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Bodies Out of Time: Rethinking Age in the Alien Universe

Warning: This article contains spoilers for several entries in the Alien franchise.

Recently, I’ve been trying to catch up on all the shows sitting on my ever-growing to-watch list. One that I was especially excited about was Alien: Earth, the latest installment in the Alien franchise, which began way back in 1979 with Ridley Scott’s science-fiction horror masterpiece, simply titled Alien. And, as it happens, it’s Halloween while I’m writing this, so it feels fitting to reflect on one of the many philosophical questions the new series raises: age.

The passage of time — and its effects on our bodies, minds, and relationships — is hardly a new theme in science fiction. In 1986’s Aliens, yet another masterpiece, Ellen Ripley, having survived the events of the first film, awakens after spending fifty-seven years in stasis aboard an escape pod. She soon learns that her daughter has grown up, lived an entire life, and died during Ripley’s suspended sleep (though expanded materials elaborate on her daughter’s adventures). A similar leap occurs in Alien: Resurrection, set more than two centuries after the original. In each case, this temporal dislocation isolates Ripley from any semblance of home or continuity.

This unmooring from time and place also runs through Alien: Earth, emerging in two key forms.

The first, and one consistent with the series’ legacy, is cryonics. Space is vast, and travel across it takes time. To traverse the immense distances between systems, the crew of the lone spaceship seen in Alien: Earth, the Maginot, much like Ripley before them, enters suspended animation. By “freezing” themselves, they avoid the ravages of age and survive journeys that would otherwise outlast a human lifespan. It’s worth noting that both NASA and ESA (the European Space Agency) have explored similar ideas — hibernation, torpor, and metabolic suspension — as potential tools for long-duration spaceflight.

However, while the ethics of cryonics and its implications for our understanding of age are intriguing, they are not the focus here. Instead, Alien: Earth complicates our everyday sense of time’s passing in a second, more existential way: it unsettles our notions of what it means to grow older and to live a whole life.

The series invites us to question what it means to age through its portrayal of the artificial lifeforms that populate its world. Androids are, of course, a familiar presence in the Alien universe. They have appeared in every film, sometimes as antagonists, sometimes as uneasy allies. The relationship between creators and their creations has been a central concern in the prequel films — Prometheus, Alien: Covenant, and Alien: Romulus. Yet while those stories focus on the nature of life itself and the moral bonds between makers and made, one question has remained largely unexplored: what does it mean for an artificial being to grow, to mature, to age? Alien: Earth addresses this question through its introduction of hybrids — synthetic bodies into which human consciousness has been uploaded.

At first glance, this might not seem problematic. If someone transfers their mind into a synthetic body identical to their original one, we would likely still regard them as the same age. A twenty-year-old who moves into an artificial body resembling their twenty-year-old self would, intuitively, remain twenty. Yet Alien: Earth upends this expectation. In the series, consciousness transfer is still experimental, and only a handful of test subjects, known as the “lost boys,” have undergone the procedure. Each of the five children, terminally ill in their biological forms, has had their consciousness transferred into a cutting-edge synthetic body. But these new bodies are not like-for-like replacements: they resemble those of adults in their late twenties. The result is five individuals who possess the physical form of adults but the minds and behaviors of children. These bodies themselves have only existed for a certain number of years. So, the synthetic bodies resemble adults, the minds of children inhabit them, but they have only been around for a short time.

What Alien: Earth reveals is how fragile our notion of age really is. We like to imagine age as a simple measure counted in years, written in the wear and tear on the body, reflected in our behavior. But when these elements drift apart, as they do for the lost boys, our categories of child and adult blur. The series forces us to ask what it truly means to grow up when body, mind, and time no longer move in step.

For much of Western thought, age and development have been bound together. In Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle posits that every living thing has a natural trajectory, a movement from potential to fulfillment. A child is an unfinished being, one whose form is still unfolding toward its purpose. The hybrids in Alien: Earth violate this order. Their bodies appear to have reached completion, but their minds remain suspended in childhood. Indeed, it is made clear in the first episode that the development, even the very functioning, of their minds may be different because those minds now inhabit bodies devoid of hormones and other biological substances that motivate and shape cognitive functioning. The lost boys embody an unnatural disjunction between form and essence, adulthood without maturity, completion without growth. In Aristotle’s terms, they have been forced into their ends before their time.

On the other end of the spectrum sits John Locke, who offers an alternative take. For Locke, as argued in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, what makes someone the same person through time is not the body at all but the continuity of consciousness and memory. It is the awareness of oneself as the same thinking thing that secures identity. Judged by this standard, the lost boys remain children, no matter how adult their bodies appear. Their minds carry the same memories, emotions, and perspectives they held before their transfer. Their new bodies may be stronger, faster, and ageless, but the selves within them are still those of children.

Between Aristotle and Locke, the hybrids occupy an unsettling middle ground. They are caught between two incompatible notions of growth. Aristotle would see them as beings who have skipped the natural stages of life; Locke would see them as persons whose identity is unchanged despite physical transformation. Alien: Earth leaves us in this tension. It refuses to tell us whether maturity resides in the body’s development or in the mind’s continuity, and this uncertainty makes the lost boys so haunting. Indeed, the group itself reflects on this difficulty and eventually reaches no clear answer.

By imagining beings who age in one sense but not another, the series asks us to reconsider how much of our humanity depends on time itself. If growth can be engineered, if bodies can leap ahead of the selves that inhabit them, then age ceases to be a simple measure of experience. Alien: Earth reminds us that aging is not only about the number of years we live, but also about how our bodies and minds keep pace — or fail to.

Decisions for the Dead: The Moral Dimensions of Body Disposal

Photograph of a graveyard overlooking hills and plains

When Monique Martinot died of ovarian cancer in 1984, her husband, hoping to achieve immortality for his wife through cryonics, placed her body in an industrial size freezer in his chateau in the town of Neuil–sur–Layon, France.  When the husband, Raymond Martinot, realized, years later at the age of eighty, that his own death was imminent, he conveyed to his son that he would like to be frozen alongside his wife until such time that their bodies could be revived.  French courts objected to this method of body disposal and demanded that both bodies be removed from the freezer and disposed of in a method consistent with national law—the bodies must be buried, cremated, or donated to science.

Dead bodies are objects, but they are objects of a fascinating and unique kind—they were once possessed by autonomous beings.  Autonomous beings, according to every known moral theory, are deserving of moral consideration. Once the being has left its erstwhile vessel, does some lingering moral status remain?  Once a person is dead, what, if any, relationship exists between that person’s autonomous choices and the body-object they have left behind? Is there a moral obligation to honor the wishes of the deceased with respect to what should be done with their body after death?  Should Monique and Raymond have been allowed to rest unmolested in their modest freezer without intrusion by the government?

Under certain conditions, dead bodies can be a threat to public health.  If the deceased died of an infectious disease, the infectious agents may still be active and can be transmitted after death.  Because of the threat posed to the public in these kinds of cases, some control by the government over the disposal of dead bodies may be morally justified.  In at least some kinds of cases, then, if an individual has a right to determine what happens to their own body after death, the right of the government to protect the public against threats to general health trumps this right.  It’s worth noting, however, that the commonly held belief that all dead bodies pose public health threats is a myth.  Belief in the myth has carried with it some fairly tragic consequences.  In the aftermath of natural disasters and other mass tragedies, unidentified bodies are often buried in mass graves to get rid of the “threat to public health.”  As a result, many individuals never learn what happened to their deceased loved ones. It seems, then, that the government’s right to intervene may rest on the contingent fact that some bodies spread disease.  In a possible world in which infectious disease is eradicated, we’d need to revisit the question of whether the government can tell its citizens that they can’t keep their dead loved ones in freezers in the basement or under the rose garden in the backyard.

If the government’s right to decide what can be done with a body after death can supersede the wishes of the deceased individual in some cases, might there be others in which governmental intervention is justified?  Consider the case of organ donation. There are currently 114,555 individuals on the waiting list for donated organs in the United States. Twenty people die every day waiting for a donated organ.  Fifty-four percent of people in The United States are registered organ donors.  This might sound like a pretty impressive number, but it is dwarfed by the percentage of the population that donates organs in countries that have an “opt out” process for organ donation.  In these countries, everyone is automatically put on the organ donor list, with the option of “opting out” if they decide they’d rather not donate. In those countries, 90% of the population is on the list of registered donors.  Only 3 in 1,000 people die in a way that allows for organs to be successfully transplanted, so the more donors the better the odds that lives will be saved.  If the government is justified in determining what happens to dead bodies when their goal is to promote public health, would they be justified in enacting “opt out” policies?  After all, the need for donated organs is also a public health issue. It’s far from clear that the “rights” of the being that once occupied the dead body are a more pressing concern than the lives lost when the organs are wasted.

There are other reasons for the government to step in when it comes to disposal of the dead. The practice of burying the dead in caskets is terrible for the environment.  Many unnecessary resources are wasted in the process, including precious trees for caskets and water to maintain pristine lawns in graveyards. During the embalming process, formaldehyde—a known human carcinogen—is pumped into human bodies.  When those bodies are buried, that carcinogen eventually seeps out, polluting soil and groundwater. Burying bodies also takes up lots of space. The practice is unsustainable. Cremation is arguably better for the environment, but not much. The practice releases harmful greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere, contributing to climate change.  We aren’t without options; there are some eco-friendly ways of disposing of human remains.  Bodies can be destroyed using a process of alkaline hydrolysis, used to liquefy human flesh.  The remaining bones can then be ground into ash in a way that uses fewer resources than cremation.  Bodies can also be encased in pods that eventually grow into trees or sealed into a ball that is then sunk to the bottom of the ocean where it will feed coral reefs. These are far more environmentally friendly ways of disposing of human remains.  Given that climate change poses serious threats to public health, would governments be justified in mandating that bodies are disposed of in more environmentally friendly ways?

It seems unlikely that changes to our organ donation or funerary practices would be met with swells of public support.  This reticence should give us pause. Many variables inform cultural practices involving dead bodies. Humans have the capacity to reflect on their own mortality, and, unsurprisingly, many of us find it terrifying.  Fear, grief, and love are powerful and crucial emotions, but they have the potential to motivate the formation of superstitious rituals and guidelines for cultural practice that are ultimately indefensible when challenged.

Life, Death, and Cryonics

Cryogenics, also known as cryonics, is a form of preservation involving the storing and preservation of a body at very low temperatures in hopes of one day reviving and repairing the body. Although to date no humans have been revived after freezing, some scientists think they are coming closer to making revivement though cryogenics a real possibility. Recent reports of a terminally ill British teen being frozen upon her death have brought cryogenics and the ethical debates surrounding the topic back into the news.

Continue reading “Life, Death, and Cryonics”