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Beyond the Numbers: Boris Johnson and the Fair Innings Argument

The world has changed a lot since COVID-19 burst onto the scene, upturned our lives, crashed economies, and killed millions. For some, the fear of the disease remains (not unjustly, either). For others, the fact that we went through such a massive event seems nearly unremarkable, or at least not unlike other generational traumas (like the Cold War), and those persons argue that we need to stop focusing on it and move on.

Governments, however, sit in an interesting liminal space between these two poles. On the one hand, they want people to return to work, which many, if not most of us, are. Yet, the lingering effects of the pandemic, direct or indirect, can still be felt throughout the workforce For example, figures recently revealed that the U.K. has record levels of economically inactive people — nearly a quarter of people of working age, a trend that started in the wake of the pandemic. To get economies moving and GDP on the rise then, states want citizens to be as active as possible.

On the other hand, governments cannot ignore the human and economic damage caused by the pandemic, something which, heaven forbid, might happen again. So, they must stick with the pandemic and investigate its emergence and our responses to it to better prevent (or, more realistically, mitigate) such a catastrophe in the future. This is the purpose of the U.K.’s COVID-19 Inquiry, launched in June 2022 by Former Prime Minister Boris Johnson. And it is with Johnson, and specifically his attitude towards the pandemic, that I wish to stay.

Now, for those blessed with memory or ignorance that obscures Johnson from recollection, let me provide the briefest of bios. Boris Johnson was the U.K.’s Prime Minister from 2019 – 2022. During that time, he and his government were hit by multiple scandals including, but by no means limited to, unlawfully proroguing parliament, ignoring a report that the Home Secretary had bullied members of staff, holding parties during the pandemic in contravention to the very laws he put in place, and supporting an MP who Johnson knew had a history of workplace sexual misconduct. It was this last scandal that eventually brought the now disgraced former PM down, with so many members of his party resigning from government that he couldn’t find people to fill any of the key roles. This eventually forced him out of office, but not before attempting a face-saving speech where he’d claim he’d be back (luckily, Johnson hasn’t returned; unluckily, he was followed by the catastrophic Liz Truss).

It is something Johnson reportedly said in December 2020 that I want to consider, however. In his diaries recounting his efforts to counsel the government during the pandemic, the Chief Scientific Advisor at the time, Sir Patrick Vallance, noted that Johnson seemed incapable of comprehending the sheer scale of the danger the emergency posed. Moreover, the PM appeared fascinated with older people accepting their fate for the greater good. In other words, he thought that those of an elderly disposition should die so that the country wouldn’t be impacted as hard. This was a position not only he held, but so did others supporting the PM (although few would admit it now). This stance is alluded to in WhatsApp messages from the PM to others, where he reflects repeatedly upon a correlation between fatality rates and age.

In short, then, it seems Johnson, the man in charge of the U.K.’s response to the pandemic, held a quasi-Darwinian stance to resource allocation and policy: If you’re too old, and thus too weak, to fight the disease, tough luck. You’ve had your life; accept your fate, and let the young, who can typically survive the infection, carry on.

This is an undoubtedly callous position to hold. Yet, callousness alone isn’t a valid reason to reject it. After all, if one can make an argument that the old should accept one’s fate, that they have lived a life and so expecting younger people and the country to sacrifice for them is unreasonable, then there might be something to the position even though it is, much like the man himself, detestable. And, as I’m sure you’ve probably guessed, there is such an argument—the fair innings argument (FIA).

The FIA is, on the face of it and in the abstract, one that many of us would find appealing. As conceptualized by John Harris:

The [FIA] takes the view that there is some span of years that we consider a reasonable life… Let’s say that a fair share of life is the traditional three score and ten, seventy years. Anyone who does not reach 70 suffers, on this view, the injustice of being cut off in their prime. They have missed out on a reasonable share of life; they have been short-changed. Those, however, who do make 70 suffer no such injustice, they have not lost out but rather must consider any additional years a sort of bonus beyond that which could reasonably be hoped for. The fair innings argument requires that everyone be given an equal chance… to reach the appropriate threshold but, having reached it, they have received their entitlement. The rest of their life is the sort of bonus which may be cancelled when this is necessary to help others reach the threshold.

Thus, it is an argument grounded in fairness and justice. Each year is a unit of value which we accrue as we age. The elderly are more prosperous than the young regarding their life experience. And so, when there is a clash of interests between the young and old, between those who have lived a life and those who have not, it seems not entirely unfair to expect the former to make a sacrifice to benefit the younger. They’ve lived a life, and they should pay that forward where necessary.

Now, there are problems with the argument, not least of which is where one draws the line between fairness and unfairness, between too young to die and too old to live. But, in the context of COVID-19 and in light of Johnson’s multiple professional indiscretions, I think the bigger picture here is that he discounted the inhumanity of his position and, indirectly, of the fair innings argument.

No matter which way you slice it, the argument is cold. It boils human experience down to a base numerical value and disregards experiential or relational qualities. All that matters is that the old have lived a life. The quality of that life? Well, that’s of no concern here. The human factor involved,  the all-consuming fear of dying? Not Johnson’s concern. And this is what aggravates me so here. Johnson reduced human life to a numbers game, something he could track and try to balance on a spreadsheet. I would say it betrays a sense of superiority and control — that it reveals a self-perception of himself as someone playing a strategy game, directing his units in battle, and trying to balance an economy for no other reason than the fun of it — but that would be a lie. We already knew this about him. After all, this is the man who, when asked as a boy what he wanted to be when he was older, said, “World king.”

It is this mentality — that life is reducible to a numerical value — that irks me so much. During the pandemic and the countless other tragedies that have occurred over our lifetimes, we saw that suffering, despair, fear, and loneliness are not problems to be solved by sacrificing those who experience them the most acutely. They are failures on our part as a society to empathize with those who go through such hardships.

Johnson forgot (and never appreciated) this, and I worry that if the FIA gains traction, we may all do the same.

Should Monarchies Be Abolished?

photograph of British monarchy crown

On September 8th, 2022, Queen Elizabeth II of England died at the age of 96. She held the crown for 70 years, making her the longest reigning monarch in the history of Britain. Her son, now King Charles III, will likely be coronated in mid-2023.

The death of the British monarch has drawn a number of reactions. Most public officials and organizations have expressed respect for the former monarchies and sympathy towards her family. However, others have offered criticism of both the Queen and the monarchy itself. Multiple people have been arrested in the U.K. for anti-royal protests. Negative sentiment has been particularly strong in nations that were previously British colonies – many have taken to social media to critique the Crown’s role in colonialism: the Economic Freedom Fighters, a minority party in South Africa’s parliament released a statement saying they will “not mourn the death of Elizabeth,” and Irish soccer fans chanted that “Lizzy’s in a box.” Professor Maya Jasanoff bridged the two positions, writing that, while Queen Elizabeth II was committed to her duties and ought to be mourned as a person, she “helped obscure a bloody history of decolonization whose proportions and legacies have yet to be adequately acknowledged.”

My goal in this article is to reflect on monarchies, and their role in contemporary societies. I will not focus on any specific monarch. So, my claims here will be compatible with “good” and “bad” monarchs. Further, I will not consider any particular nation’s monarchy. Rather, I want to focus on the idea of monarchy. Thus, my analysis does not rely on historical events. I argue that monarchies, even in concept, are incompatible with the moral tenets of democratic societies and ought to be abolished as a result.

Democratic societies accept as fundamentally true that all people are moral equals. It is this equality that grounds the right to equal participation in government.

Equal relations stand in contrast to hierarchical relationships. Hierarchies occur when one individual is considered “above” some other(s) in at least one respect. In Private Government, Elizabeth Anderson distinguishes between multiple varieties of hierarchy. Particularly relevant here are hierarchies of esteem. A hierarchy of esteem occurs when some individuals are required to show deference to (an) other(s). This deference may take various forms, such as referring to others through titles or engaging in gestures like bowing or prostration that show inferiority.

Generally, hierarchies of esteem are not automatically impermissible. One might opt into some. For instance, you might have to call your boss “Mrs. Last-Name,” athletes may have to use the title “coach” rather than a first name, etc. Yet, provided that one freely enters into these relationships, such hierarchies need not be troubling. Further, hierarchies of esteem may be part of some relationships that one does not voluntarily enter but are nonetheless morally justifiable – children, generally, are required to show some level of deference to their parents (provided that the parents are caring, have their child’s best interests in mind, etc.), for instance.

The problem with the monarchy is not that it establishes a hierarchy of esteem, but rather that it establishes a mandatory, unearned hierarchy between otherwise equal citizens.

To live in a country with a monarch is to have an individual person and family deemed your social superiors, a group to whom you are expected to show deference, despite your moral equality. This is not a relationship you choose, but rather, one that is thrust upon you. Further, the deference we are said to owe to, and the higher status of, monarchs is not earned. Rather, it is something that they are claimed to deserve simply by virtue of who their parents are, who in turn owe their elevated status to their lineage. Finally, beyond merely commanding deference, monarchs are born into a life of luxury; they live in castles, they travel the world meeting foreign dignitaries, and their deaths may grind a country to a halt as part of a period of mourning.

So, in sum, monarchies undermine the moral foundation of our democracies. We value democratic regimes (in part) because they recognize our equivalent  moral standing. By picking out some, labeling them as the superiors in a hierarchy of deference due to nothing but their ancestry, monarchies are incompatible with the idea that all people are equal.

However, there are some obvious ways one might try to respond. One could object on economic grounds. There is room to argue that monarchies could potentially produce economic benefits. Royals may serve as a tourist attraction or, if internationally popular, might raise the profile and favorability of the nation, thus increasing the desirability of its products and culture. So perhaps monarchies are justified because they are on the whole beneficial.

The problem with this argument is that it compares the incommensurable. It responds to a moral concern by pointing out economic benefits.

My claim is not that monarchy is bad in every respect. Indeed, we can take it for granted that having a monarchy produces economic benefits. However, my claim is that it undermines the moral justification of democracy.

Without a larger argument, it does not follow that economic benefits are sufficient to outweigh moral concerns. This would be like arguing that we should legalize vote-selling due to its economic benefits – it seems to miss the moral reason why we structure public institutions the ways that we do.

Another objection may be grounded in culture. Perhaps monarchies are woven into the cultural fabric of the societies in which they exist; they are part of proud traditions that extend back hundreds or even thousands of years. To abolish a monarchy would be to erase part of a people’s culture.

While it’s true that monarchies are long traditions in many nations, this argument only gets one so far. A practice being part of a people’s culture does not make it immune to critique. Had the Roman practice of gladiatorial combat to the death for the sake of entertainment survived to this day, we would (hopefully) think it ought to be eliminated, despite thousands of years of cultural history.

When a practice violates our society’s foundational moral principles, it ought to be abolished no matter how attached to it we have become.

Finally, one might argue that abolition is unnecessary. Compared to their status throughout history, monarchies have fallen out of grace in the 20th and 21st centuries. Of the nations with monarchies, few have a monarch which wields anything but symbolic power (although some exceptions are notable). This argument relies on a distinction between what we might call monarchs-as-sovereigns and monarchs-as-figureheads. Monarchs-as-sovereign violate the fundamental tenets of democracy by denying citizens the right to participate in government, while monarchs-as-figureheads, wielding only symbolic power, do not, or so the argument goes.

The issue with this argument is that it underappreciates the full extent of what democracy demands. It does get things right by recognizing that the commitment to democracy arises from the belief that people deserve a say in a government that rules over them. However, it is just not that all citizens deserve some say, but rather, that all citizens deserve an equal say. One person, one vote.

Part of the justification for democracy is that individuals ought to be able to shape their lives, and thus deserve a say in the institutions that affect us all.

Although individuals may vary in their knowledge or other capabilities, to give some greater say in our decision making is to give them disproportionate power to shape the lives of others. No one individual should automatically be someone to whom we all must defer. We might collectively agree to, say, regard someone as an expert in a particular matter relevant to the public good and thus defer to her. However, this only occurs after we collectively agree to it in a process where we all have equal say, either by voting directly for her, or voting for the person who appoints her. Unless we have a parity of power in this process, then we diminish the ability of some to shape their own lives.

On these grounds, perhaps a monarchy could be justified if the citizens of a nation voted the monarch into power. This would simply be another means of collective deferment. But since electorates are constantly changing, there would need to be regular votes on this to ensure the voters still want to defer to this monarch. Yet current monarchies, by elevating the monarch (and family) above others while leaving this outside the realm of collective decision-making, violate the moral justification of democracy – some are made superior by default in the hierarchy of esteem. The establishment of democracy and abolition of all monarchy are proverbial branches that stem from the same tree. Our recognition of human equality should lead us to reject monarchy in even innocuous, purely symbolic forms.

On the Morality of Rewriting History

aerial satellite 3d rendering of Hong Kong separated by water

China is pushing for the use of new textbooks, textbooks which will deny that Hong Kong was ever a British colony. The textbooks, which are in the process of being reviewed for approval by teachers, principles, and others affiliated with Hong Kong Bureau of education, would be implemented as curriculum this fall if approved.

These books contain a new narrative about British occupation of Hong Kong, a narrative that will rewrite the previous story that Hong Kong was “lawfully” occupied as a British colony until 1997. The new narrative maintains that Hong Kong was never a British colony and was instead always a part of China. The New York Times, which reviewed teachers’ editions of the new textbooks, quotes the following excerpt: “The British aggression violated the principles of international law so its occupation of Hong Kong region should not have been recognized as lawful.”

These revisions have been in the making for some time and have been roundly criticized by the Professional Teachers’ Union in Hong Kong as “political censorship.” The Bureau, however, rejoined that the changes will “help students develop positive values.”

This push for a new narrative generates a crucial moment for pro-democracy advocates inside and out of China.

One desired effect of this new narrative is that Hong Kong has never been apart from China, so there is no historical basis on which to claim that Hong Kong should continue to be independently and democratically run.

This isn’t the case, however, and would renege on an historic obligation. As Tiffany May writes for The New York Times, “Under the terms of the 1997 handover negotiated with Britain, China had agreed that the social and economic systems of the territory would remain unchanged for 50 years after resuming sovereignty.” Another desired effect of the narrative is that the future generation will be raised patriotic, loyal to China. Indeed, to enforce such “positive values,” students (potentially as young as kindergarteners) will be taught of a new law that permits authorities to deliver prison sentences to those who oppose Beijing.

There are several issues at stake with the question of whether China (that is, Beijing) should rewrite Hong Kong’s history.

In general, to discuss whether something morally should or ought to happen, there is a first question of whether something is morally permissible. If some action isn’t morally permissible, then we ought not to do it; however, even though an action is morally permissible, it does not follow that we ought to do the action. For example, if we conclude that limiting free speech is morally permissible in a certain circumstance, it doesn’t necessarily follow that we ought to limit free speech in that circumstance. Of course, if something ought to happen, this presupposes and requires that whatever ought to happen is morally permissible.

In asking particularly whether Beijing should re-write Hong Kong’s history, one relevant question is whether there are any permissible limitations of freedom of speech, and if so, whether this case is justified.

Part of the new laws permit severe punishment for criticism of or dissent from Beijing. Some in favor of the new laws and textbooks have argued that freedom comes with certain obligations and responsibilities, such as the primary obligation to one’s country. Those in opposition might argue that, while there are certain obligations to one country, these obligations are not relevant in this case. For the obligation to support one’s country is not exclusive of criticizing its present political/societal/economic structure. In fact, criticism might be a sign of an individual’s loyalty in that the individual may desire to change the present situation for the better. In terms of permissibility, then, a special obligation to a nation does not make it impermissible to critique that nation. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case.

Closely related to the topic of free speech is the question of whether limiting freedom of thought is ever permissible. The issues of freedom of speech and thought certainly overlap: the latter necessarily affects the ability to speak on certain topics, and the former would inevitably affect the ability to think on certain topics. And the revision of textbooks, including the elimination of information and not solely the addition of a perspective, seems to classify at least as a limitation on thought.

As George Orwell’s novel 1984 has instructed us, the revision of history practically inhibits the future generations (and perhaps present generations) from discussing and knowing history. It is unclear whether this is ever permissible, though it clearly is impermissible in the case that it is factually inaccurate. In the case of Beijing denying Hong Kong’s former status as a colony, this certainly seems to be the case. Of course, it is another matter whether it was morally correct for Britain to have occupied Hong Kong.

While I only suggested some provisional answers to the above questions, it is imperative to answer these questions to understand some of the relevant moral landscape in rewriting history.

Crisis in Sweden: A Struggle with Mass Migration

Photograph of buildings in Stockholm, Sweden

In 2015, the year of the Syrian refugee crisis, Sweden accepted over 160,000 refugees, more refugees per capita than any other European nation. The sparsely-populated country prides itself on its generosity towards newcomers, and Sweden’s foreign minister even declared the country to be a “humanitarian superpower.” Years later, Sweden continues to be one of two European nations (the other being Germany) to have opened its borders to such a drastic extent, having accepted approximately three out of every four asylum seekers in 2015. Continue reading “Crisis in Sweden: A Struggle with Mass Migration”

Brexit: Hyperglobalization and the Globalization of Nationalism

“The specter of Brexit is in all of our societies,” cautions Alexander Betts in a TED talk in July. What is “Brexit”? Brexit was a vote held on June 23rd by the peoples of the United Kingdom (UK) to decide whether their country was to stay or leave the European Union (EU): a political and economic union composed of  28 member states. Voters’ main motivation to leave the EU was due to concerns over immigration, more specifically, their concerns over an increasing amount of refugees entering the UK. In the aftermath of Brexit, the election been labeled as a “rejection of globalisation.” What does this mean?

Continue reading “Brexit: Hyperglobalization and the Globalization of Nationalism”