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Cultural Appropriation Dinner & Discussion on Oct.13

Come out to Prindle on Monday, October 13 at 5:30 PM for a dinner and discussion about the ethics of cultural appropriation. Cultural appropriation occurs when someone from one culture takes or uses something from another culture. What is taken can be a physical artifact, such as when an archaeologist takes an ancient relic and gives it to a museum. Cultural appropriation can also occur with something more abstract such as an idea, piece of music, or even an art style that is unique to the other culture, such as when Eric Clapton plays cover songs of traditional southern blues songs or when Iggy Azalea raps in a “blaccent.”  Other examples include imitating clothing styles from other cultures, as Urban Outfitters did with their “Navajo” clothing line.

Sometimes we encounter instances of cultural appropriation and immediately think it’s totally offensive, and sometimes we encounter instances that we think are more acceptable. What makes an instance of cultural appropriation wrong, if at all? When, if at all, is cultural appropriation morally permissible? How does cultural appropriation differ from cultural appreciation?

The Prindle Institute’s director Andy Cullison will give a brief presentation about cultural appropriation, and table conversation will follow. Each table will have several prompt cards to guide discussion. Dinner will be provided on a first-come, first-served basis and will include gourmet grilled cheese from student start-up Cheesin’ and soup and salad from Almost Home. This event is free and open to all DePauw students, staff, and faculty.

Prindle has coordinated this event with the School of Music to be a part of the Dvorak Music Festival due to the Native American and African-American cultural influences in Dvorak’s work.

We’re excited to delve into this complicated and relevant topic, and we hope you’ll join us and share your perspective!

Need a ride out to Prindle? A shuttle will be leaving the Hub for Prindle at 5:15 PM and will return after the event.

Twitter, Transparency, and National Security

Government surveillance is a political hot topic, and Twitter has now taken its stand on it. The company has decided to sue the U.S. Government about a law that does not allow the company to release the number of national security requests for information it receives. The company argues that the government’s restriction of disclosure of figures related to national security letters and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court orders infringes on their First Amendment rights. An adjustment was made to the government policy against releasing these numbers earlier this year after a lawsuit by Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Yahoo, and Microsoft. The change allows companies to identify which range of numbers their requests fall into. A company could say if they received between 0-999 requests, but not the exact number, even if that number was zero. Twitter wishes to release a full transparency report that gives specific numbers to show the “scope of government surveillance;” since most Twitter posts are public anyway, Twitter says it does not receive as many requests and would like to show proof to its users. Social media users on multiple platforms have been concerned about their information’s privacy, hence the lawsuits by online media companies.

Continue reading “Twitter, Transparency, and National Security”

Can moral laws exist without God? A brief introduction to “Robust Ethics”

Last week we published the abstract of Erik Wielenberg’s new book, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative RealismIn this guest post, Wielenberg, Professor of Philosophy at DePauw University, follows up with a more in-depth discussion of the book and some of the philosophers that have influenced his thinking on moral realism and God’s existence.

In 1977, two events that would significantly impact my life took place. First, the film Star Wars was released. Second, two prominent philosophers, J.L. Mackie and Gilbert Harman, unleashed some influential arguments against moral realism.  My book is about the second of these two events.

In his famous argument from queerness, Mackie listed various respects in which objective values, if they existed, would be “queer.” Mackie took the apparent queerness of such values to be evidence against their existence. One feature of objective values that he found to be particularly queer was the alleged connection between a thing’s objective moral qualities and its natural features: “What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty — say, causing pain just for fun — and the moral fact that it is wrong? … The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty.  But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’?” (1977, 41)  Mackie was also dubious of the view that we could come to have knowledge of the objective moral qualities of things. He wrote that friends of objective moral values must in the end lamely posit “a special sort of intuition” that gives us knowledge of objective values.

Harman, for his part, noted an apparent contrast between ethics and science.  He compared a case in which a physicist observes a vapor trail in a cloud chamber and forms the belief “there goes a proton” with a case in which you observe some hoodlums setting a cat on fire and form the belief “what they’re doing is wrong” (1977, 4-6).  Harman was happy to classify both of these as cases of observation (scientific observation and moral observation respectively), but he noted that the moral features of things, supposing that they exist at all, seem to be causally inert, unlike the physical features of things. Harman thought that this feature of moral properties suggests that we ought to take seriously the possible truth of nihilism, the view that no moral properties are instantiated (1977, 23).  But others have drawn on Harman’s premise to support not nihilism but rather moral skepticism, the view that we do not (and perhaps cannot) possess moral knowledge. It is the latter kind of argument that I discuss in my book.

Some have suggested that theism provides the resources to answer these challenges. Mackie himself, although an atheist, suggested that theism might be able to answer his worries about the queerness of the alleged supervenience relation between moral and natural properties. In his 1982 book The Miracle of Theism, he suggested that “objective intrinsically prescriptive features, supervening upon natural ones, constitute so odd a cluster of qualities and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events, without an all-powerful God to create them” (1982, 115-6). More recently, Christian philosopher Robert Adams suggests that the epistemological worries that arise from Harman’s contrast between science and ethics can be put to rest by bringing God into the picture (Adams 1999, 62-70).

Thus, an interesting dialectic presents itself. Mackie and Harman, who do not believe that God exists, see their arguments as posing serious challenges for moral realism. Some theistic philosophers argue this way: if we suppose that God does exist, then we can answer these challenges to moral realism. Without God, these challenges cannot be answered. Since moral realism is a plausible view, the fact that we can answer such challenges only by positing the existence of God gives us reason to believe that God exists.

I accept moral realism yet I believe that God does not exist. I also find it unsatisfying, perhaps even “lame” as Mackie would have it, to posit mysterious, quasi-mystical cognitive faculties that are somehow able to make contact with causally inert moral features of the world and provide us with knowledge of them. The central goal of my book is to defend the plausibility of a robust brand of moral realism without appealing to God or any weird cognitive faculties.

A lot has happened since 1977.  A number of increasingly mediocre sequels and prequels to the original Star Wars have been released; disco, mercifully, has died. But there have also been some important developments in philosophy and psychology that bear on the arguments of Mackie and Harman sketched above. In philosophy, the brand of moral realism criticized by Mackie has found new life. In psychology, there has been a flurry of empirical investigation into the nature of the cognitive processes that generate human moral beliefs, emotions, and actions. As a result of these developments the challenges from Mackie and Harman sketched above can be given better answers than they have received so far — without appealing to God or weird cognitive faculties. That, at any rate, is what I attempt to do in my book. In short, my aim is to defend a robust approach to ethics (without appealing to God or weird cognitive faculties) by developing positive accounts of the nature of moral facts and knowledge and by defending these accounts against challenging objections.

Works Cited
Adams, Robert. 1999. Finite and Infinite Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin.
Mackie, J.L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yik Yak is okay for Yakkin?

By now, every DePauw student has heard of the mobile app Yik Yak, a social media app that lets users post anonymous thoughts and they can only see the “yaks” posted within their area. It was created at a small liberal arts school much like DePauw, with a student population much like DePauw’s, by two college students who wanted a way for students to connect.

I agree that Yik Yak provides a space for students to say things that they wouldn’t normally. Sometimes those things are funny. But are we trading hilarity for bullying? Yik Yak gives bullies the agency to hide behind their iPhone screens. Some of these yaks posted on the DePauw feed are mean, vulgar, pointed and (most of the time) untrue. Some of these “yaks” are funny even though they are mean. Most of them are not meant in a truly malicious way, but how are we supposed to cultivate a campus climate of acceptance and accountability. Granted the only truly criminal activity that has occurred on the DePauw Yik Yak is the theft of the Longden Hall sign, but my concerns about this social media app reach far beyond the boundaries of East College. How are we as a society supposed to tell children not to bully when we do it ourselves? It might be different because it’s behind a screen, but words hurt deeper than any action can. Personally, I have seen the effects of bullying at my own high school and it’s scary.

Can we as a campus feel okay letting stereotypes and hurtful jokes become the norm and allow the perpetrators to be anonymous? Most of Yik Yak is funny but what about those few “yaks” that aren’t?

Will climate divestment work?

Guest post by Rich Cameron, Associate Professor of Philosophy at DePauw University

Scott Wisor recently wrote a post titled “Why Climate Change Divestment Will Not Work” over at the blog for the journal Ethics & International Affairs (EIA).  The post is quite provocative.  Visit the EIA blog, here, to read it.

Wisor presents himself as convinced that climate change is happening, poses a grave threat, and makes ethical demands on us all.  Nevertheless, as his title suggests, he believes that one prominent strategy for generating mass action on climate change is destined for failure:  the movement – led by Bill McKibben and his 350.org – to get large universities and investment funds to divest from fossil fuel companies.  If fossil-fuel divestment efforts are doomed to fail, then McKibben’s movement functions as a costly distraction from our pressing ethical obligation not just to act but to act effectively.  As Wisor puts it, “why spend half a decade or more on a tactic that at best won’t make a difference? Why not direct attention to the more urgent and effective task of placing a price on carbon?”

I have a number of responses to Wisor’s specific arguments, but in this post I’d like to offer two more general reflections aimed at tempering his conclusions.  The line of criticism I’ll be pursuing in this post is an odd one – that Wisor’s arguments and conclusions are all too plausible.  More specifically, his argumentative target is ill-defined and appears too easily established.  When looked at more closely, the real difficulties movements face in achieving success also require more nuanced arguments that a particular movement will fail.

My first point begins by noting that a sober look at the evidence certainly suggests that Wisor’s conclusion is likely to be true.  Pick any successful social movement from the past – the civil rights movement, the movement for India’s independence from England, etc.  Scholars of social change frequently note that while those movements were in process the odds seemed stacked against them.  Moreover, even movements we know (with hindsight) to have been successful seemed destined to fail almost right up until they managed – somehow – to succeed.  Indeed, all large scale and eventually successful movements for social change have faced armies of naysayers claiming that the tactics they employed (e.g., non-violent resistance in the cases I’ve mentioned) would not work and that those movements’ efforts served as distractions from other, allegedly more effective measures that people genuinely devoted to the cause should be supporting instead.  Perhaps the most eloquent response to this kind of criticism comes in Martin Luther King Jr.’s justly famous “Letter from the Birmingham Jail.”  We’re on your side, his critics said, but your tactics are wrong and will backfire.

Antonio Gramsci made a similar point in saying, “I’m a pessimist because of intellect, but an optimist because of will.”  The idea in Gramsci’s quote is that rational reflection on the odds of social change will almost always result in a thoroughly justified pessimism.  If you’re aware of the obstacles and think about the circumstances carefully you’re sure to come up with a thousand reasons why social change just doesn’t stand a chance.  Gramsci acknowledges that effective advocates for social change need to face up to this grim fact.  They need the “pessimism of the intellect” so that they know what they’re up against – without this they will be ineffective idealists tilting at windmills.  But social change movements do sometimes succeed, and without the benefit of hindsight it’s extremely difficult to tell which movement, if any, is going to pull off a major victory.  And that means that people devoted to the hard work of social change need more than just the pessimism that comes from clear-sightedness of the long odds we face.  They also need the “optimism of the will,” the willingness to work against long odds with the hope and confidence that some apparently doomed strategy will eventually succeed.  To quote Margaret Mead, “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed, citizens can change the world.  Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”  Without the benefit of hindsight, a strong case can be made that all social movements are doomed to failure, and if that is all Wisor is arguing in the case of the fossil fuel divestment movement then his arguments are both unsurprising and should be of little interest to committed and thoughtful activists.  If Wisor is arguing for an interesting claim, it must be not just that we’re justifiably pessimistic about the divestment movement’s odds of success.  He must argue for the stronger claim that the movement is actually tilting at windmills, that it is so clearly out of line with reality that it should be viewed as a waste of time even by those with intimate knowledge of the challenges all social movements face.

My second response to Wisor’s argument is generated by asking a simple question:  when can we say that a movement has succeeded, that its efforts have “worked”?  Wisor’s blog post seems to imply a very demanding standard for movement success – a movement must solve the problem it’s designed to address (in this case climate change).  And if this is what success requires then once again Wisor is arguing for a conclusion that is simply too easy.  It is widely acknowledged that there are no silver bullets with regard to large problems like this, and in the case of climate change it is also widely acknowledged that it’s too late to “solve” the problem anyway:  what we’ve already done commits us to enough warming that dangerous impacts are already unavoidable.  Of course, that doesn’t mean we can’t still succeed in mitigating climate change and heading off even more catastrophic impacts, but no one heading up the fossil fuel divestment movement is under the illusion that their efforts will “solve” the problem in this sense.

Still, this isn’t the only metric for success.  Activists often view movement success not in these all-or-nothing terms but as, instead, accruing piecemeal, slowly, and building over time.  A social movement that doesn’t “solve” its intended problem in the first sense may nevertheless raise awareness (and so make future solutions easier to institute).  Movements may build networks of effective and motivated actors (who may work better together in the future because of their present experience).  They may convert major institutions and groups to take stands that they otherwise would not have taken (and so, again, make future change more likely).  And so on.

All of these things plausibly constitute social movements succeeding, but none of Wisor’s specific arguments for why the fossil fuel divestment strategy “will not work” undermine the idea that the movement has already succeeded – that it has “worked” far beyond the dreams of most movements.  According to a report by Arabela Advisors, “181 institutions and local governments and 656 individuals representing over $50 billion dollars have pledged to divest to-date.”  Think too of the marches, meetings, media attention, position papers, etc. the movement has generated, and what they mean for better advocacy for policies of all sorts in the future.  The point is just that by reasonable standards the divestment movement is already a success, and nothing in Wisor’s piece suggests this movement (and others) can’t build (piecemeal, and bit by bit) on their successes in the future.

Moreover, it is important to note that when Wisor suggests alternative efforts that he thinks stand a greater chance of succeeding he mentions only a “price on carbon” and unspecified “regulatory efforts” to combat climate change.  The problem here is that Wisor’s suggested solutions do not constitute ideas for building a movement.  To generate a movement you need to mobilize masses of people and institutions and organize them around applying political pressure for change.  Of course we should put a price on carbon – but how exactly does Wisor propose that we build the political movement to get that done?  When Wisor has an idea for building a powerful movement around putting a price on carbon (or his favorite regulations) and he can show, further, that his new strategy is likely to generate more traction, enthusiasm, and support from grassroots activists and major institutions than the divestment movement has already succeeded in generating then will he have a strong real case for saying that there are more effective strategies we should be pursuing.  Saying simply that we should put a price on carbon isn’t even in the same ballpark as building the movement to divest from fossil fuels, however.  McKibben’s fossil fuel divestment strategy may not be a silver bullet guaranteed to succeed (no social movement in history ever has been, of course), but it has been a concrete and already effective strategy for bringing together a new, strong, and powerful coalition on climate.

I realize that my fairly general criticisms of Wisor’s post don’t address the specifics of his arguments.  For all I’ve said here it remains possible that his specific objections to the fossil fuel divestment movement’s strategies are indeed damning.  That is, I have not argued that the fossil fuel divestment movement is not tilting at windmills in a way that anyone who cares about climate action should shun, nor have I argued that it is only beset by the perfectly ordinary sort of “pessimism of the intellect” that beset all social movements (even ones that have succeeded).  Still, I hope I’ve clarified the way in which Wisor’s argument seems to aim at a conclusion that is both too easy and too unsurprising.  If his arguments are to be of service to his claimed allies in the incipient climate movement they will need to show more than just that there are good reasons for pessimism.  He’ll need to show that the divestment movement tilts at windmills.  With regard to the former task Wisor’s arguments (unsurprisingly) succeed.  With regard to the latter task I’m much less sure.

The Ethics of Enforcing Ethics

Decisions towards more ethical governmental process are good, right? The citizens of Tallahassee, Florida certainly think so.  With recent support of the citizens’ Ethics Advisory Panel, created by the City Commission, the city has recently employed its first ethics officer.  This appointment was the result of the panel’s comprehensive report, recommending major changes to the city’s internal processes in the name of ethics.  But this addition to the city’s payroll was met by opposition from current city staff, who disagreed with the idea of creating a new, individual position to employ the city’s ethical “to-do” list.

Continue reading “The Ethics of Enforcing Ethics”

Ebola: No Longer a Microscopic Problem

Over the past two weeks, reports of a Liberian man with Ebola being treated in Dallas have captivated our public discourse. Some worry that this may be a “Patient Zero” situation, and that the outbreak will soon transcend borders to become a global epidemic. While this fervor has taken place at home, however, even more profound turns in the handling of the Ebola outbreak are unfolding abroad.

Continue reading “Ebola: No Longer a Microscopic Problem”

A Message Left for Mason Hall Residents…

Renee, a sophomore at DePauw, came home to Mason Hall last Tuesday to find a sign harshly warning residents: “CAMERA INSTALLED. DO NOT PLACE FOOD OF ANY KIND (INCLUDING SOUP) IN THIS SINK!” However, the message did not end there. Below the first sign, a poor translation of the message into Mandarin, likely using the help of an online translating site, followed. As an international student from Beijing, Renee shared that this message was not only hurtful and offensive to her, but to the entire Chinese community.

The fact that the message was translated into Mandarin suggests two things; firstly, the assumption is made that those clogging the drain are Chinese students. Secondly, the translation presumes that the Chinese residents of Mason Hall cannot read English. As all DePauw students take the majority of their courses in English, this is an absurd and offensive assertion.

One student responded with a note that read, “Don’t understand Mandarin? Don’t write in Mandarin,” referencing the numerous errors in the translated text.

While Renee is unsure of who left the message, she does not think that it was a Resident Assistant. Nevertheless, she said that Mason Hall residents and Chinese students, in particular, are “angry because the Chinese translation doesn’t make sense at all, so we just feel it’s ridiculous.”

Racial micro aggressions of the like are anything but nonexistent on our campus. Renee expanded on this reality, saying, “Asians who come to America want to feel that this is their new home, but how others treat them makes them feel that it is not home. I think this is what’s happened at DePauw. We came here as international students and we want to see here as home… but sometimes we feel it is difficult to talk with others. Most foreigners feel that Chinese are quiet and that [non native English speakers] are somewhat not well educated. We are really not, so that stereotype really hurt us.”

Renee said that she believes that certain efforts and organizations on campus, like The Movement, Student Services, AAAS and CLC, are doing a good job working to address these issues. However, said Renee, “it’s hard to change a person’s perspective, so if you don’t want to change that perspective you can’t force change… I think it’s a normal thing that at the hub Chinese people will sit together, and white people will sit together and African American people will sit together… but we are separated to some extent.”

Many often attribute acts of discrimination to ignorance. However, the message left for Mason Hall residents was anything but thoughtless. It intentionally and purposefully targeted a certain group of individuals. Related instances reveal a need to unlearn and transform a current concept of community. Cultural, class, gender, and racial divides should not fundamentally characterize the general understanding of community on our campus. While the existence of smaller communities can be extremely empowering for any individual, an overall feeling of inclusivity seems to be lacking, with some feeling the effects of this absence more than others.

Anna Butz, a DePauw alum and former International Student Ambassador who is currently pursuing a Fulbright in Colombia, commented on the issue. Butz said, “I think this [message] is representative of DePauw as an institution, and the lack of support felt by many students who do not identify as part of DePauw’s ‘majority’ (white, heterosexual, middle to upper middle class). Unfortunately, many of those at DePauw who are in positions of power (like the person who put up this poster) are those who are not aware of the struggles faced by many DePauw students… What is worse is that I know that somewhere on DePauw’s campus someone is thinking: ‘Why the hell is this such a big deal? It’s just a poster!’ and that right there proves that our campus has a long way to go to become inclusive.”

Renee has not yet reported the incident but says that she will not remain quiet about it.

 

 

Gen Y’s Hookup Culture: Is There Something Between Consensual Sex and Rape?

Rape is a serious crime that today’s world is trying to combat. Especially prevalent on college campuses, the hook-up culture of Millennials seems to becoming a wide-spread controversy.  But what if there was something in between rape and a consensual hook up?  If you didn’t want sex, but had it and did not necessarily feel violated, should one cry rape? The word “rape” itself carries with it a heavy burden for both parties involved. One who must live with the memory and the other who must suffer the consequences of his or her actions.
Veronica Grandex published an article on Total Sorority Move that provided an anecdote that many females of Generation Y can relate to. She narrated her experience with a hook-up that she did not want but still had. She shares,  “It wasn’t until he grabbed a condom that I really knew how I felt. I was not okay with this. I did not want to have sex with him. But I did.”…… “I woke up with an “oh shit” feeling that quickly turned into an “oh well.” I didn’t really feel I’d been violated, though part of me knew I had. I wasn’t mad. I wasn’t hurt. I didn’t want vengeance. I didn’t even feel weird around him soon after. I didn’t feel much of anything. I certainly didn’t feel like I’d been raped. But what had happened the night prior was not consensual sex, and I didn’t like it.”
To many other females who have been exposed to the Millennial hook-up culture, this article was nothing new. I’ve encountered the same experience whether that be myself or when providing moral support to other friends. There definitely is something in between rape and consensual sex, but what that is, none are sure about. Is it possible that Generation Y has blurred too many lines? Could it be that these blurred lines of the Millennial hookup culture have implicated what it means to have consensual sex? Is there even a problem with this, or could it be girls just having a hard time to saying no to sex? What other ethical issues arise from the hook-up culture of Millennials? Let us know in the comments below!
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Professor Erik Wielenberg publishes “Robust Ethics”

DePauw Philosophy professor Erik Wielenberg has recently published his third book entitled Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. In his latest work,

“[Wielenberg] draws on recent work in analytic philosophy and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism and develop an empirically-grounded account of human moral knowledge. Non-theistic robust normative realism has it that there are objective, non-natural, sui generis ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. The early chapters of the book address various challenges to the intelligibility and plausibility of the claim that irreducible ethical features of things supervene on their non-ethical features as well as challenges from defenders of theistic ethics who argue that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. Later chapters develop an account of moral knowledge and answer various recent purported debunkings of morality, including those based on scientific research into the nature of the proximate causes of human moral beliefs as well as those based on proposed evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs.”

Wielenberg, who specializes in ethics (including moral psychology) and philosophy of religion, is also the author God and the Reach of Reason: C.S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell, and Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, and is the co-editor of New Waves in Philosophy of Religion.

New Privacy Battle Between Tech Companies and the Feds

In the wake of Edward Snowden’s leak about the NSA surveillance programs, tech companies have been quick to respond to consumer concerns about the privacy of their data. Google and Apple are starting to roll out new privacy protections that encrypt consumer information on the phone. In some cases, these encryptions are so well done that even those companies cannot access user data. Apple for example noted that they can no longer bypass customer passcodes.

Consumers could rest assured that even if the government asked Apple and Google to access user data, those companies couldn’t do it. This has government officials very concerned and they are looking to halt Apple and Google’s efforts to encrypt mobile data.

There are two competing issues here. On the one hand, private companies want to give consumers a product that they want. People want the security that comes with knowing that their data is really private and in their control. However, if the privacy protection is so good that government can’t access it (even if a court order), then we have created an environment that is a free-for-all for criminals. Countless crimes are solved after obtaining court orders with probable cause to gather evidence from suspects’ smartphones.

Should companies leave a window into our phones that can be accessed in the event of a criminal investigation? Does the government have a right to intervene in these kinds of product design decisions? What do you think?