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Wage Theft and the Social Construction of Crime

On June 25th, house members once again introduced the Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act. As the bill’s sponsors point out, “wage theft” — when an employer fails to give an employee a benefit or payment they are legally entitled to — is the largest source of property crime in the US. The bill seeks to increase employer accountability, facilitate recovery of owed money, and increase penalties for employers engaging in wage theft.

However, despite the incredible scale of wage theft and the impact it has on workers, historically, wage theft has been treated as a bureaucratic matter, rather than a criminal one. (And employee underpayment is assuredly sometimes a matter of bureaucratic error.)  Under current law when wage theft is established, the employee is entitled to back pay and sometimes so-called liquidated damages in an amount equal to the back pay. Although, as of June 2025, the US Department of Labor no longer pursues liquidated damages. To be clear, the proposed law still does not criminalize wage theft at the federal level, although it does increase possible damages. Some states have, however, taken steps to criminalize wage theft.

What determines when something is treated as a crime and how serious the consequences should be? One approach is analytic. We begin by considering the social goals at play. Surely one aim is deterrence – in criminalizing intentional wage theft, we expect employers will take further precautions to ensure fewer instances occur. In considering policy, we might also look at other kinds of theft to see how wage theft fits those models. Wage theft certainly deprives workers of property, a key hallmark of theft. Although, conversely, it does not take existing property from employees, but deprives them of owed property. So, from a technical perspective, one could argue it is best understood as breach of contract.

Rarely though is the law decided on such dry analytic grounds — power matters too. Enter the social construction of crime. “Social constructs” have been somewhat maligned over the past few years, entangled in the culture war. But the underlying idea is simple and useful. Social constructs are things whose existence and character are a product of societal agreement. If all humans were to suddenly disappear, mountains would still exist, as would artifacts such as cars. However, the value of money would not. Money then, or at least the value of money, is a social construct.

A social constructivist approach to crime contends that what things we identify as crimes (and what punishments they deserve) are not the result of pure ethical analysis, but the product of a social context and often reflect who has power and influence. In a previous article, I discussed the case of punishment for pollution in the US. Plausibly, the lesser status of “wage theft” reflects the lesser political influence of employees compared to their employers.

But wage theft also demonstrates how labor organizers and activists leveraged the socially constructed nature of crime. While the idea of employers stealing from their employees is hardly novel, the term “wage theft”  is quite new, dating to the early 2000s. It strategically packaged together a number of employment infractions, from unpaid overtime to employee misclassification, and labeled them as theft. By design, it stresses that employers are taking money from their employees, rather than simply violating policy. In short, it created a category of crime.

This fact alone is neither good nor bad. Being a social construct is a descriptive claim about what kind of thing something is. From a philosophical perspective, the crucial question is what are the reasons behind a designation. For example, there may be excellent reasons to consider murder a crime. We may be less impressed with the US Supreme Court’s very narrow reading of corruption. A social constructivist approach helps us attend to the full suite of reasons behind whether something is criminalized and how seriously it is taken.

A social constructivist approach also reminds us that criminality is contested ground and the categories we have arrived at are not inevitable. For example, homosexuality used to be criminalized in the US. Wage theft is a straightforward case. It is not buried deep in our culture and it is easy to understand how the treatment of wage theft is a product of changing social conditions. We can imagine far deeper revisions of the relationship between wage labor and criminality. Many Marxists, for example, would stress that all labor under capitalism is similar to theft because the owner-class takes all additional profits resulting from their employees’ labor and appropriates it for themselves. This is a much more radical claim and pushes harder against our entrenched sense of the appropriate organization of the economy.

In fact, this is a key value for more “radical” philosophy even if we ultimately disagree. We all go through life picking up beliefs here and there, often quite casually. By interrogating our beliefs and confronting alternatives even to core convictions, we can improve the reasoning behind our ethical commitments.

Fortunately, Congress does not have to wrestle with the socially constructed nature of crime nor radical alternatives to wage labor to vote on the proposed wage theft law. The law uses existing non-criminal enforcement processes and simply makes them more robust. It remains to be seen if, unlike 2022, the bill will make it out of committee.

“Cruel Optimism,” Minimum Wage, and the Good Life

photograph looking up at Statue of Liberty

In early May, executives from the fast casual restaurant Chipotle Mexican Grill announced that the company would be raising its average hourly wage to $15 by the end of June. A few weeks later, Chipotle also announced that its menu prices would be increasing by about four percent to help offset those higher wages (as well as the increasing costs of ingredients). This means that instead of paying, say, $8.00 for a burrito, hungry customers will now instead be expected to pay $8.32 for the same amount of food.

While you might think that such a negligible increase would hardly be worth arguing about, opponents of a minimum wage hike jumped on this story as an example of the supposed economic threat posed by changing federal labor policies. During recent debates in Congress, for example, those resistant to the American Rescue Plan’s original provision to raise the federal minimum wage frequently argued that doing so could disadvantage consumers by causing prices to rise. Furthermore, Chipotle’s news exacerbated additional complaints about the potential consequences of the Economic Impact Payments authorized in light of the coronavirus pandemic: allegedly, Chipotle must raise their wages so as to entice “lazy” workers away from $300/week unemployment checks.

Nevertheless, despite the cost of burritos rising by a quarter or two, the majority of folks in the United States (just over six out of ten) support raising the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour. As many as 80% think the wage is too low in general, with more than half of surveyed Republicans (the political party most frequently in opposition to raising the minimum wage) agreeing. Multiple states have already implemented higher local minimum wages.

Why, then, do politicians, pundits, and other people continue to spread the rhetoric that minimum wage increases are unpopular and financially risky for average burrito-eaters?

Here’s where I think a little philosophy might help. Often, we are attracted to things (like burritos) because we recognize that they can satisfy a desire for something we presently lack (such as sustenance); by attaining the object of our desire, we can likewise satisfy our needs. Lauren Berlant, the philosopher and cultural critic who recently died of cancer on June 28th, calls this kind of attraction “optimism” because it is typically what drives us to move through the world beyond our own personal spaces in the hopes that our desires will be fulfilled. But, importantly, optimistic experiences in this sense are not always positive or uplifting. Berlant’s work focuses on cases where the things we desire actively harm us, but that we nevertheless continue to pursue; calling such phenomenon cases of “cruel optimism,” they explain how “optimism is cruel when the object/scene that ignites a sense of possibility actually makes it impossible to attain the expansive transformation for which a person or a people risks striving.” Furthermore, cruel optimism can come about when an attraction does give us one kind of pleasure at the expense of other, more holistic (and fundamental) forms of flourishing.

A key example Berlant gives of “cruel optimism” is the fallacy of the “good life” as something that can be achieved if only one works hard enough; as they explain, “people are trained to think that what they’re doing ought to matter, that they ought to matter, and that if they show up to life in a certain way, they’ll be appreciated for the ways they show up in life, that life will have loyalty to them.” Berlant argues that, as a simple matter of fact, this characterization of “the good life” fails to represent the real world; despite what the American Dream might offer, promises of “upward mobility” or hopes to “lift oneself up by one’s own bootstraps” through hard work and faithfulness have routinely failed to manifest (and are becoming ever more rare).

Nevertheless, emotional (or otherwise affective) appeals to stories about the “good life” can offer a kind of optimistic hope for individuals facing a bleak reality — because this hope is ultimately unattainable, it’s a cruel optimism.

Importantly, Berlant’s schemata is a paradigmatically natural process — there need not be any individual puppetmaster pulling the strings (secretly or blatantly) to motivate people’s commitment to a given case of cruel optimism. However, such a cultural foundation is apt for abuse by unvirtuous agents or movements interested in selfishly profiting off of the unrealistic hopes of others.

We might think of propaganda, then, as a sort of speech act designed to sustain a narrative of cruel optimism. According to Jason Stanley, a key kind of damaging propaganda is “a contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals.” When a social group’s ideals are eroded into hollowness — when stories about “the good life” perpetuate a functionally unattainable hope — then the propagandistic narratives facilitating this erosion (and, by extension, the vehicles of propaganda spreading these narratives) are morally responsible.

The case of Chipotle arises at the center of several overlapping objects of desire: for some, the neoliberal hope of economic self-sufficiency is threatened by governmental regulations on market prices of commodities like wage labor, as well as by federal mechanisms supporting the unemployed — with the minimum wage and pandemic relief measures both (at least seemingly) relating to this story, it is unsurprising that those optimistic about the promise of neoliberalism interpreted Chipotle as a bellwether for greater problems. Furthermore, consumer price increases, however slight, threaten to damage hopes of achieving one’s own prosperity and wealth. The fact that these hopes are ultimately rather unlikely means that they are cases of cruel optimism; the fact that politicians and news outlets are nevertheless perpetuating them (or at least framing the information in a manner that elides broader conversations about wealth inequity and fair pay) means that those stories could count as cases of propaganda.

And, notably, this is especially true when news outlets are simply repeating information from company press releases, rather than inquiring further about their broader context: for example, rather than raising consumer prices, Chipotle could have instead saved hundreds of millions of dollars in recent months by foregoing executive bonuses and stock buybacks. (It is also worth noting that the states that elected to prematurely freeze pandemic-related unemployment funding, ostensibly to provoke workers to re-enter the labor market, have not seen the hoped-for increase in workforce participation — that is to say, present data suggests that something other than $300/week unemployment checks has contributed to unemployment rates.)

So, in short, plenty of consumers are bound to cruel optimisms about “the good life,” so plenty of executives or other elites can leverage this hope for their own selfish ends. The recent outcry over a burrito restaurant is just one form of how these strings are pulled.

To Tip or Not to Tip: D.C.’s Ballot Initiative 77

Photograph of a clear glass jar with dollars in it

As debates about immigration stirred up controversy in the capital, D.C. held its primary elections last Tuesday, with citizens casting their vote for mayor, city council, representatives in Congress, and most controversially, Ballot Initiative 77. Though news from the capital usually takes the form of Congress’ latest political battle, Initiative 77 made national headlines due to the intense debate that it caused amongst D.C. residents. The initiative asked voters whether or not the pre-tipped minimum wage should be raised from $3.33 to $15 per hour by 2026. On Tuesday June 19th, it passed, winning 55% of the vote and signaling division among D.C. residents. What lies at the heart of this disagreement amongst D.C. residents? Is tipping consistent to American values or a way of reinforcing race and class divisions? And is the “Save Our Tips” campaign truly representative of the tipped workforce? Continue reading “To Tip or Not to Tip: D.C.’s Ballot Initiative 77”