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A Challenge to Federalism: Mask Mandates and Subsidiarity

photograph of Florida road map

In this post I want to investigate a puzzle about federalism, and in particular a puzzle for those committed to subsidiarity.

Federalism is a political system in which power is divided between more and less local governments. The United States has a federal system, decisions are made by local governments, state governments, and the federal government. Not only are decisions made by these various bodies, but different bodies are empowered to make different decisions.

Sometimes you will hear people claim they want a greater degree of federalism, and what that usually means is that they want more decisions to be made by individual states, and fewer decisions to be made by the federal government. Thus, the conservative lawyer and journalist David French published a book last year arguing that an increase in federalism is necessary to handle political polarization. French thinks that, given that California is far more liberal than Tennessee, it makes more sense to have California and Tennessee each develop their own healthcare systems, rather than have one federal healthcare system.

Now, the puzzle I want to investigate can be asked in those general terms, but the puzzle will be clearer if we look at a more specific form of federalism.

Subsidiarity is an approach to political philosophy which says that decisions should be made by the most local body capable of making the decision. Everyone in my household can decide what book to read on a Saturday afternoon, so it should be up to each person what to read. I should not decide what my wife should read, nor should she decide what I read. If we want to take a family vacation, however, then we can’t just each decide where we want to go. If we each decide, then she might go to the mountains while I go to the beach, with the result that we don’t take a family vacation at all. Where to vacation, then, must be made at the family level. We, as a family, cannot set up a sewer system, and so the county should be in charge of deciding how to distribute water and electricity. Our county cannot administrate an intrastate road system, and so intrastate roads should be handled by the state. The state of Florida cannot coordinate for national defense, and so national defense should be handled by the federal government.

Why might one support a principle of subsidiarity? Well there are lots of reasons. First, you might think that more local control allows decision makers to be more responsive to local conditions and preferences. Thus, many oppose federal minimum wage legislation on the grounds that it is better to allow individual states to decide the minimum wage that is best for them. Most people will agree that the minimum wage in Switzerland should be different from the minimum wage in Bangladesh, but if different economic conditions across countries mean we want a different minimum wage, why would the same not be true between individual U.S. states?

Second, you might support subsidiarity on the grounds that it provides laboratories of experimentation. If each state tries their own healthcare system, then we are more likely to discover which system actually works best.

Third, and I think most plausibly, you might support subsidiarity on grounds of democracy and freedom. The more local an election, the more influence an individual can exercise. If I have more say over local decision-making, then it seems more democratically legitimate for a local body to make decisions on how I can live. Not only that, but because the United States is heterogeneous, with people often clumped with others of similar political persuasion, the more we devolve decisions to local control, the more people will be governed by the sort of policies they would choose themselves. If most people in California want state-funded healthcare while most people in Arkansas do not, then a federalist system where each state can adopt their own healthcare system helps ensure that most people are governed by the system that reflects their particular political preferences.

So what is the puzzle? The puzzle is raised by policies where a less local government bans a more local government from restricting even more local decision-making. The example that started me thinking about this came from my home state of Florida. Governor DeSantis recently signed a bill to end all local COVID-19 restrictions and emergency orders. In doing so, Florida has joined other Republicancontrolled states in passing laws that prohibit local authorities from instituting more restrictive COVID precautions.

As someone who generally supports subsidiarity, how should I think about these policies?

We could make a federalist or subsidiarity argument both for and against these state policies. The argument against these policies is easy: subsidiarity says that we should generally defer to more local decision-making. A state coming in and saying that a local town cannot have their own mask mandates overrides that local control. Counties and cities should be free to make their own decisions, as such, it is inappropriate for the state to ban cities from passing mask mandates.

However, you could also make an argument for the other side. You might say that it should be up to individuals whether or not they wear a mask. Individuals and families should be free to make their own decisions. As such, it is inappropriate for local authorities to maintain mask mandates at this point in the pandemic, and as such it is right for the state to step in in order to protect individuals from the overreach of local governments.

To help understand the conflict, imagine we iterated this puzzle at a higher level. Just as Florida passed a law banning cities from requiring masks, suppose the U.S. Federal Government passed a law banning states from prohibiting mask mandates. You could say this is bad for federalist reasons, the federal government should leave it up to the states. But you could also say this is good for federalist reasons, this ensures that states don’t overstep and violate the freedoms of local authorities.

This puzzle of subsidiarity is actually just a particular example of a puzzle that crops up in lots of places. Consider, for instance, this puzzle raised by Marcia Baron:

“An administrator once told me about the following dispute. A speaker had been invited to campus. The point of his lecture would be to oppose free speech. Some of the faculty objected strenuously to having him to campus and favored ‘uninviting’ him. Free speech is a great value, and they did not want to see it undermined by this or any other speaker. Others defended the plan to bring him to campus – and they did so in the name of free speech.

How could both parties appeal to free speech – and only free speech — in defense of their respective views? Those who opposed the speaker’s visit saw free speech as a goal, a goal which would not be advanced and might well be hindered by a speaker who spoke against it. Those who supported the speaker’s visit saw free speech as a matter of principle, imposing a side-constraint on our conduct. In the view of the former, what is desired is that free speech flourish, and to that end it might occasionally be necessary to squelch (what would otherwise be) free speech. In the view of the latter (those who supported the speaker’s visit), free speech is a value not in the sense of a goal to be promoted, but a value never to be violated. It would be a violation of free speech to prevent a speaker from speaking on the ground that his or her views were considered noxious, outrageous, or dangerous. That allowing the speaker to speak might undermine the cause of free speech by winning over some impressionable college students to the speaker’s side is irrelevant, in the supporters’ view. Those who opposed the speaker’s campus visit viewed free speech as a goal to be promoted or advanced. Those who opposed the attempt to uninvite the speaker saw free speech as a matter of principle: as constituting a side-constraint on our conduct. Side-constraints work this way: they tell us that no matter how worthwhile the goal, there are things which we may not do even if they are crucial for that goal.”

This is, I think, the same sort of puzzle. Can we restrict speech to maintain more freedom of speech? Can states force decisions on local governments, to stop them forcing decisions on others? And if Marcia Baron is right, the question we need to answer is does subsidiarity work like a side-constraint, or like a goal to be promoted? If it is a goal to be promoted, then these state policies might make sense. If it is instead supposed to act as a side-constraint these policies are problematic. How does one decide?

I don’t think there is any easy answer. Even if you look at one particular reason for accepting subsidiarity it can be tough to decide. Suppose you think that more local bodies are better able to make decisions for themselves. One the one hand, that might support allowing local governments to decide what is best for their specific conditions. But on the other hand, that might support letting each person decide for themselves whether or not they want to continue masking. And there is something to both these thoughts. Ideally, those who are vaccinated can mostly go without masks and those unvaccinated should continue wearing masks. So, ideally, people could make the best decision for themselves.

But then again, sometimes people make bad decisions and impose risks on others, and you might think that local authorities are in the best position to know how high the general risk is in a given local community.

In this particular context I’m inclined to think that local authorities should be empowered to make emergency decisions. I think the principle of subsidiarity means that states should not dictate what local governments can do.

But on the other hand, sometimes I support overarching restrictions. For instance, the Constitution is federal law that prevents states from imposing a religion on their citizens. I think the choice of religion should be up to individuals, and as such it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to impose on states a prohibition on compelling religious practice.

The puzzle persists, then, and there are no easy answers.

The Ethics of a Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax

photograph of traffic gridlock for multiple blocks

“It’s just an excuse to take more money from us.” As Canada has implemented a carbon tax, this is the commonly voiced complaint. This kind of skepticism appears to be grounded in the belief that a) climate change either is not real or not a threat and that b) a tax is an inappropriate reaction to the situation. When first confronted with the idea of a revenue-neutral carbon tax people’s response is often one of puzzlement. However, after explanation, skeptics often become receptive. But is a revenue-neutral tax ethically better than one that is not revenue-neutral? 

A revenue-neutral tax is a tax that does not increase the revenue for the operating expenses of the government. All of the money collected through taxation is distributed back to people, usually in the form of rebates directly to taxpayers or through reductions in income taxes. The government’s net revenue does not increase, hence the tax is revenue-neutral. Those who favor such taxes like the idea that the size of government does not increase. It also answers the skeptic from earlier; it isn’t just an excuse for a tax because it does not contribute to the government’s net revenue. 

If every taxpayer receives a rebate of the same amount, then those who use the least carbon get to keep the largest amount of money. Those who use the most carbon either save the least or have to pay more. Thus, the economy as a whole is incentivized to use less carbon and to invest in products and technologies that are better for the environment. Ethically, a tax like this seems prudent; it helps address climate change and it does so in a way that it can address the concerns of tax skeptics. 

On the other hand, a revenue-neutral tax potentially overlooks important ethical concerns. For example, climate change is likely going to lead to infrastructure and public health problems. Philosopher Simon Caney has described some of the ethical duties in adapting to climate change. These include spending money on building sea-walls to protect people in coastal areas, subsidizing people to move from threatened coastal settlements, and spending money to inoculate people from infectious diseases that will become a greater danger due to climate change. Often, these kinds of expenses fall on governments to fund. 

British Columbia was the first jurisdiction in North America to implement a revenue-neutral carbon tax. One of the legal requirements of the tax initially was that carbon tax revenue be offset through income tax reductions. 

As one can imagine it is difficult to raise those taxes again after they have been cut. Thus, as costs relating to climate change begin to fall on governments those governments may find it more difficult to raise additional revenue to pay for additional expenses because of a revenue-neutral tax.

Further, the effects of climate change are going to be most felt by future generations. Climate change will be expensive as well as economically disruptive. This means that those most affected by the costs of climate change will be worse off when it comes to managing the effects. A non revenue-neutral tax would allow governments to provide additional funding and investments for future generations and thus better fulfill ethical duties of adaptation to climate change. Indeed British Columbia recently opted to change their revenue-neutral policy so that those tax funds can be devoted towards energy retrofits and public infrastructure in order to support climate adaptation.

Often carbon taxes are considered justifiable according to what is called the polluter pays principle. According to Mizan R. Kan this principle has a long standing and widespread rationale. It holds that those who cause damage through pollution should pay for it. While not universal, many interpretations of the principle hold that the polluter should not only pay for engaging in pollution, but also to compensate for that damage. This would mean that there are duties of funding adaptations to climate change. 

A revenue-neutral carbon tax does require polluters to pay for their pollution but it does not require them to compensate for the damage that their pollution costs. Thus, the polluter pays principle may better justify a non revenue-neutral carbon tax over one that is revenue neutral. If we interpret this principle not only as an economic principle but as an ethical one, then a non revenue-neutral tax that uses funds for adaptation would seem to be more ethically justified then a revenue-neutral one.

Of course, a carbon tax is not the only way to meet ethical duties of preventing and adapting to climate change, and a non revenue-neutral tax may be a harder sell to the public and to politicians. Conservatives can support a revenue-neutral tax because it does not increase the size of government and proposing the alternative may increase political gridlock, making it more likely that nothing will be done at all. This is why the choice between a revenue-neutral and a non revenue-neutral tax presents an ethical dilemma. 

A non revenue-neutral carbon tax offers the opportunity to use funds to meet ethical duties both to prevent climate change and to fund adaptations to climate change. This can not only help us today but it can satisfy duties that we may have to future generations. Thus, as a single policy it better satisfies our ethical duties. However, it may be more difficult to get bi-partisan support to pass such a tax given skeptical attitudes and cynicism regarding efforts to tackle climate change. If no tax is passed at all and no other policy proposal (such as a cap-and-trade scheme) is enacted then even fewer ethical duties are met. Thus, because a revenue-neutral tax may be more practical in that it has the best chance of being enacted, it may be the most ethical option. 

Perhaps the best solution is to ensure that the public is better informed about the differences and merits of both kinds of taxes so that a more rational and fact-based conversation can be had. For the public to best articulate its needs and determine which is the most effective option, it will likely require an open and honest discussion about what the needs of local communities are and will be, and what will allow the public to see a carbon tax as a legitimate option for addressing climate change.