what we’re being urged to do in light of the lanternfly invasion. Being squashed is clearly a painful experience. As such, we would consider it morally reprehensible to squash a human, or a dog, or even a mouse. Yet, for some reason, this very action is here being condoned. How can we make sense of this? Are we in fact doing something morally wrong every time we squash a spotted lanternfly?

An important first step is to note that the experience of being squashed will not be consistent across species. For a human, it will be utterly traumatizing – filled with not only physical pain, but the dread and terror of one’s imminent end. Arguably, the pain will be slightly less for the dog or mouse – if only since they will largely lack awareness of what’s happening to them. What, then, will the experience be like for the lanternfly? This is a difficult question – made all the more difficult by the fact that we are only on the cusp of discovering that insects might feel pain, let alone being able to quantify it. Let’s assume, then, that the amount of pain (both physical and psychological) experienced by a lantern fly upon being squashed is significantly less than that felt by a human or dog or mouse going through the very same experience. Perhaps it’s the equivalent of a human receiving a particularly bad papercut.

What this means, then, is that our moral attitudes towards squashing lantern bugs should be roughly the same as inflicting painful papercuts on others. And, chances are, even though the latter is a relatively minor harm, we would usually refrain from doing this on the assumption that it is morally wrong.

For this reason, we would seem to have a moral reason to refrain from inflicting the precise same amount of pain on lanternflies. To do otherwise would, according to Singer, be speciest.

But we cannot stop our moral considerations there. While it might be wrong to inflict pain on a single insect for no good reason, we also need to take into account how our actions will affect the pain and pleasure of other living beings. This is particularly relevant in the context of invasive species. Some species – by their very existence in an alien environment – create enormous suffering and death for the local fauna. Just look at the ecological devastation wrought by domestic cats. In such cases, a small amount of harm to some animals might be justified by the fact that it avoids a much greater harm to other animals.

The lanternfly might be one such case. While the damage they cause is largely flora-based – feasting on around 70 host plant species – the flow-on ecological effects are set to be devastating, as native fauna finds itself starving as a result of dwindling food supplies.

But here’s the thing: even if some greater good justifies us causing harm to an invasive species, we are under a moral obligation to do all we can to minimize the harm necessary to achieve that good.

And this shouldn’t be surprising. It might be morally permissible for me to break someone’s car window in order to save the life of a severely dehydrated dog on a hot summer’s day. But that same justification wouldn’t allow me to then go on to key their door and slash their tires.

The same limits apply here. Even if we have good reason to do all we can to destroy lanternflies, this does not warrant wanton cruelty. This is why ethicists are so concerned about implementing ‘bounties’ on certain invasive species. Perverse incentives can bring about perverse outcomes. If there is a greater ecological good to be achieved, we may be morally justified in causing harm to certain invasive species. However, this harm will only be permitted to the extent that it is necessary in order to achieve that good. Gratuitous harm will remain morally impermissible. We should endeavor, then, to solve ecological crises while treating invasive species as humanely as possible. And if insects can experience pain, then this includes them too.

The Painful Truth About Insects

closeup photograph of mosquito

In a recent study, scientists from the Queen Mary University of London argue that insects possess central nervous control of ‘noiception’ – that is, the ability to detect painful stimuli. Put simply, this discovery makes it plausible that insects are capable of feeling pain in much the same way as humans and other animals. It’s worth considering, then, how this finding might be relevant to our moral considerations of insects.

Generally, we tend to think of humans as being equal. But what do we mean by this? Clearly it’s not that all humans are, in fact, equal. Humans differ enormously in their interests and capabilities. Some students want to become rock stars, others want to be mathematicians, while others might suffer from disabilities that make both of those options more difficult to pursue. Nor do we mean that all humans should receive equal treatment – since different humans have vastly different needs. The aspiring rock star needs a guitar, while the math-whiz needs access to quality education. The person suffering from a disability, on the other hand, might need extra assistance that would be unnecessary for their more able-bodied classmates.

It seems, then, that when we say that all humans are equal, we mean to say that the interests of all humans should be given equal consideration.

Put another way: we should care equally about all people – no person is of greater value than another. It’s this very notion that grounds the case against various types of bigotry like racism and sexism. To prioritize the interests of one person over another based purely on their ethnicity or gender is to deny the principle of equality.

In his seminal book, Animal Liberation, Peter Singer considers how the principle of equality might be extended beyond humans. If it’s wrong to prioritize the interests of certain beings based on their ethnicity or gender, then shouldn’t it also be wrong to prioritize them based on their species?

If animals have interests, how can we justify prioritizing our interests above theirs without, essentially, being speciest?

But this raises a very important question: do animals even have interests? It’s certainly clear that humans do. As noted above, some humans have an interest in becoming rock stars, while others have an interest in becoming mathematicians. And then there are those interests that are almost universally held by humans, such as interests in being healthy, safe, financially secure, and loved. But what about animals? It’s not obvious that there are goats who aspire to be rock stars, nor pigs that aspire to be mathematicians. Nor do any animals seem to show concern for things like financial security or love.

According to Singer, however, the only prerequisite for having interests is the capacity to experience pleasure and pain – or what we might call “sentience.” Why? Well, if something can experience pleasure, then it has an interest in pursuing pleasure. Likewise, if something can experience pain, then it has an interest in avoiding pain.

If some living being experiences suffering, then there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into account. And, if we adopt the principle of equality, then that suffering must be counted equally with the same amount of suffering when experienced by any other being.

So if kicking a person and causing them X amount of pain is morally wrong, then kicking a dog and causing that same amount of pain is just as wrong. Likewise, if it would be morally wrong to inflict Y amount of pain on a human in order to test the safety of a new cosmetic, then it will be just as morally wrong to inflict this same amount of pain on an animal for the same purpose.

Singer’s argument has huge ramifications for many of the ways in which we treat animals. Consider the animal suffering that goes into the production of a single cheeseburger – and how terrible we would consider that same suffering if it was experienced by a human. What’s more, this suffering is offset by only a small benefit to the human who eats the burger – a benefit that could just as easily be achieved via non-meat and non-dairy alternatives. In fact, much – if not all – of the animal products and by-products we consume start to become morally questionable when seen in this light.

Of course, one simple solution would be to discount – or disqualify entirely – the suffering of animals on the basis that they aren’t as intelligent as humans. But this is to go against the very principle of equality that many of us hold dear. When thinking about humans, we would consider it reprehensible to say that someone’s pain and suffering is less important simply because they are less intelligent than someone else. So we must take the same approach to animals.

The only consistent way to justify the suffering we inflict on animals is to say that their suffering counts for less simply because they are animals. But that’s speciesism – and it shares precisely the same (very bad) rationale that justifies racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry.

Indeed, Singer’s observations have motivated many people to adopt vegetarian or vegan lifestyles. But what are we to make of this new research that suggests insects might also be sentient? If an ant can feel pleasure and pain, then an ant has interests. And if an ant has interests, then the principle of equality demands that that suffering be counted equally with the same amount of suffering when experienced by any other being. Suppose, for example, that swatting a mosquito causes that mosquito to feel Z amount of pain. Suppose, then, that – for a human – that same amount of pain would be the equivalent of a hard slap to the face. If we believe that slapping a human is morally wrong, then the principle of equality would require us to reach the same moral judgement about inflicting the same amount of pain on a mosquito. This would mean, then, that swatting a mosquito was morally wrong.

It’s a strange conclusion, and one that is still very much open to debate. For one, we would need to establish that insects do in fact experience pain in the same morally relevant way as humans and other non-human animals. We would then need some way of measuring this pain in order to form reasonable moral judgements. It might, for example, turn out that the suffering experienced by a swatted mosquito is minuscule – much less, in fact, than the bite it gives to the next human it encounters. In such a case, we could possibly make a case for the moral permissibility of swatting that mosquito.

But in the absence of better information about whether – and to what extent – insects experience pain, what should we do? There’s a chance that there’s nothing problematic about causing insects to suffer. But there’s also a chance that we’ve been horribly wrong. Until only recently we were still unsure about whether non-human animals experienced pain, with veterinarians trained before 1989 taught to ignore animal suffering. In fact, doctors up until that decade were still skeptical that human babies experienced pain, with many infant surgeries routinely carried out without anesthesia. Given our poor track record of understanding pain in other living beings, the mere possibility that insects suffer should give us reason to pause and reconsider how we treat them.

Do Insects Matter?

close-up photograph of grasshopper

A few years ago I told my mom about a paper I’d written about insect suffering. She said: “Insect suffering? Like if I step on an ant?” I said: “Yes.” She said: “People talk about that?” I changed the subject because I was too embarrassed to explain that, no, they usually don’t, but I think they should.

But whether insects suffer, and whether this matters morally, is increasingly important. Many people now promote replacing meat from cows, pigs, chickens, etc. with protein from farmed insects. They think eating insects, and insect products, would be environmentally friendlier. Others, such as Brian Tomasik and Jeff Sebo and Jason Schukraft, are not convinced. Some are not convinced by the environmental claims, but they mostly worry about the implications for animal welfare. The animals that produce your meat, eggs, and dairy are almost always raised on factory farms where they are treated extremely inhumanely. Many philosophers, including me, think this is a good argument for getting your protein from vegan sources, like beans, lentils, nuts, seitan, and Beyond Burgers. (If that sounds too hard, you might start by cutting out chicken and eggs, since chickens are treated the worst.) Unfortunately, as Sebo and Schukraft describe, insect farms aren’t exceptions on the inhumane treatment front. If insects matter morally, this could be extremely bad: farming insects for human or animal consumption is increasingly popular, and we may soon be farming tens of trillions of insects every year.

I think that whether insects matter morally depends on at least two questions: (1) are insects sentient?, and (2) is being sentient enough for insects to matter morally? I answer these questions: (1) maybe, and (2) yes. Since insects might matter morally, it makes sense to give them the benefit of the doubt when we can do so without sacrificing anything too important. After saying more about all this, at the end, I’ll say some things about what it means to care morally about insects.

Are insects sentient?

Being sentient means that you are capable of having conscious experiences. Something is a conscious experience if there is something it is like to have it. Think about what you experience when you look at the black letters on this page. There is something it is like for you to see the color black, just as there is something it is like for you when you feel sad, or hear a song on the radio, or think about your plans for the future. There is also something it is like when a bat uses echolocation, even though we humans, who can’t echolocate, can’t imagine what it’s like. The experiences of seeing black, being sad, echolocating, etc. are all conscious experiences.

Can insects have conscious experiences? Is there something it’s like to be a fly or an ant, or are they “dark inside”? The short answer is that we’re not completely sure either way. I won’t try to review the evidence here; it’s reviewed in some of the pieces I linked above. What matters now is this: if it’s realistically possible that insects are sentient, and if sentience is enough for them to matter morally (as I argue next), then it makes sense to give them the benefit of the doubt when possible. If they matter morally and we unnecessarily harm them, we’ve done something bad.

Do all sentient beings matter morally?

Some individuals matter morally for their own sake. Others don’t. It’s wrong to hurt you, or a dog, without a good reason. It might be wrong for me to destroy a chair for no reason: maybe it’s your favorite chair. But that would be different. I would wrong you if I destroyed the chair. But I wouldn’t wrong the chair. The chair doesn’t matter for its own sake; only how it affects others matters. If I were on a distant planet with a chair no one cared about, it wouldn’t be wrong to destroy the chair. But if I were on a distant planet with a person or a dog no one cared about, it would still be wrong to hurt the person or the dog. They matter for their own sakes, not just because others care about them.

The question is whether insects matter for their own sakes. I think that if they are sentient, they do matter for their own sakes. Think about dogs. It is extremely wrong to light a dog on fire. It is usually okay to light a picture of a dog on fire. Why is that? Surely the answer has to be something like: the dog has a mind, feelings, an inner life, the dog is someone and not just something, and doing this terrible thing means the dog will feel horrible pain and lose out on valuable future experiences. In other words, the reasons not to hurt a dog have to do with the fact that dogs are sentient. But none of this is true of the picture of the dog; it really is just a thing that you can treat however you want.

So it seems to me that sentience is enough for an individual to matter morally: nothing with a mind, with the capacity for consciousness, is a mere thing. There is a further question about whether it might be possible for an individual that isn’t sentient to matter morally. But we don’t need to answer that here. What matters is that, if insects are sentient, they do matter morally.

What does this mean?

Suppose you and a fly are both drowning. I can only save one. Obviously, I should save you. That’s true even if you both matter morally. For one thing, I know you matter morally whereas I only know the fly might matter morally. But also: you have many desires and hopes about the future which will be foiled by death; you have relationships which will be cut short and loved ones who will miss you; death would make you miss out on a long life full of rich experiences as opposed to, for the fly, a much shorter life full of simpler experiences; the terror and pain you feel while drowning would be much worse than that felt by the fly; etc. These and other reasons mean your death would be much worse than the death of the fly. Some philosophers also think the mere fact that you are human also matters, whereas others think that belief is mere prejudice. But we can ignore that for now. After all, some of the factors I mentioned also apply to dogs, and so mean you should also save a dog over an insect. So I do kill insects sometimes, both by accident (which is unavoidable) and intentionally. For instance, when my cats got fleas, I gave them flea treatment.

But in that case, you might wonder, why worry about insects at all? If the suffering of humans (and dogs, and all those factory-farmed mammals and birds and fish) is so much worse, why not focus on that, and ignore the insects? Well, you should care about all that other stuff, too. But, first, it’s not always a competition. You can take various small steps that won’t detract from addressing these other things. By attuning us to the moral importance of sentience, concern for insects might even make us more concerned about other, more sophisticated beings. And, second, humans have the ability to affect very many insects, and the death and suffering of tens of trillions of farmed insects may be extremely bad when added up, even if each insect’s treatment is only a little bit bad. (In the future, it may even be possible for us to intervene in nature to improve the condition of the quintillions of insects that live in the wild.)

So: live your life and be concerned about everyone, but be concerned about insects, too, and try to avoid hurting them when you can. And let others know you’re doing this. Whether moral concern for insects spreads will affect whether we make the right decisions on big-picture issues, like whether to farm them. And it will also affect how embarrassed I get when I talk to my mom.

Insecticidal Tendencies: Insects as Candidates for Ecological Ethics

A bluebird perched on a barbed wire fence

Our world is vanishing in ways we do not always see or have pressing interest in, let alone regard as having moral or ethical consequence. Two recent studies in France have reported “catastrophic” declines in bird populations in the French countryside, with a total of one third of birds disappearing over the past 17 years and some species seeing declines of 50-90 percent. The culprit, according to researchers, is the large-scale use of pesticides in a once idyllic part of the world now dominated by industrial agriculture and monocultural farming practices (the growing of only one type of crop). We continue to be faced with the image of “silence” Rachel Carson provided us, in her seminal work on the ecological effects of chemical pesticides, in which “spring now comes unheralded by the return of the birds.” While the “indirect” harms that pesticides have on other creatures requires complex analysis, one effect of indiscriminate use is the large-scale destruction of avian food sources, forcing their starvation or migration elsewhere. Germany and France, another study in 2015 found as part of a larger European trend, have lost 80 percent of their flying-insect biomass over the past 30 years. The lesson is, or should be, that causality in nature does not stop where we want it to. Continue reading “Insecticidal Tendencies: Insects as Candidates for Ecological Ethics”